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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON TECHNOLOGY, PRODUCTIVITY AND MISALLOCATION
Tanida Arayavechkit
Jeremy Greenwood
There is a growing consensus that aggregate productivity is the most important factor
in determining income per capita and living standards. The deep causes of productivity are
technology and resource misallocation, which are the outcomes of firms’ decision making.
Thus, a solid understanding of a firm-level mechanism is central to economic development.
This dissertation consists of three chapters, each of which studies firms’ decision making
under different economic environments.
Chapter 1 studies firms’ technology and production choices in the context of information
frictions and financial frictions. Empirical evidence suggests a positive role of financial
development in firms’ technology adoption and the speed of technology diffusion. The
chapter examines the role of information acquisition and financial development in explaining
how technology differences may arise and persist during the technology adoption process.
This, in turn, affects a country’s total factor productivity (TFP) level and the speed of TFP
convergence. The quantitative study is applied to the Chilean manufacturing sector during
the period of 1986-2007.
Chapter 2 studies firms’ technology and production choices in the context of trade
liberalization. Empirical evidence shows that, in a low-income country, trade liberaliza-
tion triggers within-industry changes in firms’ skill intensity and productivity, as well as
between-industry labor reallocation. The chapter examines the role of comparative advan-
tage and trade cost reduction in determining aggregate productivity and the demand for
skills through firm-level adjustment. The quantitative study is applied to the impact of
Indonesia’s trade reform in 1995 on the Indonesian manufacturing sector.
iv
Chapter 3 studies firms’ rent-seeking behavior and production choices when tax benefits
are tied to capital holding. Evidence shows that the dominant issue of corporate lobbying
in the U.S. is taxation. Firms that lobby are granted tax benefits and enjoy systematically
lower effective tax rates than non politically active firms. Thus, corporate lobbying distorts
the allocation of capital in the economy. The chapter explores the macroeconomic effects
of capital-based tax benefits and their interaction with endogenous corporate lobbying be-
havior. The quantitative study is applied to the U.S. firm-level data during the period of
1998-2011.
v
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Chapter 1
Technology Choice, Learning Dynamics and
Financial Development
Abstract
Why are firms in some countries slower to adopt new technology than firms in other
countries? Why do firms in different countries eventually end up with different levels of
technology? This chapter studies the role of information acquisition and financial develop-
ment in explaining how technology differences may arise and persist during the technology
adoption process. This, in turn, affects a country’s total factor productivity (TFP) level
and the speed of TFP convergence. Empirical evidence suggests a positive role of finan-
cial development in firms’ technology adoption and the speed of technology diffusion. A
general equilibrium dynamic model is developed to study this relationship. In the model,
the process of technology adoption involves learning and financing a higher-level technol-
ogy project. Financial development affects the cost of information acquisition, which either
delays the learning process or causes it to cease prematurely. Firms then operate with sub-
optimal levels of technology and production. As a result, poor financial development can
cause persistent TFP differences between two countries even if both have the same talent
and have access to the same technology ladder. Applying the model to Chilean manufac-
turing firms, the quantitative analysis shows that an improvement in financial development
to a fully efficient level not only increases a country’s TFP by 25% but also doubles the
speed of TFP convergence.
1
1.1 Introduction
Why are firms in some countries slower to adopt new technology than firms in other
countries? Why do firms in different countries eventually end up with different levels of
technology? Technology, defined broadly as production techniques and knowledge relevant
to production, is an important determinant of cross-country variation in total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP). For a developing country, technology adoption presents an opportunity to
close the TFP gaps between it and more advanced economies. Understanding why there are
significant differences in technology adoption across countries is thus essential for explaining
this observed variation in TFP. The process of technology adoption is known to involve both
learning about a new technology and financing its adoption. This paper studies the role of
information acquisition and financial development, both theoretically and quantitatively, in
explaining how technology differences may arise and persist during the technology adoption
process. This, in turn, affects a country’s TFP level and the speed of convergence to a more
advanced level of development.
Cross-country data suggest that it is TFP rather than capital accumulation that de-
termines the income per capita differences across countries. [Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare
(1997); Prescott (1998); Blundell et al. (1999)]. Two sources of variation in TFP are em-
phasized in the literature. Parente and Prescott (1994) argue that differences in TFP across
firms and countries can generally be explained by barriers to the usage intensity of tech-
nologies that embody a higher level of productivity than do older technologies.1 Hsieh and
Klenow (2009), later on, propose that greater misallocation of resources across firms can
have important negative effects on aggregate TFP. Following strong evidence supporting
the role of financial development in economic development, documented by King and Levine
(1993), there is an extensive literature proposing the framework to study the link between
TFP and a country’s level of financial development. However, this literature focuses on the
impact of financial development through the resource misallocation and capital accumula-
1Others are Easterly and Levine (2003), Hall and Jones (1999) and Prescott(1998).
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tion channel [Amarel and Quintin (2010); Buera et al. (2011); Greenwood et al. (2010,
2013)]. This paper, by looking at another channel, hypothesizes that variation in TFP is
driven by differences in technology adoption, which, in turn, are affected by different levels
of financial development. The hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence documented
in this paper.
Technology adoption presents an opportunity for developing countries below the tech-
nological frontier to close the income gap. Keller (2004) finds that foreign sources of tech-
nology account for over 90% of TFP growth for most developing countries. There are two
potential factors that determine the technology adoption process: the unknown nature of
new technology and the economic environment. Uncertainty is caused by the firm’s lack
of prior production history and relevant data about production in a local context. This
idea is emphasized by the role of learning in the technology adoption process in the work
of Parente (1994) and Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996). The economic environment includes
human capital, financial development, and business environment, which determine the abil-
ity to absorb and adapt international knowledge and technology. In this paper, evidence
is found to support the positive role of financial development in firms’ technology adoption
and the speed of technology diffusion. Three data sets are used. First, data in the World
Bank Enterprise Surveys is employed to show that firms are less likely to adopt foreign
technology if the individual cost of financing is high, or if they operate in a country with
poor financial development. Second, the speed of the technology adoption process is studied
using the Historical Cross-Country Technological Adoption data set. This provides a long
historical time series of technology-use intensity. Technology diffusion is faster in countries
with better financial development. Last, panel data from Chilean manufacturing industries
is used to keep track of firms’ technology adoption over time. Firms tend to continue using
foreign technology if their productivity increased in the previous year. One can think of
this as part of a learning and experimenting process using new technology.
To address the impact that financial development has on TFP through the technology
3
adoption channel, a dynamic model of firm technology adoption and competitive financial
intermediaries is developed. Heterogeneous firms climb up a technology ladder to catch up
with the world technological frontier. They decide whether to move to a higher technology
level and how much to invest in capital. Funding is obtained from financial intermediaries.
Without long-term experience with higher-level technology, how talented a firm is at using
the technology is initially unknown. Financial intermediaries produce information. They
evaluate firms and offer a firm-specific debt contract. There are two methods of loan eval-
uations. An ex ante evaluation is performed using the available loan evaluation technology
before an intermediary lends out for the first time. After each production period, an ex
post evaluation is performed. An intermediary re-evaluates a firm based on its performance
and adjusts the debt contract accordingly. In the event of default after each production,
financial intermediaries can recover a fraction of output.
Based on these ingredients, both firms and financial intermediaries are Bayesian learners
in the context of an information problem. They have some beliefs about how talented the
firm is in using higher-level technology. Firms learn and update their beliefs about their
talent type by observing their success with a higher-level technology. Therefore, firms make
technology adoption decisions by considering both operating profits and learning benefits.
Financial intermediaries observe the outcomes of previous loans and update their beliefs
given the information available about individual firms and the market as a whole. Financial
development is characterized by two indicators: the quality of pre-lending evaluation and
the recovery rate on defaulted loans.
The framework provides a link between financial development and firms’ technology
adoption. Learning and information accumulation provide a way to overcome the infor-
mation problem arising in the technology adoption process. Analytical results show that
financial development can either impede or facilitate learning through two channels. First,
firm-specific borrowing costs and credit access are tied to loan recovery rates. A low recovery
rate not only limits adopting firms to starting with a small production size, but also prevents
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firms that believe they are low in talent from experimenting with new technology, as these
credit constraints increase the information gathering costs. Second, inaccurate pre-lending
evaluation precludes potential firms that either receive a bad evaluation or experience a
sequence of bad outcomes from adopting higher-level technology. Furthermore, if firms’ ca-
pabilities in using higher-level technology are positively correlated with their abilities to use
their current technology, firms will need time to accumulate information about their cur-
rent technology before moving forward, thus delaying the choice of higher-level technology.
Because poor financial development either delays the learning process or causes it to cease
prematurely, firms operate with sub-optimal levels of technology production. Therefore,
even if two countries have the same talent and have access to the same technology ladder,
poor financial development can cause TFP differences to arise and persist.
In order to quantify the effect of financial development on a country’s TFP level and
speed of convergence, the model is calibrated to the Chilean Annual Manufacturing Survey.
The model posits a steady state, in which 50% of potential firms operate at a sub-optimal
technology level and cannot move up the technology ladder. The results show that an
improvement in financial development to a fully efficient level increases a country’s TFP by
25%. Some transitional dynamics are then undertaken to explore the dynamics of Chilean
manufacturing TFP in response to access to the world technology frontier. The resulting
path for TFP matches the Chilean TFP index time series relatively well. The path shows
a gradual increase in the manufacturing TFP before it levels off. Finally, the speed of TFP
convergence is doubled when there is efficient finance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents empirical findings on technology
adoption and financial development to support the hypothesis that variation in TFP is
driven by differences in technology adoption, which in turn are affected by different levels
of financial development. Then, Section 1.3 gives an overview of the model. Section 1.4
sets up the analytical model with two technology choices and provides analytical results.
Section 1.5 proposes the full model where firms have to move up the technology ladder in
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order to get closer to the world technological frontier. The quantitative analysis, including
the stationary equilibrium and transition dynamics, is performed in Section 1.6. Concluding
remarks are then offered in Section 1.7. Appendix A.1 provides details about the data sets
used in this paper. Appendix A.2 provides the proofs for all lemmas and propositions from
Section 1.4.
1.2 Empirical Evidence
This section documents a positive impact of financial development on technology adop-
tion. First, cross-country firm-level data show a positive relationship between financial
development and firms’ decisions on foreign technology adoption. In particular, firms in
countries with high levels of financial development, and facing a low cost of financing, tend
to adopt foreign technology. Second, cross-country aggregate-level data suggest that finan-
cial development and the speed of technology adoption are positively correlated. A country
with better financial development experiences a faster rate of technology diffusion and a
higher level of TFP.
1.2.1 Firms’ Technology Adoption Decisions and Financial Development
The World Bank Enterprise Surveys 2, a firm-level data set collected by the World
Bank, is employed to study the relationship between firms’ technology adoption decisions
and financial development. In the survey, firms report whether they use foreign technology.
This will be used as a proxy for the firm’s technology adoption decision. To get an idea of
how this decision is related to the level of financial development, Figure (2) plots a fraction
of firms reporting that they employ foreign technology in their production process with two
measures of financial development: domestic credit to the private sector and the interest-
rate spread. Both measures are taken from the World Development Indicators, averaged
2See Appendix A.1 for all data definitions.
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over the years 2002-2005. Domestic credit to the private sector as a share of GDP reflects
how easily a firm has access to credit. With common usage in the literature on finance
and growth, the higher ratio of private credit to GDP indicates a higher level of financial
development. The interest rate spread is the difference between the interest rate charged by
banks on loans to private sector customers and the interest rate paid by banks for demand,
time, or saving deposits. It reflects the cost of intermediation. A narrow interest rate
spread, therefore, implies a higher level of financial development. Figure (1) shows that the
higher the level of financial development, the higher the fraction of firms adopting advanced
foreign technology. In other words, firms in a country with a lower cost of financing and
better access to finance are more likely to adopt advanced technology.
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Figure 1: Technology Adoption: Firm-Level Data
To formalize the above results, the following logit model is estimated by pooling all
firms in the selected sample together:
Adoptjkc = β0 + βfin × FDjc + βj × Firmj + βk × Industryk + βc × Countryc + ²jkc
where j indexes firms, k indexes industries and c indexes countries. Adoptjkc is a dummy
variable that takes value 1 if the firm employs foreign technology in its production process
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and 0 otherwise. FDjc corresponds to a measure of financial development which will be
measured using four indicators: (1) loan recovery rate, (2) interest rate spread, (3) credit
depth information index, and (4) firm-specific interest rate.3 The first three indicators are a
country’s level of financial development, while the last indicator is a firm-specific financing
barrier. Firmj is a matrix of firm characteristics including size, human capital, foreign
ownership and foreign activity. Industryk are industry dummies. Countryc is a matrix
including GDP per capita, regulation environment, and country dummies.4
The estimated coefficients reported in Table (1) confirm that financial development
plays an important role in determining the firm’s adoption choice. Higher loan recovery
rates reflect a lower expected cost imposed on creditors when insolvency might occur. The
positive coefficient on this term indicates that firms in the country with higher recovery
rates are more likely to adopt foreign technology. Similarly, the negative coefficient on
interest rate spreads indicates that firms in the country with lower spreads tend to adopt
foreign technology. Spreads, which reflect a combination of credit risk exposure and costs of
intermediation, are the relative cost of financing a project. A credit depth information index,
which is a proxy for the quality of loan evaluation, has a positive coefficient. Countries with
high quality and accessible credit information usually have higher firm adoption rates. These
countries also have high TFP and a low percentage of non-performing loans to gross loans.
At the firm level, self-reported financing obstacles and high interest rates impede firms from
adopting foreign technology. In addition, the likelihood of adopting foreign technology is
positively related to size, human capital, foreign activity and foreign ownership.
1.2.2 Technology Usage Lags, TFP and Financial Development
The role of financial development is related not only to the technology adoption decision,
but also to the speed of technology adoption. This role is suggested by the Historical Cross-
3These 4 measures will be directly related to financial development features of our model.
4See Appendix A.1 for specific details about the regression variables and observations.
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Table 1: Determinants of Advanced Technology Adoption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Recovery rate 0.029∗∗ - - -
(0.015) - - -
Interest rate spread - −0.075∗∗ - -
- (0.041) - -
Credit depth of information index - - 0.120∗∗ -
- - (0.065) -
Firm-specific interest rate - - - −0.086∗∗
- - - (0.035)
Workers 0.640∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.112)
Skilled 0.252∗∗ 0.253∗∗ 0.252∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.162)
Foreign owned 1.545∗∗∗ 1.544∗∗∗ 1.544∗∗∗ 1.128∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.198)
Importer 0.697∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.128)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country controls† Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.10
Number of observations 6,333 6,333 6,333 2,633
1 ∗significant at 10%, ∗∗significant at 5%, ∗∗∗significant at 1%
2 †Country controls include GDP per capita, regulation environment, and country dummies.
Country Technological Adoption data set (HCCTA) which provides historical time series of
technology usage across countries.5 Following Comin et al. (2008), the focus is on cross-
country technology usage lags: how many years ago the technologies were used in the U.S.
with the same intensity as they are used in the countries in the samples. The examples
here consider two technologies used in an agricultural sector and a manufacturing sector:
fertilizer usage and electric arc furnace steel production technology. Table (2) summarizes
technologies, sets of years and sample sizes for this analysis.
Consider the scatterplots presented for a sample of countries in Figure (2). The left
panel of each subfigure displays how higher levels of productivity are connected with shorter
technology usage lags. Productivity of the agricultural sector and the manufacturing sector
5Comin and Hobijn (2004). See Appendix A.1 for calculation details.
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Table 2: Summary of the Date for Technology Usage Lags
Technology Year Invention year #Obs
Period of average TFP year
credit to GDP ratio
Fertilizer 1990 1850 49 1970-1990 1990
Electric Arc Furnaces
1985 1900 41 1970-1985 1985
(Steel Production)
are proxied by the country’s TFP and the value added in the agricultural sector, respectively.
On the left panel in Figure (2), observe that higher levels of financial development are also
linked with shorter technology usage lags. Financial development is measured by private
credit to GDP ratios. Based on data availability, the measure of financial development is
the average private credit to GDP ratios from 1970 to the selected year. This link happens
when better financial development implies better access to credit.
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Figure 2: Technology Usage Lags of Two Technologies
Countries with better financial development exhibit higher speeds of technology diffu-
sion. This result holds even if GDP and per-capita income are controlled for. In particular,
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for fertilizer usages:
Lagsfertilizer = 56.48
(14.37)
− 0.08
(0.04)
DomCredit− 0.63
(0.61)
ln(GDP )−0.0003
(0.0001)
PerCapita, R2 = 0.50
and for Electric arc furnaces technology in steel production:
LagsSteel = 203.79
(45.08)
− 0.21
(0.11)
DomCredit − 5.27
(1.86)
ln(GDP )− 0.001
(0.0002)
PerCapita, R2 = 0.61.
In sum, a country with a less developed financial system has a smaller fraction of firms
adopting foreign technology and a slower technology adoption rate. This country, at the
aggregate level, has lower TFP and is slower to catch up with the world technology frontier.
The next section proposes a mechanism though which financial development plays a role in
a firm’s technology adoption process.
1.3 Model
A dynamic model with heterogeneous firms facing technology adoption choices is pro-
posed. Time is discrete and indexed by t = 1, 2, 3, .... The analysis focuses on two types
of agents: firms and financial intermediaries. Firms produce output in the economy. They
face technology adoption choices in their production process. Productivity of new technol-
ogy is unknown and risky. Firms might not be talented enough in adopting and adapting
new technology to a local context. Without long-term experience with new technology, a
firm’s talent is unknown. Production requires working capital, which is funded by financial
intermediaries. Financial intermediaries evaluate firms and offer a firm-specific debt con-
tract. There are two types of loan evaluations. An ex ante evaluation is performed using
the available loan evaluation technology before an intermediary lends out for the first time.
After each production, an ex post evaluation is performed. An intermediary re-evaluates
a firm based on its performance and adjusts the debt contract accordingly. In the event
of default after each production, financial intermediaries can recover a fraction of output.
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The structure of a debt contract will depend on the estimated default probability and the
recovery rate.
Because information about a firm’s talent is unknown, agents in the economy hold some
beliefs. A firm and a financial intermediary accumulate information to update their beliefs
in a Bayesian fashion. In particular, new information is acquired when a firm decides to
operate with new technology. A firm uses the realized profit to update its belief about its
talent. An intermediary uses the realized profit to re-evaluate a firm and update its belief
on a firm’s default probability. The technology adoption process is then characterized by
the processes of learning-by-doing and learning-by-lending.
Next, the analytical model with two technology choices will be set up. A firm’s tech-
nology adoption decision is whether or not to adopt a high-level technology. This helps
explain the key mechanism and derive the analytical results. After that, the full model,
where a technology adoption decision lies along the technology ladder, is presented. A firm’s
technology adoption decision is whether to adopt a higher-level technology and move up
the technology ladder.
1.4 Analytical Model: Two Technology Choices
For analytical purposes, this section proposes a dynamic model with heterogeneous
firms facing only two choices of technology in their production process. In each period,
firms choose to operate using either new technology or old technology.
1.4.1 Firms and Technology
There exists a continuum of heterogeneous risk-neutral firms of measure 1 indexed by
j ∈ [0, 1]. The discount factor for firms is denoted by β. Given a productivity z, a firm
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produces output, o, with the following production function.
o = zkα , 0 < α < 1. (1.1)
Note that there are diminishing returns to scale in production. A firm finances its input
using working capital, k, provided by the financial intermediary.
The productivity z ∈ {zo, zn}, depending on the technology that a firm chooses. There
are two kinds of production technology available for each firm: old technology and new
technology. In each period, firms choose to operate using either new technology or old
technology. Productivity of both technologies is firm-specific. Old technology is an existing
technology, with which firms have been operating for a certain period of time. They then
have complete knowledge about their productivity, implying the productivity is determin-
istic. Each firm j possesses the productivity of old technology zo, which is drawn from
the distribution Φ(zo) on the support [zo, zo]. Assume that every agent in the economy
possesses information about existing technology, either from experience or from historical
data which are publicly available.
Firms that operate using new technology can either be a high talent type h or a low
type l. This captures how talented firms are in adopting new technology. Specifically, there
is a setup period denoted by t = 0 that nature assigns each firm j of the type τ j ∈ {h, l},
which is unobservable. In this analytical section, assume fraction μ of firms are high-type
firms. This is, however, the common knowledge of every agent. In addition, firms are
subject to idiosyncratic risks. For high-type firms, the productivity of new technology zn is
drawn from the distribution Ψh(zn). For low-type firms, it is drawn from the distribution
Ψl(zn). Both distributions are defined on the same support [zn, zn]. High-type firms are,
on average, more productive, implying EΨh(zn) ≥ EΨl(zn). Lastly, assume that investing
in new technology requires the minimum investment size ϕ.6
6Technology adoption usually requires an initial fixed cost. This will prevent firms from investing even a
very small amount in new technology to acquire information.
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Although information about firm types is incomplete, firms have a prior belief about
their type. At the beginning of each period t, the firm has a belief that it is of type h with
probability λft . After each period of production, the firm acquires new information only if
it chooses to operate with new technology. The firm observes its realized productivity zn
and updates its belief using Bayes’ rule. In this setting, firms hold heterogeneous beliefs
but learn and act in isolation.
1.4.2 Financial Intermediaries and Loan Evaluation
Financial intermediaries are risk neutral and operate in a competitive market. They can
borrow in the international credit market at some fixed rate r. An intermediary evaluates
a firm’s default probability and makes one-period loans to a firm. For regulatory reasons,
assume a financial intermediary can only hold debt claims. In the event of default after
each production, financial intermediaries can recover a ξ fraction of output. As mentioned
before, there are two methods of loan evaluations: an ex ante and an ex post evaluation.
The level of financial development is manifest in the recovery rate and the accuracy of an
ex ante loan evaluation.
Suppose the firm j borrows to operate a risky project using new technology. There is
a probability that it will be insolvent and default. A debt contract specifies loan size, k,
and the interest rate i, which reflect the firm’s default probability. The estimated default
probability varies across types. Because the firm’s type is unknown, the structure of a debt
contract offered to the firm will depend on the intermediary’s belief about the firm’s type.
Denote λbt the belief of an intermediary that the firm is of type h at the beginning of each
period t. If the firm with productivity zo borrows to finance an old technology project
and a new technology project, the sets of debt contracts offered by an intermediary will be
denoted by Do(zo, λbt) and Dn(zo, λbt), respectively.
Consider the pre-lending period t = 0. Let ρj be common knowledge in the economy
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that firm j is a high type. With the assumptions that fraction μ of firms are type h
and that all firms are equally likely to be type h, ρj = μ for all j. When firm j starts
borrowing from an intermediary, without any loan evaluation, the most accurate belief that
the intermediary can hold about firm j being a high type is merely the probability ρj .
However, the intermediary evaluates the firm ex ante before lending out for the first time.
An initial belief of the intermediary that the firm is of type h, λb,j0 , is set using the available
loan evaluation technology. This technology can refer to a default probability model based
on firms’ characteristics or financial statistics. To be consistent with the Bayesian feature of
the model, the evaluation technology is represented by the intermediary getting the signal
about the firm’s type. Specifically, the signal υj is drawn once firm j starts borrowing from
a financial intermediary, where υj can be either h or l. Conditional on the true type of the
firm, the signal is drawn from the distribution
υj | τ j
 = τ
j with probability θ
6= τ j with probability 1 − θ
(1.2)
where θ ∈ [0.5, 1]. The quality of loan evaluation is determined by the parameter θ, which
measures the accuracy of the signal. At one end, the signal is uninformative when θ = 0.5.
At the other end, the signal perfectly reveals the firm’s type when θ = 1.7 After receiving
the signal, the financial intermediary forms an initial belief using Bayes’ rule:
λb,j0 (ρ
j , υj = h) =
θρj
θρj + (1− θ)(1− ρj) (1.3)
λb,j0 (ρ
j , υj = l) =
(1− θ)ρj
(1− θ)ρj + θ(1− ρj) . (1.4)
The updating rule shows that an initial belief depends on the quality of the evaluation
7As in most developing countries, financial intermediaries play a crucial role in evaluating potential
borrowers. The assumption that financial intermediaries perform the evaluation task is valid for several
reasons. First, financial intermediaries can use the available loan evaluation technology at a lower cost. In
other words, they can be more efficient in evaluating firms than other agents, such as firms, consulting firms
or accounting firms. This is a result of specialization and economies of scale. Second, debt contracts offered
by an intermediary are usually based on an intermediary’s own evaluation. Firms are less credible when
claiming that their project will be successful.
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technology θ8, the signal υ and the uninformative prior ρj . For simplicity of the analysis,
assume that the initial belief of firm j is adjusted to that of the intermediary.9
For period t ≥ 1, if the firm has operated its business using new technology, the inter-
mediary observes the productivity realizations of zn after production. It then evaluates ex
post to revise its belief about the firm’s type by Bayesian updating. This posterior belief is
used to re-estimate the firm’s default probability, which then determines the interest rate
offered to that particular firm in the future. Lastly, assume that there are publicly available
historical data and perfect information sharing among financial intermediaries, so every
agent shares a common belief.10
1.4.3 Firms’ Production Choices
A firm starts period t with old technology productivity zo and belief λt that it is a highly
productive firm in operating new technology. After deciding on the technology choice, the
firm chooses how much to invest. This is a static maximization problem. For simplicity,
the subscript t will be omitted.
Let Do(zo, λ) and Dn(zo, λ) be the sets of possible debt contracts offered by an interme-
diary if the firm borrows to finance an old technology project and a new technology project,
respectively. The firm will default on its debts if the production is so unprofitable that a
firm is not able to pay back the loan. The problem is trivial if the firm chooses old technol-
ogy, as zo is known at the time of borrowing. Denote πo(zo, k, i) = max{zokα− (1+ i)k, 0}.
Given Do(zo, λ), the firm maximization problem is
max
(k,i)∈Do(zo,λ)
πo(zo, k, i) (1.5)
8 ∂E[λb,j0 |τj=h]
∂θ
> 0,
∂E[λb,j0 |τj=`]
∂θ
< 0.
9Even though the firm has its own belief, the results from the analysis still hold as long as the intermediary
offers debt contracts based on its own evaluation.
10An alternative assumption is that the firm signed a contract, so it engages in a long-term lending
relationship with the intermediary.
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If the firm chooses to operate using risky new technology, it will choose a debt contract
to maximize the expected profit. Let πn(zn, k, i) = max{znkα − (1 + i)k, 0} be the firm’s
profit after the productivity zn is realized. With probability λ, zn is drawn from the
distribution Ψh(zn) and with probability 1 − λ, zn is drawn from the distribution Ψl(zn).
Given Dn(zo, λ), the firm maximization problem is
max
(k,i)∈Dn(zo,λ),k≥ϕ
{
λ
∫
πn(zn, k, i)dΨh(zn) + (1− λ)
∫
πn(zn, k, i)dΨl(zn)
}
(1.6)
1.4.4 Debt Contracts
Firms which operate using old technology never default in this model. As productivity
is predetermined when the firm makes the production decision, it is suboptimal for firms
to choose b such that they make negative profit. Thus, the set of debt contracts for these
firms is trivial:
Do(zo, λ) = {(k, i) : k ∈ R++ and i = r} . (1.7)
Firms which operate using new technology, on the contrary, may not be able to repay
the loan if the realization of zn is low. Given loan size k and the interest rate i, denote
zn∗(k, i) = (1+i)kkα , which is a default threshold. This is a cutoff value of z
n that firms will
default if zn ≤ zn∗(k, i). For the firm that is believed to be a high type with probability λ,
the estimated default probability p(k, i, λ) is given by
p(k, i, λ) = λΨh(zn∗(k, i)) + (1− λ)Ψl(zn∗(k, i)). (1.8)
As the market for financial intermediaries is competitive, financial intermediaries take the
interest rate i as given. Suppose the firm is believed to be a high type with probability λ
and wants to borrow k. Taking i as given, the financial intermediary’s profit from a debt
17
contract is
π˜(k, λ; i) = [1− p(k, i, λ)](1 + i)k + p(k, i, λ)ξE [znkα | zn < zn∗(k, i)]− k(1 + r) (1.9)
where p(k, i, λ) is an estimated default probability from equation (1.8) and ξ is a fraction
of output that an intermediary can recover from an insolvent firm. Financial intermediaries
will participate in selling only those contracts that make non-negative profits in expectation.
The competitive market assumption implies that a financial intermediary breaks even in
expected value with every debt contract:
π˜(k, λ; i) = 0. (1.10)
For a firm that is believed with probability λ to be a high type, a set of debt contracts that
allows a financial intermediary to break even in expected value can be characterized by
Dn(zo, λ) =
{
(k, i)
∣∣∣∣1 + r = (1 + i)(1−Ψλ ( (1+i)kkα ))+ ξkα−1 ∫ (1+i)kkα0 zndΨλ(zn)} (1.11)
where Ψλ represents the distribution λΨh(∙) + (1 − λ)Ψl(∙). For the rest of this paper,
ψλ will be the associated density function λψh(∙) + (1 − λ)ψl(∙). A financial intermediary
equalizes the cost and the expected revenue of each debt contract. The interest rate offered
is determined by a firm’s default risk and loan recovery rate. Particularly, a loan risk
premium is high if a firm is likely to default and a financial intermediary expects to recover
a small fraction of defaulted loans.
Assumption 1. The distribution Ψ is such that Ψh(∙) and Ψl(∙) satisfy the monotone like-
lihood ratio property (MLRP), which implies that Ψh(∙) first order stochastically dominates
Ψl(∙) on the support [zn, zn].
Assumption 1 states that, ceteris paribus, high-type firms always have lower a prob-
ability of default.11 From (1.11), the structure of debt contracts is determined by both
11This MLRP is a sufficient condition for monotonicity results. In some cases, only the first order stochastic
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the firm-specific default probability and the country-specific recovery rate. The former is
directly determined by the belief λ. The interest rate can then be expressed as a function
i = I(k, λ). Proposition 1 characterizes debt contracts in terms of an interest rate schedule
and loan availability in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (Debt Contracts).
(i) (Interest rate schedule) The equilibrium interest rate i is increasing in the size of the
loan k and decreasing in the recovery rate ξ, given the belief λ.
(ii) (Interest rate schedule) The equilibrium interest rate i is decreasing in the belief λ and
the recovery rate ξ, given the size of the loan k.
(iii) (Loan availability) Given the belief λ, there exists a maximum loan size kˉ(λ) such that,
for all k > kˉ(λ), there does not exist an interest rate i such that the financial inter-
mediary’s break-even condition is satisfied. The maximum loan size kˉ(λ) is increasing
in the belief λ and the recovery rate ξ.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.1.
For a particular firm, the firm is more likely to default if it borrows a larger amount of
loan. Thus, the larger the loan size the firm wants to borrow, the higher the interest rate
that the firm will be charged. Now, compare two different firms. If λi > λj , the estimated
default probability of a λi-type firm will be lower than that of a λj-type firm. As a result,
Dn(zo, λi) offers the same set of k ∈ R++ at a lower interest rate compared to Dn(zo, λj).
If it is the case that an intermediary charges an infinite interest rate to a λ-type firm that
wants to borrow k, this will be interpreted as the intermediary not issuing any debt contract
with loan size k to that firm. In other words, the firm has no credit access. Proposition
1 also implies that, if a loan of size k is not approved for the λi-type firm, it will not be
dominance property is necessary to obtain the monotonicity results.
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offered to the λj-type firm either. In this sense, the set of contracts Dn(zo, λj) is said to be
weakly dominated by the set of contracts Dn(zo, λi).
Turn now to the recovery rate ξ. With higher recovery rates, financial intermediaries can
recoup a larger fraction of a loan through reorganization, liquidation or debt enforcement
proceedings in the event of insolvency. This implies a lower expected cost of debt contracts
and, hence, a lower interest rate that intermediaries charge to firms. The impact of ξ varies
across λ and default probabilities. That is, low recovery rates tend to have a larger impact
on firms with low λ and high default probability. Proposition 1, therefore, gives an idea of
how an inaccurate evaluation and a low recovery rate can create a sub-optimal technology
level as well as resource misallocation. This is because some high-type firms may face high
financing costs and some high-type firms may not even have credit access.
1.4.5 Firms’ Technology Adoption
A firm starts period t with old technology productivity zo and belief λt that it is
a highly productive firm in operating new technology. The firm then makes a choice of
technology. The optimal technology choice not only includes a flow profit component, but
also an experimentation component reflecting the value of acquiring new information. This
is then a dynamic decision problem. If the firm decides to use old technology, it faces a static
maximization problem of choosing the production level, as shown in (1.5). The firm then
receives a deterministic return but adds no new information to its information set. If the
firm decides to use new technology, it faces a static maximization problem of choosing the
production level, as shown in (1.6). After zn is realized, the firm has an option to default.
The realized return is a noisy signal of the firm’s type. The posterior belief is obtained
using Bayes’ rule. This reflects how the firm learns about its actual type over time.
The problem is a Belief Markov Decision Process. Bayesian updating rules suggest
that a belief about firm type depends on a previous belief, a firm’s technology choice, and a
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realization of zn. Therefore, the firm’s technology choice problem can be written recursively
with belief λ as a state variable:
V (zo, λ) = max
e∈{0,1}
(1− e)W o(zo, λ) + eW n(zo, λ) (1.12)
where the options are two types of technology:
W o(zo, λ) = max
(k,i)∈Do(zo,λ)
πo(zo, k, i) + βV (zo, λ) (1.13)
Wn(zo, λ) = max
(k,i)∈Dn(zo,λ),k≥ϕ
∫
πn(zn, k, i) + βV (zo, Λ(λ, 1, zn)dΨλ(zn) (1.14)
subject to the following belief updating function
λ′ = Λ(λ, e, zn) =

λψh(zn)
λψh(zn)+(1−λ)ψl(zn) , if e = 1,
λ, if e = 0.
(1.15)
Given the belief updating rule (1.15), the resulting optimal recursive policy functions are
two production choice policy functions: Kn(zo, λ), Ko(zo, λ), and a technology choice policy
function: E(zo, λ). For simplicity of notation, denote the maximized flow profit of (1.13)
and (1.14) as πo∗(zo, λ) and Eπn∗(zo, λ), respectively.
Lemma 1 (Profit Functions and Value Functions).
(i) πo∗(zo, λ) and Eπn∗(zo, λ) are bounded and nondecreasing in λ.
(ii) There exists a unique solution to the Bellman equation (1.12).
(iii) V (zo, λ) is nondecreasing in λ.
(iv) Supposing Eπn∗(zo, λ) is convex in λ, then V (zo, λ) is convex in λ.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.2.
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Flow profits from using old technology do not depend on beliefs. When using new
technology, firms with a good prospect of being high type enjoy higher expected profits and
can experiment at a lower cost. The weak monotonicity is obtained for profit functions
and preserved in the value functions. This will be crucial for deriving the threshold rule
of technology adoption. The assumption that the new technology profit function is convex
in beliefs is a natural property for information measures. The expected profit is relatively
high for firms whose belief is close to 1 compared to firms whose belief is uninformative. As
in a standard Bayesian learning model, the convexity is preserved in the value functions.
Proposition 2 (Technology Adoption).
(i) There exists a cutoff λ(zo) such that all firms with beliefs λ > λ(zo) and productivity
zo choose to adopt new technology.
(ii) The cutoff λ(zo) is increasing in zo.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.2.
A firm decides to experiment on new technology as long as its belief is greater than
the cutoff level. The firm expects a higher profit from new technology. Moreover, it can
experiment at a lower cost because debt contracts are more favorable with larger loan
amounts at lower interest rates. Because a deterministic profit from old technology is
the opportunity cost of experimenting with new technology, the cutoff also depends on
productivity zo. Firms are less likely to use new technology if the profit from using old
technology is already high. Nevertheless, in this dynamic problem, firms make a technology
choice based on two values: the value from flow profit and the value from information
acquisition. Thus, it may appear that some firms are willing to receive lower flow profit
to experiment with new technology and acquire new information. In fact, if acquiring new
information is highly valuable, the only reason that firms refrain from experimenting with
new technology is the high cost of using new technology, determined by the structure of
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debt contracts.
1.4.6 The Impact of Financial Development
How does a country’s level of financial development affect technology adoption by firms?
As mentioned before, the level of financial development in this setting is proxied by two
indicators: the recovery rate ξ and the accuracy of loan evaluation θ. Proposition 2 suggests
that the level of financial development can affect technology adoption through two main
channels. First, it affects the equilibrium cutoff level. Second, by fixing the cutoff, the level
of financial development determines how likely it is that beliefs will fall below this threshold.
Consider the set of firms, I, defined by
I = {(λ, zo) | λ < λ(zo)} (1.16)
Firms which lie in this inactive set will stop experimenting with new technology and operate
using old technology. Suppose that firms are distributed over beliefs and productivity in
accordance with the distribution function Γ(zo, λ). Then the measure of firms in an inactive
set I is
γo =
∫
zo
∫ λ(zo)
0
dΓ(zo, λ) (1.17)
Proposition 3 (Inactive Set). The cutoff λ(zo) is decreasing in the recovery rate ξ. For
any distribution of firm’s belief and productivity (λ, zo), a measure of firms in an inactive
set I is decreasing in ξ.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.3.
Apply Proposition 3 to an initial joint distribution of (λ0, zo). There will be more firms
that start experimenting with new technology if an intermediary can recover a larger fraction
of output in the event of default. This gives firms more chances to learn their true type. In
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other words, a low recovery rate leads to higher financing costs and less credit access. As a
result, many firms are precluded from acquiring new information. A low recovery rate not
only limits adopting firms to starting with a small production size, but also prevents firms
that believe they are low in talent from experimenting with new technology, because these
credit constraints increase the information gathering costs.
We turn now to how the level of financial development affects the final technology de-
cision. The analysis is extended to consider the limiting distribution of (λ, zo). Note that
this limiting distribution is an invariant distribution of beliefs. It is, however, possible that
the economy achieves an invariant distribution of technology choices even though the dis-
tribution of beliefs is still evolving over time. In the limit, all firms stop experimenting and
choose the more productive technology given their information sets.
Lemma 2 (Martingale Properties).
(i) Unconditional on the true types, {λt}∞t=1 is a martingale.
(ii) For any given policy functions Ko(zo, λ), Kn(zo, λ) and E(zo, λ), {λt}∞t=1 form a
bounded non-negative supermartingale if the true type is l and a bounded non-negative
submartingale if the true type is h.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.4.
Because the result of belief convergence holds for every firm, this holds for the economy,
given an initial belief distribution of (zo, λ0) and sequences of zn realization [{znt }∞t=1(j)]j∈[0,1].
Theoretically, the economy weakly converges to the equilibrium with invariant distribution
of (zo, λ) where λ represents the beliefs of the absorbing states, λ = 1 or λ < λ(zo).12
12The measure of sequences {znt }∞t=1 which lead to λ → 1 is, however, zero. As a result, the belief
converges almost surely to λ ≤ λ(zo) and no firm adopts new technology. This problem is solved once the
full model with exogenous exit is introduced. With exogenous exit, the stationary distribution consists of
firms operating with new technology.
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Proposition 4 (Sorting). For almost all sequences of zn realization {znt }∞t=1 for each firm
j,
(i) (All low type firms are weeded out) If the true type is `, firm j’s belief converges almost
surely as t →∞ to λ ≤ λ(zo).
(ii) (Not all high-type firms rise to the top.) If the true type is h, firm j’s belief converges
almost surely as t →∞ to the absorbing states, λ = 1 or λ ≤ λ(zo).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.4.
The problem will not be interesting if the technology features are such that all firms
should adopt new technology or no firm should adopt new technology. Therefore, the
interesting case is the intermediate case where it is optimal for some high-type firms to
adopt new technology. These firms will be referred to as potential firms. Proposition 4
implies that the optimal adoption rules do not almost surely reveal the truth. Apparently,
all low-type firms, whose optimal policy is to operate using old technology, will finally
fall into the inactive set even though their beliefs do not converge to zero. However, not
all potential firms will end up using new technology. This is either due to an inaccurate
initial prior or a sequence of bad shocks. If the initial prior is highly inaccurate, such that
potential firms cannot even start experimenting with new technology, they end up operating
with sub-optimal technology. Even though the offered set of debt contracts allows potential
firms to go through the learning process, the sequence of bad shocks, together with the
inaccurate initial prior, can drive the belief below the cutoff. This causes the firms to stop
experimenting and to choose not to adopt new technology.
The fraction of potential firms experimenting and eventually adopting new technology
is then directly linked to the accuracy of ex ante loan evaluation θ and the recovery rate
ξ. Clearly, ξ determines the equilibrium cutoff level, while θ determines the accuracy of
initial beliefs and how likely it is that beliefs will fall below the cutoff level. Therefore,
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given the same fraction of high-type firms in the economy, the lack of development in the
financial sector would result in more high-type firms falling in an inactive region. From this
point, TFP differences can arise and persist even if two economies have the same talent
and have access to the same technology. The low level of financial development hinders
and prematurely halts the learning process, resulting in firms operating with a sub-optimal
technology level and a sub-optimal production level.
1.5 Full Model: Technology Ladder and Technological Fron-
tier
During the early and medium stages of economic development, catching up to the world
technological frontier is the main channel that developing countries can gain in terms of
productivity and growth. The adoption of existing technologies seems to be a viable channel
compared to the riskier and costlier innovation channel. In this section, a model of choosing
between two technologies is incorporated in an environment where firms have to move up
the technology ladder in order to get closer to the world technological frontier. With the
technology ladder setting, the effect of financial development on both the timing of adoption
and the final technology choice can be explored. Moreover, this effect will be amplified. If a
firm is precluded from adopting a low-level technology, it is precluded from all higher-level
technology. The delay in adopting a low-level technology will also delay the adoption of all
higher-level technology.
1.5.1 Environment
The technology ladder is indexed by step s = 0, 1, 2, ..., S. Step s = 0 refers to old
technology, implying that old technology is S steps behind the technological frontier. For
step s ≥ 1, firms can either be high type, h, or low type, l, at each step. At step s, the
productivity of high-type firms is drawn from the distribution Ψhs (z
n), while the productivity
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of low-type firms is drawn from the distribution Ψls(z
n). Both distributions are defined on
the same support [zn, zn]. Assume that high-type firms are, on average, more productive
EΨhs (z
n) ≥ EΨls(zn). Average productivity of high-type firms is increasing when firms move
up the technology ladder, EΨhS (z
n) ≥ EΨhS−1(z
n)... ≥ EΨh1 (z
n).
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 1, 2, 3, .... Each period, new firms enter at step
s = 0. A new firm possesses old technology productivity zo, which is drawn from the
distribution Φ(zo) on the support [zo, zo]. Nature also assigns the firm’s type at each step
τ js ∈ {h, l} for s = 1, ..., S. This is unobservable. The firm can move up the ladder one step
at a time. After each production, it exits the economy with probability δ. Once deciding
to step down, the firm has to operate using old technology from that period onward until
it exogenously exits. Denote this as s = 0.
Suppose a firm enters a period t at some step s on the technology ladder from the
previous period. The firm has a belief λs that it is high type in its skill at using step-s
technology. The firm chooses the technology level and decides how much to invest. It has
three technology options. First, it can return to old technology and operate using this
technology forever until it exogenously exits. In this case, the firm can borrow from a
set of debt contracts Do(zo). Second, the firm can continue using the current technology.
If the firm decides to do so, it can borrow from an intermediary who will offer a set of
debt contracts Dns (zo, λs). After the productivity zn is realized, the ex post evaluation is
performed. If the firm survives, it enters the next period with the same step s and the
updated belief λ′s. The last option is to move up to the next step s + 1. Because the firm
has never before operated at this technology step, there will be an initial belief that the
firm is of type h, with probability λ0,s+1. The firm can then borrow from an intermediary
who will offer a set of debt contracts Dns+1(zo, λ0,s+1). As in the analytical model, this is
obtained by the ex ante evaluation. Figure (3) illustrates how firms climb up the technology
ladder.
For generality, let the average probability that firms are type h at step s+1 vary across
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Figure 3: Climbing Technology Ladder
firms, denoted by ρjs+1.
13 This is a common knowledge. After receiving the pre-lending
signal, a financial intermediary forms an initial belief using Bayes’ rule:
λj0,s+1(ρ
j
s+1, υ
j
s+1 = h) =
θρjs+1
θρjs+1 + (1− θ)(1− ρjs+1)
(1.18)
λj0,s+1(ρ
j
s+1, υ
j
s+1 = l) =
(1− θ)ρjs+1
(1− θ)ρjs+1 + θ(1− ρjs+1)
(1.19)
These two equations are analogous to equations (1.18) and (1.19) from the analytical model.
1.5.2 Decision Problems
As in the analytical model, financial intermediaries operate in a competitive market
and offer a set of debt contracts such that they break even in expected value with every
13Firms’ capabilities in using higher-level technology might be positively correlated with their abilities to
use the current technology. That is, firms are more likely to be type h at s + 1 if they are type h at s. In
the quantitative analysis, this will be designated.
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contract. Given a set of debt contracts Dos(zo) and Dns (zo, λs), the firm’s profit maximization
problem is analogous to (1.5) and (1.6). Denote πo∗(zo, λ) the maximized flow profit from
old technology and Eπns ∗(zo, λ) the maximized flow profit from step-s technology.
We turn now to the technology choice problem. This dynamic problem can be written
in a recursive form as in the analytical model. If the firm enters a period with s = 0, it has
no option but to use old technology. The value function depends only on old technology
productivity:
V0(zo) =
πo∗(zo)
1− (1− δ)β . (1.20)
Next, for all steps 1 ≤ s ≤ S − 1, the value function can be expressed as a function of state
variables, including old technology productivity zo, a technology step s, a belief λs, and
a pre-lending signal υs+1. The firm can switch back to old technology, continue with its
current technology, or move up to higher-level technology. The firm maximizes the expected
present value of discounted profit with discount factor β. The technology choice problem
can be expressed as
V (zo, s, λs, υs+1) = max
{
V0(zo),Wc(zo, s, λs, υs+1),Wu(zo, s + 1, λs, υs+1)
}
(1.21)
where
Wc(zo, s, λs, υs+1) = Eπns
∗(zo, λs) + (1− δ)β
∫
V (zo, s, Λ(λs, 1, zn), υs+1)dΨλss (z
n) (1.22)
Wu(zo, s+1, λs, υs+1) =
 Eπ
n∗
s+1(z
o, λ0,s+1(ρs+1, υs+1))+
(1− δ)β
∫
Eυ [V (zo, s + 1, Λ(λ0,s+1, 1, zn), υs+2)] dΨ
λ0,s+1
s+1 (z
n)

(1.23)
and the belief updating function
Λs(λ, 1, zn) =
λψhs (z
n)
λψhs (zn) + (1− λ)ψls(zn)
; s = 1, ..., S. (1.24)
If the firm decides to switch back to old technology, it will stay with old technology
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forever until it exogenously exits. If it chooses to continue, its profit will be stochastic and
the continuation value will depend on the updated evaluation after the productivity zn is
realized. If the firm chooses to experiment with higher-level technology, an intermediary
will perform the pre-lending evaluation. An initial belief determines the structure of debt
contracts. The profit is stochastic depending on the firm’s type at step s + 1. The continu-
ation value depends on the updated evaluation after the productivity zn is realized, as well
on as a pre-lending signal for step s + 2.
Lastly, if the firm enters a period with s = S, it has no option to move up. The firm
can either continue with its frontier technology or switch back to old technology. The value
of the firm is given by
VS(zo, λS) = max
{
V0(zo),EπnS
∗(zo, λS) + (1− δ)β
∫
VS(zo, ΛS(λS , 1, zn))dΨ
λS
S (z
n)
}
(1.25)
where the belief updating function is (1.24).
1.5.3 Stationary Equilibrium
In the technology ladder setting, the goal is to understand how the level of financial
development affects the distribution of firms along the ladder. A definition for a stationary
equilibrium is introduced below. This will prove useful in comparing the manufacturing
TFP across countries in the quantitative analysis.
Definition 1. Given the exogenous risk-free rate r, a stationary equilibrium consists of
technology choice and production policy functions; value functions of firms; a belief updating
function; debt contracts offered by financial intermediaries; and probability measure Γ0(z0),
Γ0≤s<S(zo, λ, υ; ~τs) and ΓS(λ, zo; ~τS) such that
1. The interest rate schedule is determined in competitive fashion, reflecting the firm’s
default probability.
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2. Technology choice and production policy functions are optimal decision rules for the
firms’ decision problems.
3. The belief updating function satisfies Bayes’ rule.
4. Probability measures Γ0, Γs<S and ΓS are stationary. They evolve according to the
equilibrium mapping given the firm’s technology choice policy functions and the belief
updating functions.
1.6 Quantitative Analysis
This section evaluates quantitatively how the level of financial development shapes the
patterns and the timing of firms’ technology adoption as well as firms’ production decisions.
This, in turn, determines the country’s level and speed of TFP convergence. To simulate
the model, values must be assigned to its parameters. This will be done by calibrating
the technology ladder model presented in Section 1.5 to match the stylized facts from the
Chilean Annual Manufacturing Survey (ENIA).14 Two analyses are performed. First, the
stationary equilibrium analysis explores a stationary distribution of firms along the ladder.
The level of TFP in Chile, relative to that in the U.S., is computed to quantify the effect
of financial development on the TFP gap. Second, the transitional dynamics analysis is
performed to see the impact of financial development on the speed of TFP convergence in
Chile.
Although the main reason that the model is matched to Chilean data is the availabil-
ity of technology adoption data, Chile, as one of the successful fast-growing developing
countries, can be an interesting case study. Crespi (2006) addresses several features of the
Chilean economy that make the study of long-run trends of growth more compelling. One
is that the micro-economic regime has remained the same for the last 25 years, resulting in
a context of stability in the incentive system.
14See Appendix A.1.
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1.6.1 Dynamics of Technology Adoption: Evidence on Learning
Before proceeding to the quantitative analysis, the presence of foreign technology adop-
tion dynamics is explored. Using Chilean Annual Manufacturing Survey (ENIA) data over
the period 1995-2007, expenditures on licenses and foreign technical assistance of each firm
are tracked over time. Figure (4) shows that there is a coincidence between a firm’s pro-
ductivity and how much it has spent on foreign technology in the past three years.
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Figure 4: ln(TFP ) of Increased Spending and Decreased Spending Firms
Firms that spent some amount of money on foreign technical assistance and licensing are
categorized into two types: increased spending and decreased spending. Increased spending is
a firm which has increased its foreign technology spending in the past three years. Decreased
spending is a firm which has decreased its foreign technology spending in the past three
years. The ln(TFP) of increased spending firms is, on average, higher than that of decreased
spending firms. The difference in mean log TFP between these two groups is statistically
different from zero at the 1% significance level. The result is robust to the analysis with two
sub-samples: a high-technology industry and a low-technology industry.15 The conjecture is
that increased spending firms behave like the high-type firms in the model, while decreased
15Industry types are classified by ISIC REV.2 where the high-technology industry includes ISIC: 35, 38.
All other industries are categorized into the low-technology industry.
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spending firms behave like low-type firms.
Table 3: Dynamics of Technology Adoption
Dependent Variable (1{FTAt > 0}) (1) (2) (3) (4)
TFPt−1 0.074 0.073∗∗∗ - -
(0.049) (0.015)
TFPt−1 × 1{FTAt−1 > 0} 0.173∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ - -
(0.011) (0.006)
ΔTFPt−1 - - 0.042 0.031
(0.054) (0.025)
ΔTFPt−1 × 1{FTAt−1 > 0} - - 0.155∗∗ 0.104∗∗
(0.091) (0.055)
Firm-level controls
√ √ √ √
Year dummies
√ √ √ √
Model Logit, FE Probit, RE Logit, FE Probit, RE
Number of observations 9,493 53,214 7,314 43,035
1 ∗significant at 10%,∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
2 FE: Fixed effects model, RE: Random effects model
The spending on foreign technical assistance and licensing has the advantage of having a
panel structure that can be used to control for unobserved firm and industry characteristics.
Therefore, a binary panel regression is performed to see whether a firm’s decision to continue
using foreign technology depends on its successful experience with the technology. The
dependent variable is a binary measure of foreign technology adoption, taking value 1 if
the spending on foreign technical assistance and licensing is positive. The focus is on
an interaction between productivity (or changes in productivity) and foreign technology
adoption in the previous period. High productivity, or an increase in productivity, are
interpreted as successful experiences when firms adopt foreign technology. Year dummies
and firm-level characteristics are included as controls; these include the number of workers,
capital per worker, skill intensity and foreign ownership. Estimation results are reported
in Table (3) where panel (1) and (3) report the fixed-effect logit model and panel (2) and
(4) report the random-effect probit model. The positive coefficient on the interaction terms
suggests that, if firms spend money on foreign technology and their productivity turns out
to be high, firms are more likely to continue spending money on foreign technology.
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Because the results are also robust to changes in productivity, firms tend to continue
with foreign technology if their productivity has improved. Evidence shows that firms tend
to change their foreign technology decisions after observing the productivity gain from using
the technology. One can think of this as part of a learning and experimenting process with
foreign technology.
1.6.2 Fitting the Model to Chilean Data
Both stationary equilibrium and transitional dynamics analyses will use a common set
of parameter values, which are calibrated in this section. Values are assigned to the model’s
parameters so that the stationary equilibrium is matched with the Chilean economy in 2007.
The length of a period is one year. Some standard parameters are assigned the conventional
values. The real interest rate r is 3%, to match the Chilean real interest rate in 2007. The
discount factor is set so that β = 0.98, implying around this 3% return. The decreasing
returns to scale parameter is set to 0.85 as in Cole et al. (2012). The exogenous exit rate δ
is the average yearly exit rate in the Chilean manufacturing sector, which is 9%, taken from
Fernandes and Paunov (2012). The minimum working capital for operating new technology,
ϕ, is set such that the ratio of the minimum input to the maximum input of firms adopting
new technology is 0.003, as observed in the Chilean data.
The next step is to parameterize the technology ladder. The logarithm of old technology
productivity is assumed to be a truncated and discretized version of a normal distribution
with mean μo and variance σ2zo . The logarithm of new technology productivity z
n is a
truncated normal distribution with mean μs if a firm is high type at step s and variance
σ2zn . If a firm is low type, productivity has the same variance with mean μl.
16 There are
six steps on the technology ladder. The mean productivity of high-type firms is described
16Note that the log-normal distribution of zn with μs > μl only satisfies the first order stochas-
tic dominance property but not the MLRP. However,
∫
Vt(z
o, Λ(λ, 1, zn))dΨλ(zn) can be rewritten as∫
Vt(z
o, Λ(λ, 1, ε))dΦ(ε), where Λ(λ, 1, ε) =
[
1 + 1−λ
λ
exp
{
− 1
2
(
Δμs
σzn
Δμs+2ε
σzn
)}]−1
, Φ is the cumulative stan-
dard normal distribution and Δμs = μs − μl. It can easily be shown that Ut(Λ(λ, 1, zn)) is increasing in λ
and the proof of monotonicity can then follow.
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as in Cole et al. (2012) by
μs = ln(μˉ0 + μˉ1s + μˉ2s2 + μˉ3s3) for s = 0, 1, ..., 5.
The underlying type on each step of the technology ladder τ js ∈ {l, h} is chosen to allow
firm types to be correlated across steps. In particular, firms are more likely to be type h at
step s + 1 if they are type h at step s. This is a very plausible assumption. Firms which
are talented at using technology are more likely than untalented firms to be talented at
using a higher-level technology. Let ρs be the probability that the firm is type h at step s.
Assume that Pr(τ1 = h | zo) = ρ1(zo) = κ0Φ( ln zo−μ0σo ), so that ρ1(zo) is increasing in zo.
Pr(τs+1 = h | τs = h) = κs > 0 and Pr(τs+1 = h | τs = l) = 0, implying ρs+1(λs) = κsλs.
Recall that ρs is common knowledge in the economy. An initial belief at each step λ0,s+1 is
set using ex ante evaluation technology introduced in (1.18) and (1.19). The parameter κs
governing the conditional probability of being type h follows
κs =
[
1 + (κˉ0 + κˉ1s + κˉ2s2 + κˉ3s3)2
]−1 for s = 0, 1, ..., 4.
Lastly, the parameters governing the country’s level of financial development are the accu-
racy of pre-lending evaluation θ and the loan recovery rate ξ.
Table 4: Parameter Values
Value Description Source
Predetermined Parameters
α 0.85 Return to Scale Cole et al. (2012)
β 0.98 Discount factor 3% return
δ 0.09 Exit rate Fernandes and Paunov (2012)
r 0.03 Real Interest Rate Real interest rate 2007
Calibrated Parameters
μl -0.29 Low type productivity
σzn 0.89 New technology productivity std
σzo 0.33 Old technology productivity std
θ 0.55 Accuracy of pre-lending evaluation
ξ 0.21 Loan recovery rate
μˉ0, μˉ1, μˉ2, μˉ3 (3.25, 2.8, 0.003, -0.04) Technology ladder parameters
κˉ0, κˉ1, κˉ2, κˉ3 (0.3, 1.02, -0.34, 0.028) High-type probability parameters
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Table 5: Targeted Moments
Targeted moments Data Model
(2007) (stationary distribution)
Share of
...each sales 50th,75th, 90th percentile: New technology (0.10, 0.33, 0.62) (0.07, 0.33, 0.63)
...each sales 50th,75th, 90th percentile: Old technology (0.05, 0.16, 0.40) (0.04, 0.16, 0.41)
Ratio of mean sales 0.30 0.29
Ratio of mean input 0.29 0.31
Default rate (Ratio of firms with negative profit) 0.15 0.13
Recovery rate as a fraction of loans 0.20 0.20
Cumulative distribution of sales by age (5, 9, 13 years) (0.19, 0.36, 0.49) (0.16, 0.35, 0.49)
The parameters {μˉ0, μˉ1, μˉ2, μˉ3, κˉ0, κˉ1, κˉ2, κˉ3, μl, σzo , σzn , θ, ξ} are calibrated to match
the following target moments: (i) the share of sales at the 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile for
firms using new technology; (ii) the share of sales at the 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile for
firms using old technology; (iii) the default rate; (iv) the ratio of mean sales of non-adopting
firms to mean sales of adopting firms; (v) the ratio of mean input of non-adopting firms
to mean input of adopting firms; (vi) the Chilean recovery rate as a fraction of loans; and
(vii) the cumulative distribution of sales by age – 5, 9 and 13 years. Table (4) reports the
parameter values and Table (5) reports the target moments. The technology ladder is the
heart of the analysis.
Figure (5) then illustrates the calibrated features of the technology ladder. The left
panel shows that the mean productivity of high-type firms increases when firms move up
the ladder. The middle panel displays the conditional probability ρ1(zo) as an increasing
function of zo. The probability of becoming high type at step s + 1 conditional on being
high type at step s is illustrated in the right panel.
1.6.3 Stationary Equilibrium Analysis
The stationary equilibrium analysis is done by simulating an economy consisting of
50,000 firms with entry and exit until the distribution becomes stationary. The stationary
distribution of firms along the ladder suggests how the lack of development in the financial
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Figure 5: Calibrated Features of the Technology Ladder
sector precludes firms from reaching their optimal technology levels. This can be seen from
Figure (6), which plots the distribution of firms along the ladder steps for the benchmark
case along with the full-information case. The benchmark distribution on the left panel is
obtained when all parameters are assigned the calibration values. The right panel displays
the distribution when the type of each firm in the economy is common knowledge. This is
analogous to setting θ = 1.
Recall that the potential firm refers to the firm that would adopt higher-level technology
if it knew its true type, given the same debt schedule that it currently faces. Compared to the
full-information distribution, all potential firms at step 5 are precluded from adopting their
optimal technology level in the benchmark case. Most firms are precluded from adopting
low-level technology, especially at step 1 technology, bringing the chance to adopt any
higher-level technologies to zero. As can be seen, as firms move up the technology ladder,
the effect of financial development becomes more severe. Observe that 50% of potential
firms end up with sub-optimal technology levels. In that setting, information friction is
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Figure 6: Stationary Distribution of Technology Levels
the main obstacle to technology adoption. A low level of financial development results in
only 50% of potential firms accumulating enough information and eventually choosing an
optimal technology level. Table (6) shows that the model does a good job of matching the
technology adoption decisions of Chilean manufacturing firms.
Table 6: Technology Adoption in the Stationary Equilibrium
Data Model
% of firms adopting foreign technology 22.1 22.8
We move on now to the TFP gap analysis to see how financial development can ex-
plain the TFP gap between the U.S. and Chile. The TFP here is defined as an aggregate
manufacturing TFP, given by ln(O) − α ln(K). Both countries face the same technology
ladder toward the technological frontier but have different levels of financial development
and talent. Therefore, all productivity paramater values are based solely on the previous
calibration, while the values of {κˉ0, κˉ1, κˉ2, κˉ3, θ, ξ} are reassigned for the U.S. economy. The
pre-lending evaluation technology in the U.S. is assumed to be efficient. That is, θUS = 1.
The rest are reassigned values so that the model yields the U.S. loan recovery rate and
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Table 7: TFP Gap and Financial Development
Parameters Relative TFP %Δ TFP % TFP Gap
i. Benchmark ξ θ κs 0.59 - -
ii. Recovery rate ξUS θ κs 0.62 5.5 7.3
iii. Evaluation ξ θUS κs 0.71 21.5 29.3
iv. Fully efficient ξUS θUS κs 0.73 25.1 34.1
v. Talent ξ θ κUSs 0.96 64.5 90.2
Chile’s TFP relative to the U.S. as observed in the data. In particular, the U.S. recovery
rate as a fraction of loans is 0.7 reported by the World Bank’s Doing Business Report.
The Chile’s TFP relative to the U.S. is 0.59, reported by the UNIDO World Productivity
Database. This yields ξUS = 0.91 and κUSs = 2κs.
17
How important is efficiency in the financial sector for explaining the TFP gap between
the U.S. and Chile? Table (7) shows the composition effect of financial development and
talent. Given the talent of the Chilean economy, if the country could adopt U.S. financial
practices, it would be able to close 34% of its TFP gap. However, simply by improving its
talent to the U.S. level, Chile could close as much as 90.2% of its TFP gap. In other words,
adoption of U.S. financial practice raises the relative TFP by 0.14 or 21.5% if the economy
has talent κs, but increases the relative TFP by only 0.04 or 4.1% if the economy has talent
κUSs . This implies that an improvement in financial development has larger benefits for
countries with talent shortfalls. This is because the information problem is more severe in
these countries. The result is consistent with the fact that financial development plays a
larger role in explaining the TFP gap of less developed countries.
1.6.4 Transitional Dynamics Analysis
In this section, the speed of technology adoption and the speed of TFP convergence will
be explored. The period studied is from 1986 to 2007. In 1986, the economy was in the state
17The values of κUSs are reassigned to be a multiplier of the benchmark case.
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where only old technology was available. The Chilean economy started to have access to the
technology ladder toward the world technological frontier in 1987. This is because, in 1987,
Chilean manufacturing imports from high-income countries started to grow exponentially.
Although the main reason import data are used as a proxy for foreign technology adoption
is that the series are long enough to determine the transition period, the data on imports
of machinery and equipment are also widely used in the literature as a proxy for foreign
technology adoption [Caselli and Coleman II (2001); and Caselli and Wilson (2002)]. This
is supported by the evidence that import activities are important channels for the transfer
of technology [Almeida and Margarida Fernandes (2008)].
To simulate the transitional dynamics in response to the access to the technology ladder
in 1987, two exogenous processes of real risk-free rates talents are given. These are treated
as the expected processes. The fraction of new talented firms entering the economy is likely
to increase over time when human capital and skills have been improving. This change is
captured by changes in the parameters governing the conditional probability of being high
type, κs,t, over time. Let κs,t = xtκs, where κs represents the benchmark parameter values
calibrated to match the data in 2007. xt is then obtained from the human capital index at
time t relative to 2007. Figure (7) shows the process of risk-free rates on the left panel and
an increase in the fraction of new talented firms entering the economy over the period 1986-
2007. After simulating an economy consisting of 50,000 firms with entry and exit over the
period of study, the time series of aggregate manufacturing TFP is obtained.18 To compare
our model’s results with the actual data, Figure (8) presents the transitional dynamics of
the model’s aggregate manufacturing TFP along with Chile’s aggregate TFP from Fuentes
et al. (2007). Both are expressed as a TFP index, with the TFP of 1986 normalized to
100. The model does a very good job of matching the time path of the Chilean aggregate
TFP, which exhibits a gradual increase in TFP once the economy has access to the world
technological frontier.
18In this transitional dynamics analysis, the distribution of firms in 2007 is not necessarily a stationary
distribution.
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Figure 7: Two Exogenous Processes: Real Risk-Free Rate and Talent
There are two underlying mechanisms driving this gradual change in the TFP when
development is lacking in the financial sector. First, firms need some time to accumulate
information in order to overcome financing problems. Because firm types are positively
correlated across steps, potential firms have to accumulate information until they get a
good pre-lending evaluation for investing in higher-level technology. This might delay the
speed of moving up the ladder, as well as the speed of choosing the optimal production
level. The time path, therefore, reflects higher-level technology adoption and more efficient
resource allocation over time when firm types are more accurately identified through the
process of learning and experimenting. Second, the economy waits until the information
problem becomes less severe. The fraction of new talented firms entering the economy
increases over time, so, from the intermediary’s point of view, firms on average become
more talented. Firms born in the latter periods then face fewer financing obstacles. Over
time, there will be more talented firms which face fewer obstacles to adopting higher-level
technology. This results in a gradual increase in the aggregate manufacturing TFP.
The impact of financial development on the TFP gap has already been shown. Now, it
is interesting to see how an improvement in financial development affects the level and speed
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Figure 8: Transitional Dynamics of TFP
of TFP convergence. Figure (9) illustrates the transitional dynamics of TFP for different
levels of financial development. The solid line is the benchmark case with the recovery rate
and the accuracy of pre-lending evaluation calibrated for Chile’s economy. Better finan-
cial development leads to productivity improvement by stimulating technological progress
through technology adoption and by increasing the efficiency of resource allocation. On
the one hand, higher recovery rates, either from reducing liquidation process costs or from
regulatory reforms, result in a lower cost of information accumulation. An increase in the
loan recovery rate from 21% to 91% improves the TFP level by approximately 5% as more
firms are allowed to learn their true types. However, the speed of convergence is actually
quite slow. Firms still need some time to accumulate information. On the other hand, a
more accurate pre-lending evaluation reduces the need for information accumulation and
enables high-type firms to move up the technology ladder at a faster pace. Compared to
the benchmark case, when the country adopts the U.S. financial practice, the TFP not only
converges to a level which is approximately 30% higher, but the speed of convergence is
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Figure 9: Transitional Dynamics and Financial Development
also doubled.
1.7 Conclusion
Why are firms in some countries slower to adopt new technology than firms in other
countries? Why do firms in different countries eventually end up with different levels of
technology? Empirical evidence in this paper suggests that, as financial development im-
proves, more firms adopt new technology and the technology diffusion process is faster. The
role of financial development in explaining differences in technology adoption and TFP is
then explored here. To do so, a dynamic model of firm technology adoption and competi-
tive financial intermediaries is developed. Without long-term experience with higher-level
technology, how talented a firm is at using the technology is initially unknown. Learn-
ing and information accumulation provide a way to overcome this information problem in
the technology adoption process. How severely financial intermediaries impede information
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accumulation depends on the level of financial development.
Analytical results show that firms value the information from technology experimen-
tation. They are willing to receive lower flow profits in exchange for the opportunity to
acquire new information. The lack of development in the financial sector, however, pre-
cludes potential firms from accumulating information and adopting higher-level technology.
A low recovery rate raises firm-specific borrowing costs and limits credit access. This not
only discourages technology experiments by firms that have low beliefs about their ability
to use new technology, but also limits adopting firms to small loans and low production
at the beginning of technology adoption. Inaccurate pre-lending evaluation also precludes
potential firms, which either receive a bad evaluation or experience a sequence of bad luck,
from adopting higher-level technology. In the technology ladder setting, when firms’ capa-
bilities to use higher-level technology are positively correlated with their abilities to use their
current technology, poor financial development delays the choice of higher-level technology.
This is because firms need time to accumulate information about their current technology
before moving forward.
Consider two countries which have the same talent and have access to the same technol-
ogy ladder. The country with a lower level of financial development will have the learning
process delayed or prematurely ended. As a result, firms are slower to adopt higher-level
technology and more firms end up operating with a sub-optimal technology level and a
sub-optimal production level. This is then followed by a slower speed of TFP convergence
toward a lower level of TFP.
The result is confirmed and quantified by the quantitative analysis. The model is
calibrated to the Chilean Annual Manufacturing Survey. In a steady state, 50% of potential
firms operate at a sub-optimal technology level and cannot move up the technology ladder.
An improvement in financial development to a fully efficient level increases a country’s
TFP by 25%. The results also show that a marginal return to an improvement in financial
development is larger for a country with talent shortfalls. Some transitional dynamics are
44
then undertaken to explore the dynamics of Chilean manufacturing TFP in response to
access to the world technology frontier. The model generates a gradual increase in the
manufacturing TFP before it levels off. The resulting path for TFP matches the Chilean
TFP index time series relatively well. Finally, the speed of TFP convergence is doubled
when there is efficient finance.
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Chapter 2
Technology, Skills and Productivity:
A Perspective of Comparative Advantage
and Heterogeneous Firms
Abstract
Trade liberalization triggers changes in productivity and the demand for skills, at both
firm and aggregate levels. A unified model of international trade with multiple sectors, het-
erogeneous firms, and endogenous technology choices is developed to study this impact in
developing countries. Advanced technologies improve productivity but they are skill biased.
Productivity gains from adopting advanced technology are greater in skill-intensive indus-
tries. Analytical results show that, within industry, more firms adopt advanced technology
and become more skill intensive, but, between industries, labor is reallocated toward com-
parative advantage industries. These two effects work in opposite directions in determining
aggregate productivity and the demand for skills, resulting in an ambiguous effect of trade
liberalization. The model is parameterized using Indonesian manufacturing data before
trade reform. The counterfactual reform matches the data qualitatively well. In Indonesia,
the skill premium falls, implying a decrease in the aggregate demand for skills. An in-
crease in industrial productivity is large enough such that aggregate productivity increases,
although slightly dampened due to between-sector reallocation.
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2.1 Introduction
Trade plays a crucial role in the development process of most developing countries.
Trade liberalization triggers changes in productivity and the demand for skills, at both firm
and aggregate levels. Previous studies on developing economies have explored this effect
through three main channels: between-industry reallocation, within-industry reallocation
and technology upgrading. Most literature, however, focuses on middle-income countries,
such as Brazil and Columbia, to which the standard Heckscher-Ohlin theory does not di-
rectly apply. The literature then studies the within-industry reallocation and technology
decision channels in the context of a standard one-sector heterogeneous firm model. The
model ignores various effects, when both comparative advantage and firm-level decisions
are present, when in fact the comparative advantage effect is not negligible in low-income
countries, in which skilled labor is relatively scarce.1 Unlike middle-income countries, low-
income countries experience a large labor reallocation across sectors and a fall in the skill
premium following trade liberalization. To account for this, a unified model of interna-
tional trade with multiple sectors, heterogeneous firms, and endogenous technology choices
is developed. The model provides a rich setting for explaining how productivity and skill in-
tensity of firms in different industries respond to trade liberalization. This, in turn, provides
some implications for the effect of trade liberalization on changes in aggregate productivity
and the aggregate demand for skilled labor.
Empirical evidence shows a large labor reallocation across sectors following trade liber-
alization in low-income countries. This pattern, however, is not the case in middle-income
countries. Figure (10) shows the measure of cross-sector labor shifts around each country’s
trade liberalization period, normalized and averaged across all countries in each group.
This measure is the average value of changes in sector shares of manufacturing employment
proposed by Wacziarg and Wallack (2004). The average change in a sector’s share of em-
ployment over two years increases around the trade liberalization period in the group of
1See Romalis (2004) for evidence on comparative advantage.
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low-income countries.2
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Figure 10: Average 2-Year Change in a Sector’s Share of Employment, Low-Income Coun-
tries
Using the standard one-sector heterogeneous firm model, thus, ignores the role played by
comparative advantage, which can be large in low-income countries. Because firm response
to trade liberalization is different across industries depending on comparative advantage
and the nature of technology, the goal of this paper is to provide a unified framework which
captures both technology and inter-industry reallocation channels.3 To allow for such in-
teraction, endogenous technology choices are introduced in a general equilibrium model of
comparative advantage with heterogeneous firms from Bernard et al. (2007b). The frame-
work considers a world of two countries, two factors, and two industries. Each industry
consists of a continuum of firms, each producing a differentiated variety within their indus-
try, subject to both fixed and marginal costs. Factors of production are defined as skilled
2Trade liberalization periods of each country are taken from Wacziarg and Welch (2008). Low-income
countries refer to lower-middle-income countries, as categorized by the World Bank, including Morocco,
Bolivia, Ghana, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Indonesia, and Guatemala. Middle-income countries refer to upper-
middle-income countries, as categorized by the World Bank, including Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Columbia,
Ecuador, Romania, Peru, and Turkey. This pattern is robust to the average change in sector shares over
3, 4, and 5 years. See Appendix B.1 for details and evidence from middle-income countries and other time
intervals.
3Cross-country firm-level data suggest that exporters in skill-abundant countries are more skill-intensive
and are more likely to use advanced technology compared to non-exporters. This evidence is shown in
Appendix B.2.
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and unskilled labor, and the two industries vary in the relative skill intensity. The supply
of skilled labor varies across countries, leading to comparative advantage trade. Hetero-
geneous firms endogenously choose their technology level. Advanced technology improves
productivity, but it is skill-biased, and it is more biased in a skill-intensive sector.4
The model provides a rich setting for obtaining analytical results, not only for explain-
ing how productivity and skill intensity of firms in different industries change following
trade liberalization, but also for analyzing the implications for aggregate productivity and
the aggregate demand for skilled labor. In a low-income country, a reduction in trade
costs, on the one hand, affects domestic and export revenues leading to (i) labor reallo-
cation toward comparative advantage industries, i.e., low-tech industries; (ii) technology
upgrading among exporters, especially in comparative advantage industries; and (iii) more
intensive firm selection into the market, especially in comparative advantage industries. On
the other hand, changes in the skill premium, caused by a reduction in trade costs, have
an ambiguous effect on technology upgrading and firm selection. If comparative advantage
plays a significant role, more exporters upgrade their technology and become more skill
intensive. The aggregate demand for skills and aggregate productivity are determined by
within-industry transformation and between-industry reallocation. While the former raises
the demand for skills, the latter decreases it. Although within-industry transformation
improves productivity in both types of industries through firm selection and technology
upgrading, it is possible that its positive effect on aggregate productivity is dampened by
between-industry reallocation. This is the case if low-tech industries have a lower produc-
tivity gain from technology upgrading. When comparative advantage reallocates resources
toward low-tech industries, which on average have lower productivity, it creates a negative
effect on aggregate productivity.5
4For skill-biased technical change, see e.g., Bernard et al. (2007a) for evidence for the US, Verhoogen
(2008) for Mexico, Alcala and Hernandez (2010) for Spain, Molina and Muendler (2013) for Brazil, and
Bustos (2011) for Argentina. For sector bias of skill-biased technical change, see e.g., Kahn and Lim (1997)
for evidence for the US, Haskel and Slaughter (2002) for OECD countries, and Esposito and Stehrer (2009)
for Poland and Hungary.
5This is the usual composition effect when two industries are different in terms of average productivity
gain.
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All analytical results hold for the case of a small open economy. To obtain the extended
results, the quantitative analysis is applied to Indonesia’s trade reform in 1995 during the
WTO wave. The goal is to explain a transformation in the Indonesian manufacturing
sector and quantify the impact of the trade reform on aggregate productivity and the
aggregate demand for skills. Indonesia is a lower-income economy, which has undergone
comprehensive trade liberalization in the last four decades. The response of Indonesian
manufacturing firms to trade reform and changing skill supply also shows different patterns
across industries, according to the degree of specialization and the nature of technology. The
model is parameterized to Indonesian manufacturing firms in 1990. A counterfactual reform
is compared to a post-reform period in 1998. The results match the data qualitatively well.
The skill premium falls. The exporter skill-intensity premium, which measures the extent to
which exporters are more skill intensive than non-exporters, increases in a low-tech industry
and decreases in a high-tech industry. The exporter productivity premium, measured by
log value added per worker, increases in a low-tech industry and decreases in a high-tech
industry. These changes suggest that a comparative advantage effect plays a significant role
in a very skill-scarce country like Indonesia. Although not directly observed in the data,
the counterfactual reform predicts that industrial productivity increases in both industries
but that labor is also reallocated toward a low-tech industry, which on average has a lower
productivity gain. In Indonesia, an increase in industrial productivity is large enough such
that aggregate productivity increases, although slightly dampened due to compositional
change.
The paper makes two main contributions. First, the framework extends previous work
on comparative advantage and heterogeneous firms [ e.g., Bernard et al. (2007b); Bernard et
al. (2003); Burstein and Vogel (2012)], and heterogeneous firms and technology upgrading
[e.g., Atkeson and Burstein (2010); Bustos (2011)]. The framework simultaneously explains
how the productivity and skill intensity of firms in different industries respond to trade
liberalization, and also provides some implications on changes in aggregate productivity
and the aggregate demand for skilled labor. Second, the paper employs the model to
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quantitatively analyze the effect of trade reform on a manufacturing sector, at both firm
and aggregate levels, in Indonesia, where the scarcity of skills is more apparent. This adds
to the existing theory and evidence on trade liberalization among developing countries [e.g.,
Bustos (2011); Bas (2012); Amiti and Cameron (2012); Kugler and Verhoogen (2012)].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the comparative advantage model
with heterogeneous firms and endogenous technology choices. Section 2.3 presents analytical
results on the specialization pattern and the impact of trade liberalization on firms’ decisions
for the model with two technology choices, along with the small open economy application.
In Section 2.4, a quantitative analysis and a counterfactual trade reform are undertaken
using Indonesian manufacturing data. Section 2.5 revisits the model with a counterfactual
analysis on skill upgrading and a shift in Indonesia’s comparative advantage. Section 2.6
presents concluding remarks.
2.2 The Model
Consider a world of two countries, two industries, two factors, and a continuum of
heterogeneous firms. The model extends Bernard et al. (2007b) by incorporating endoge-
nous technology choices. Technology choices are introduced with two important features:
skill-biased technical change and sector bias of skill-biased technical change. That is, tech-
nological progress improves productivity but is skill-biased. The bias is more prominent in
a skill-intensive sector. This setup is guided by an empirical application.
Two countries, Home and Foreign, are identical and differ only in terms of skilled labor
supply. As the focus is on developing countries, assume that Home is skill scarce, S
∗
U∗ >
S
U .
For the rest of the paper, an asterisk is attached to Foreign variables. Each country consists
of two monopolistically competitive industries indexed by j: a low-tech industry, j = l, and
a high-tech industry, j = h, where the latter is more skill intensive.6 Heterogeneous firms
6Manufacturing data show that R&D intensity and skill intensity are closely related when firms are
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in each industry, indexed by i, produce differentiated goods using skilled and unskilled
labor. A representative household acquires utility from consumption of the output from
both industries. The household also supplies skilled and unskilled labor to firms.
2.2.1 Household and Demand
The representative household supplies a unit of labor with a fraction of skilled labor S
and a fraction of unskilled labor U at wage rates ws and wu. The representative household’s
utility depends on the output of two industries, each of which contains a large number of
differentiated varieties produced by heterogeneous firms i ∈ [0, 1] where
U = Qηl Q1−ηh , (2.1)
where Qj is a consumption index defined over consumption of individual varieties, qij , with
the price index, Pj , defined over prices of varieties, pij ,
Qj =
[∫ 1
0
qρijdi
] 1
ρ
, Pj =
[∫ 1
0
p1−σij di
] 1
1−σ
(2.2)
where σ = 1(1−ρ) > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution across varieties. For simplicity,
assume that the elasticity of substitution between varieties is the same in both industries.
Given aggregate expenditure R, household expenditure on each variety i is
rij = ηjR
[
pij
Pj
]1−σ
. (2.3)
classified according to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). Thus, in this paper, the
concepts low-tech/high-tech and unskilled-intensive/skill-intensive are used interchangeably.
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2.2.2 Production and Technology
For each sector, each differentiated good is produced by a monopolistically compet-
itive firm. Production requires unskilled (u) and skilled (s) workers. Prior to entry, all
firms are identical and face a sunk entry cost fe. Once the sunk entry cost is paid, firms
draw inherited productivity, ϕ, from a distribution G(ϕ) with the support [ϕmin,∞). This
inherited productivity remains fixed after entry. This setting is the same as in the stan-
dard heterogeneous-firm model of Melitz (2003). At this point, all firms are endowed with
the same technology level z = 0. Firms can invest fz(z) to choose a technology level
z ∈ (−∞,∞) which will improve or decrease their productivity. This is the extension of
technology upgrading introduced by Bustos (2011). Assume fz is increasing and convex in
the technology level z.
To produce, firms pay a fixed overhead cost f each period which causes some firms
to exit the market. After paying this cost, a firm with inherited productivity ϕ and a
technology level z produces output y according to the following constant returns to scale
production function:
yj(ϕ, z, s, u) = ϕ
[
β
1
α
j (a
s
j(z)s)
α−1
α + (1− βj) 1α (auj (z)u)
α−1
α
] αα−1
, (2.4)
where s and u are units of skilled and unskilled labor, with α > 0 representing the elasticity
of substitution. βj determines the relative importance of skilled labor in industry j, so
βh > βl. aj(z) captures productivity improvements from technological progress, which are
defined as
asj(z) = exp
(
γsj z
)
and auj (z) = exp
(
γuj z
)
.
γsj shapes the skill bias of technology and rescales the exponential firm productivity. γ
s
h −
γuh > γ
s
l − γul > 0 implies that technological progress in a high-tech industry is more skill-
biased. The key idea is that technological progress in a high-tech industry, although usually
associated with high productivity and high returns to skills, is more complementary with
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skilled workers.7 All firms in both sectors share the same fixed entry and overhead costs, as
well as the same technology cost function. These costs use both skilled and unskilled labor
whose intensity of use depends only on βj , independent of the firm’s technology level, z. It
can be seen that industries differ only in their skill intensity and skill bias of technological
progress.
2.2.3 International Trade
International trade is subject to both fixed and marginal costs of exporting. Firms
decide whether to sell only in a domestic market or in both domestic and foreign markets
in which they have to pay a fixed cost of exporting fx. This fixed cost is produced in a
similar way to other fixed costs using both skilled and unskilled labor. To deliver a unit of
industry j’s good from Home (Foreign) to Foreign (Home), firms must export τj (τ∗j ) units
of the good.
2.2.4 Firms’ Problems: Exit, Export and Technology
Given wages ws and wu, a firm from industry j with inherited productivity ϕ and
technology level z minimizes its cost by employing skilled and unskilled labor with the ratio
sj(ϕ, z)
uj(ϕ, z)
=
(
wu
ws
)α βj
1− βj e
(α−1)(γsj−γuj )z. (2.5)
The demand for skilled labor is positively correlated with two sector-specific skill charac-
teristics: the skill intensity βj and the skill bias of technology γsj − γuj , while it is negatively
related to the skill premium. Therefore, for firm (ϕ, z), the cost of producing one unit of
7Hollanders and Weel (2002) find a stronger and significant relationship between R&D intensity and the
employment shares of higher-skilled workers in high-tech industries.
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output can be expressed by
cj(ϕ, z) =
1
ϕ
[
βj(ws)
1−α exp
(
(α− 1)γsj z
)
+ (1− βj)(wu)1−α exp
(
(α− 1)γuj z
)] 11−α
. (2.6)
Profit maximization implies that equilibrium prices are a constant mark-up over marginal
costs. Export prices are a constant multiple of domestic prices due to the marginal costs of
exporting:
pdj(ϕ, z) =
cj(ϕ, z)
ρ
and pxj(ϕ, z) =
τjcj(ϕ, z)
ρ
. (2.7)
Given the demand from Home and Foreign derived in equation (2.3), a firm’s profit from the
domestic market, πdj(ϕ, z), and an additional profit from exporting to the foreign market,
πxj(ϕ, z) are:
πdj(ϕ, z) =
ηjR
σ
[
ρPj
cj(ϕ, z)
]σ−1
− fc0j and πxj(ϕ, z) = ηjR
∗
σ
[
ρP ∗j
τjcj(ϕ, z)
]σ−1
− fxc0j (2.8)
where c0j =
[
βj (ws)
1−α + (1− βj) (wu)1−α
] 1
1−α . That is, all firms in the same industry
share the same fixed costs regardless of their inherited productivity or technology level.
A firm with inherited productivity ϕ chooses exit status e, export status x and tech-
nology z to maximize profit:
πj(ϕ) = max
e∈{0,1},x∈{0,1},z
(1− e) {πdj(ϕ, z) + xπxj(ϕ, z)− fz(z)c0j} . (2.9)
Denote E(ϕ), X(ϕ), and Z(ϕ) firm ϕ’s optimal choices. A firm’s benefit from advanced
technology is proportional to its inherited productivity ϕ, so more productive firms choose a
higher technology level. Because the profits πdj(ϕ,Zj(ϕ)) and πxj(ϕ,Zj(ϕ)) are increasing
in firms’ inherited productivity, firms’ exit and export decisions can be characterized by
inherited productivity cutoffs, ϕˉj and ϕˉxj . In particular, E(ϕ) = 0 if ϕ ≥ ϕˉj and X(ϕ) = 1
if ϕ ≥ ϕˉxj .
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2.2.5 Determining the Technology Choice
To see how the optimal technology choice is determined, firms’ optimization implies
that the optimal technology rule can be explained by equating the marginal benefit and the
marginal cost of the technology choice:8
ϕσ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inherited Productivity
(cj(1, z)1−σ + ²)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost saving
[
1 + x(ϕ, z)
(
P ∗j
Pj
)σ−1
R∗
R
τj
1−σ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Source of Revenue
= c0jf ′z(z) (2.10)
given an export decision, x(ϕ, z), if the firm has inherited productivity ϕ and chooses tech-
nology level z. The marginal benefit consists of three components: inherited productivity,
technology cost saving, and sources of revenue. Firms with high inherited productivity
and an additional revenue source will benefit more from a productivity improvement when
upgrading their technology. The optimal technology choice Z(ϕ) is, therefore, increasing in
a firm’s inherited productivity ϕ. However, to what extent a higher level of technology can
save costs depends on its productivity improvement, its skill bias and the country’s skill
premium. Advanced technology improves firm productivity but changes its skill structure.
That is, although a productivity improvement undoubtedly reduces the unit cost of pro-
duction, a change in the skill structure has an ambiguous effect on the unit cost, depending
on the skill premium. A skill-biased technology upgrading may increase the unit cost if
the skill premium is high. The firm also incurs additional costs of investing in technology
development. The more advanced the technology level is, the higher the fixed cost that the
firm has to pay. Thus, it is not surprising to see some firms downgrade their technology.
8Both the marginal cost and marginal benefit of technology upgrading are strictly increasing in z, so some
restriction must be imposed on the technology cost function to ensure the existence of optimal technologies.
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2.2.6 Equilibrium
In each industry j, there is a mass of prospective entrants. These entrants are forward
looking and correctly anticipate their future expected profits and exogenous exit rate of
δ. After paying a sunk entry cost, an entrant realizes initial productivity ϕ drawn from a
known distribution G(ϕ). The entrant then makes an exit decision. In an equilibrium with
positive firm entry, the free entry condition must hold. This requires the expected value of
entry to equal the sunk entry cost in each industry:
1
δ
∫ ∞
ϕˉj
πj(ϕ)dG(ϕ) = fec0j . (2.11)
The steady state equilibrium is characterized by constant masses of firms entering,
producing and exporting in each industry. This requires that the mass of successful entrants
equal the mass of incumbents who exit the market in each industry:
[1−G(ϕˉj)] Mej = δMj (2.12)
where Me denotes the mass of entrants and M denotes the mass of producing firms. Using
the equilibrium pricing rules (2.7) and the optimal decisions (2.9), the equilibrium price
indices can be expressed by
Pj =
[
Mj
∫ ∞
ϕˉj
pdj(ϕ,Zj(ϕ))1−σμj(ϕ)dϕ + M∗j
∫ ∞
ϕˉ∗xj
p∗xj(ϕ,Z
∗
j (ϕ))
1−σμ∗j (ϕ)dϕ
] 1
1−σ
(2.13)
where
μj(ϕ) =

g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕˉj) , ϕ ≥ ϕˉj
0 , otherwise
(2.14)
is the ex post distribution of inherited productivity among producing firms.
To close the model, labor markets and goods markets must clear. Using the relative
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demand for skilled and unskilled labor (2.5), the demand for varieties of the good (2.3)
and firms’ optimal decisions (2.9), firm ϕ’s demands for skilled and unskilled labor used for
production can be derived:
upj (ϕ) = ηjρ
σ(RP σ−1j + 1{ϕ ≥ ϕˉxj}τ−σj R∗P ∗j σ−1)cj(ϕ,Z(ϕ))α−σ
(1− βj)(auj (Z(ϕ)))α−1
ϕ1−α(wu)α
,
spj (ϕ) = ηjρ
σ(RP σ−1j + 1{ϕ ≥ ϕˉxj}τ−σj R∗P ∗j σ−1)cj(ϕ,Z(ϕ))α−σ
βj(asj(Z(ϕ)))
α−1
ϕ1−α(ws)α
. (2.15)
Firms also hire labor to produce all fixed costs: overhead, export, technology, and entry.
The demands for skilled and unskilled labor to produce one unit of fixed costs are
sfj = c0j
α βj
(ws)α
, and ufj = c0j
α (1− βj)
(wu)α
. (2.16)
The labor market clearing conditions require that the aggregate demand for labor used
for the production process and fixed costs equals the aggregate labor supply:
∑
j=1,2
[
Mj
∫
spj (ϕ) + (f + fz(Zj(ϕ)) + 1{ϕ ≥ ϕˉxj}fx)sfj μj(ϕ)dϕ + Mejfesfj
]
= S (2.17)
and
∑
j=1,2
[
Mj
∫
upj (ϕ) + (f + fz(Zj(ϕ)) + 1{ϕ ≥ ϕˉxj}fx)ufj μj(ϕ)dϕ + Mejfeufj
]
= U. (2.18)
Lastly, the goods market clearing conditions require that the world’s demand equals
the world’s supply for all countries and industries. In particular, the sum of domestic and
foreign expenditures on domestic goods is equal to the total industry revenue which, by the
free entry condition, equals the total amount of wages paid to workers for each industry:
ηjMj

∫
R
(
pdj(ϕ,Zj(ϕ))
Pj
)1−σ1 + 1{ϕ ≥ ϕˉxj}R∗
R
(
τPj
P ∗j
)1−σμj(ϕ)dϕ
 = wsSj + wuUj .
(2.19)
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Definition 2. An equilibrium is a collection of aggregate prices and wages {Pl, Ph, ws, wu},
firms’ decisions {ϕˉj , ϕˉxj , Zj(ϕ), pj(ϕ, z), pxj(ϕ, z), spj (ϕ), upj (ϕ), sfj , ufj }j=l,h, aggregate quan-
tity {R,Ql, Qh} and allocation of labor {Sj , Uj}j=l,h in Home and Foreign such that the fol-
lowing equilibrium conditions are satisfied for each country: (i) firms’ pricing rules (equation
(2.7) for each industry and for the domestic and export markets separately), (ii) firms’ exit,
export and technology decisions (equation (2.9) for each industry), (iii) firms’ labor demand
to produce variable and fixed costs (equation (2.15) and (2.16) for each industry) (iv) free
entry (equation (2.11) for each industry), (v) household optimization (equation (2.3)), (vi)
labor market clearing (equation (2.17) and (2.18)), (vii) the values for the equilibrium price
indices implied by household and firm optimization (equation (2.13) for each industry),
and (viii) world expenditure on a country’s varieties equals the value of their production
(equation (2.19) for each industry).
2.3 Analytical Results: A Case of Two Technology Choices
Once the economy moves from autarky to costly trade, firms adjust their behavior. This
section analyzes how a reduction in trade costs from τ = ∞ to τ < c affects firm decisions
both within and across sectors. To establish the analytical results, a technology choice is
assumed to be discrete. In particular, following the setting in Bustos (2011), there are two
technology choices z0 = 0 and z1 = Δ where fz(z0) = 0 and fz(z1) = fΔ. The focus of this
analysis is on the equilibrium where fΔ is high enough such that there are three groups
of firms: (1) the least productive firms selling domestically and using z0 technology, (2)
exporters using z0 technology, and (3) exporters using z1 technology. In addition, assume
that inherited productivity distribution G(ϕ) is a Pareto distribution 1 − ϕ−k with the
support [1,∞). The condition that k > σ − 1 is then needed to ensure that the variance of
log productivity is finite. Apart from the tractability reason, this distribution also provides
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a reasonable approximation of the observed variation in firm productivity. Although there
are no longer closed-form solutions for several key endogenous variables of the model, a
number of analytical results concerning the impacts of trade can still be derived. The
results are first obtained for the case of two large countries with a difference in the supply
of skilled labor supply. Then, they are extended to the case of a small open economy.
2.3.1 Two Large Countries
First, consider two countries of the same size. They are identical and only differ in
terms of skilled labor supply. By assumption, the exit, export, and technology decisions
can be summarized by three productivity cutoffs. This is because the fixed costs of exporting
and technology upgrading are the same for all firms while the extra benefit is increasing
in inherited productivity. In particular, firms with inherited productivity ϕ higher than
ϕˉj , ϕˉxj , and ϕˉzj will produce for the domestic market, produce for the foreign market, and
upgrade their technology to Δ, respectively.
To separately examine the effect of inherited productivity and the technology choice,
redefine the production cost function as c(ϕ, z0) =
c0j
ϕ and c(ϕ, z1) =
cΔj
ϕ , where c0j = c(1, 0)
and cΔj = c(1, Δ) as characterized by equation (2.6). Solving the zero profit conditions,
the relationship between the export cutoff and the exit cutoff can be characterized by:9
ϕˉxj
ϕˉj
= Λxj = τj
(
fx
f
R
R∗
) 1
σ−1 Pj
P ∗j
, (2.20)
while the relationship between the technology cutoff and the exit cutoff can be characterized
by
ϕˉzj
ϕˉj
=
[
f + fxΛxj1−σ
fΔ
((
c0j
cΔj
)σ−1
− 1
)] 1
1−σ
. (2.21)
It can be seen that two factors that determine industrial productivity and skill in-
9See Appendix B.3.
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tensity are firm selection and firms’ technology choices. Firm selection – the selection of
high-productivity firms into the market and the drop-off of low-productivity firms from
the market – affects the inherited productivity distribution of firms operating in the mar-
ket. Given the inherited productivity distribution, firms’ technology choices then shape the
actual productivity and skill intensity distribution of firms operating in the market. There-
fore, in what follows, the focus will be on the effect of a trade cost reduction on these two
productivity cutoffs, ϕˉj and ϕˉzj . To ensure that the skill-biased technical change and the
sector bias of skill-biased technical change play a significant role in the results, the following
condition is imposed on the production function parameters.
Assumption 2. Differences in the relative skill intensity and the skill bias of technical
change between a high-tech industry and a low-tech industry are large enough such that(
c0h
cΔh
)σ−1−1(
c0l
cΔl
)σ−1−1 is decreasing in w
s
wu .
An increasing skill premium decreases the cost-saving benefits from technology upgrad-
ing. Because a high-tech industry relies heavily on skilled labor, this assumption assures
that a gain from technology upgrading increases by more in a high-tech industry when the
skill premium decreases. To obtain the analysis on firm selection and technology choices, it
is necessary to establish the export decisions by firms.
Lemma 3 (Export decisions). The export cutoff is closer to the exit cutoff in a coun-
try’s comparative advantage industry, ϕˉxhϕˉh >
ϕˉxl
ϕˉl
and ϕˉ
∗
xl
ϕˉ∗l
>
ϕˉ∗xh
ϕˉ∗h
. Therefore, the frac-
tion of surviving firms that export is higher in a country’s comparative advantage industry,
1−G(ϕˉxl)
1−G(ϕˉl) >
1−G(ϕˉxh)
1−G(ϕˉh) and
1−G(ϕˉ∗xh)
1−G(ϕˉ∗h) >
1−G(ϕˉ∗xl)
1−G(ϕˉ∗l ) .
Proof. See Appendix B.3.1.
When trade is costly, only a subset of firms find it profitable to export. Profits from
export sales relative to domestic sales are larger in a comparative advantage industry, so
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more firms find it profitable to export and the export cutoff lies closer to the exit cutoff.
The Pareto distribution of inherited productivity implies that there is a higher fraction of
exporting firms in the country’s comparative advantage industry.
The effect of trade opening on technology decisions works through two channels. First,
a reduction in trade costs affects domestic and export revenues. This causes production to
shift toward a comparative advantage industry and causes firms to change their technology
choices. This is called the direct effect of costly trade, which is the first-order effect. Second,
because the direct effect leads to a shift in the relative demand for skilled labor, the skill
premium changes. This skill premium change affects firms differently depending on their
factor intensity. This is called the indirect effect of costly trade, which is the second-order
effect. In other words, the direct effect is thus the change in productivity cutoffs due to
the reduction in trade costs, with the skill premium held fixed. The indirect effect is the
change in productivity cutoffs in response to the skill premium change. Propositions 1-4
show the direct and indirect effects of costly trade on firms’ technology choices and firm
selection. Proposition 5 then summarizes how costly trade can affect industrial productivity
and aggregate productivity.
Proposition 5 (Direct effect of costly trade on firms’ technology choices). If the relative
supply of skilled labor is perfectly elastic, a move from autarky to costly trade moves the
technology upgrading cutoff closer to the exit cutoff by a larger percentage in a country’s
comparative advantage industry.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.1.
Within an industry, additional revenues obtained from the foreign market following a
reduction in marginal trade costs induce exporters to opt for more advanced technology.
This affects all firms proportionally according to their inherited productivity. Across in-
dustries, revenue from the foreign market relative to the domestic market is larger in a
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comparative advantage industry. If the relative supply of skilled labor is perfectly elas-
tic, the skill premium is held fixed. The revenue of more productive exporting firms rises
by more in a comparative advantage industry. Therefore, the technology upgrading cutoff
moves closer to the exit cutoff to a larger extent in a comparative advantage industry. The
Pareto distribution implies that the fraction of technology upgrading firms increases by a
larger percentage in a country’s comparative advantage industry.
Proposition 6 (Direct effect of costly trade on firm selection). If the relative supply of
skilled labor is perfectly elastic, a move from autarky to costly trade induces more inten-
sive selection of high-productivity firms with a larger percentage in a country’s comparative
advantage industry.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.1.
As in Melitz’s model, trade opening raises profits of high-productivity firms that become
exporters, increasing the expected value of entry in each industry. The industry becomes
more competitive, driving the low-productivity firms out of the market because they no
longer receive enough revenue to cover fixed production costs. The model presented here
introduces another channel through which technology choices operate. From Proposition
(5), trade not only increases profits of exporting firms but also induces technology upgrading
among these firms. These two forces together increase the expected value of entry, and so
the exit productivity cutoff. The increase is larger in a comparative advantage industry, as
the positive direct effect on profits of exporting firms and technology upgrading decisions
is larger in a comparative advantage industry.
Moving on to the indirect effect of a reduction in trade costs, this is the second-order
effect arising from a change in the skill premium. As discussed, the direct effect shifts pro-
duction toward a comparative advantage industry and encourages firms to upgrade their
technology. Because industries have different factor intensity, a shift in production changes
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the relative demand for skilled labor and, thus the skill premium. This channel is referred
to as a specialization channel.10 Technology upgrading is skill-biased, so it shifts demand
toward skilled labor and raises the skill premium. This channel is referred to as a skill-biased
technical change channel.
Proposition 7 (Indirect effect of costly trade on firms’ technology choices).
1. The specialization channel drives down the skill premium in Home, moving the tech-
nology cutoff closer to the exit cutoff. The opposite occurs in Foreign.
2. The skill-biased technical change channel raises the skill premium, moving the tech-
nology cutoff further from the exit cutoff in both countries.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.1.
Specialization causes production to shift toward a low-tech sector in Home, decreasing
the relative demand for skilled labor and thus the skill premium. This induces firms to
choose to upgrade their skill-biased technology. The opposite occurs in Foreign, where pro-
duction shifts toward a high-tech sector, raising the skill premium and, as a second-order
effect, discouraging firms from upgrading their technology. The direct effect of trade open-
ing also increases the number of firms using skill-biased advanced technology. As a result,
the relative demand for skilled labor and the skill premium increase, dampening the positive
effect on technology upgrading in both countries.
Proposition 8 (Indirect effect of costly trade on firm selection).
1. The specialization channel drives down the skill premium in Home, inducing more
intensive selection of high-productivity firms. The opposite occurs in Foreign.
2. The skill-biased technical change channel raises the skill premium, inducing less in-
10This is the Stolper-Samuelson effect that trade opening raises the relative return to the factor that is
used intensively in a country’s comparative advantage industries.
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tensive selection of high-productivity firms in both countries.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.1.
The change in the skill premium, occurring through the specialization channel, creates
a stronger incentive for firms in Home to upgrade their technology, increasing the expected
value of entry and the exit cutoffs. The opposite occurs in Foreign, causing a decrease in the
exit cutoff. By the same reasoning as that for Proposition 7, the indirect effect, through the
skill-biased technical change channel, dampens the positive effect on technology upgrading
and the exit cutoffs in both countries.
How might costly trade affect industrial productivity and aggregate productivity? De-
fine an index of industrial productivity as an industrial average of firm productivity:
Φj =
∫
yj(ϕ,Zj(ϕ), s
p
j (ϕ), u
p
j (ϕ))
yj(0, 0, s
p
j (ϕ), u
p
j (ϕ))
μj(ϕ)dϕ (2.22)
where spj (ϕ) and u
p
j (ϕ) are determined by (2.15) and Zj(ϕ) = Δ if ϕ ≥ ϕˉzj and 0 otherwise.
This measure is similar to that in Melitz (2003) but allows both inherited productivity and
productivity improvement from technology upgrading to be captured. Aggregate produc-
tivity, Φ, is then defined as a weighted average of industrial productivity:
Φ =
∑
MjΦj∑
Mj
. (2.23)
Proposition 9 (Effect of costly trade on aggregate productivity in Home). If the special-
ization channel dominates, trade opening has two sets of effects on aggregate productivity
in Home:
1. (Mass Effect) The relative equilibrium mass of firms in a low-tech industry increases.
2. (Industrial Productivity Effect) Industrial productivity increases in both industries due
to technology upgrading and intensive firm selection.
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Proof. See Appendix B.3.1.
The impact of trade cost reduction on aggregate productivity can be decomposed into
two sets of effects: the industrial productivity effect and the mass effect. The specialization
channel causes a fall in the skill premium in Home. The direct effect and the indirect effect,
thus, move the technology upgrading cutoff closer to the exit cutoff and also raise the exit
cutoff in both industries. Some low-productivity firms drop out of the market. Among those
staying in the market, a larger fraction of firms upgrade their technology. Industrial produc-
tivity then increases in both industries. However, trade opening changes the composition
of firms, namely, the mass effect. As Home specializes according to comparative advantage,
an increasing share of resources is allocated to a comparative advantage industry. The mass
of firms in a low-tech industry increases relative to those in a high-tech industry.
The effect of trade opening on aggregate productivity can be ambiguous if a productivity
gain from technology upgrading is allowed to vary across industries. Specifically, if a high-
tech industry has a higher productivity gain from technology upgrading, as is usually the
case, a reduction in trade cost may lead to a fall in aggregate productivity if resources are
re-allocated away from a high-tech industry. This can occur even though trade opening is
productivity-improving in both industries.
2.3.2 Small Open Economy
Because the focus is on a developing country, it is interesting to consider Home as a
small open economy. The analysis considered here is thus a unilateral trade opening by
Home which involves a reduction in trade barriers from τ∗ = ∞ to τ∗ < c and a fixed
export cost from fx = ∞ to fx < c. Foreign can then be referred to as the rest of the world
which already has some degree of trade openness. The key assumption is that some Foreign
variables are not affected by any changes in Home. These variables include the exit cutoffs,
the technology cutoffs, the mass of firms, the skill premium, the total expenditures, and
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the price indices. The export cutoffs and the measure of exporters, however, respond to a
reduction in trade barriers. Intuitively, one can think of Foreign as a very large country
or a country that trades with many countries. Additional revenues from exporting to one
small economy is thus so negligible that it has no effect on an individual firm’s exit and
technology decisions. Nevertheless, when each individual firm decides whether to export to
one small country, the trade barrier of that country does matter.
The small open economy analysis requires a few changes in the equilibrium character-
ization. First, R∗ and P ∗j are exogenous, with
P ∗l
P ∗h
>
P autl
P auth
. This condition assures that
the relative ability to supply skilled labor is reflected in the relative price index. Second,
ws,aut
wu,aut >
ws∗
wu∗ . This condition assures that the relative ability to supply skilled labor is re-
flected in the skill premium. Finally, conditions (2.11) to (2.19) are only required for Home.
Under these conditions, the results for Home from the previous section can be applied to
the small open economy. Appendix B.3.2 formally shows how those propositions remain
true when Home, as a small open economy, moves from autarky to costly trade.
2.4 Quantitative Exercise: Evidence from Indonesia
This section applies a small open economy variant of the continuous technology choice
model formulated in Section 2.2 to Indonesian data. First, a description of Indonesian re-
forms and manufacturing data is given. The model is then calibrated to the pre-liberalization
period by matching some stylized facts about the Indonesian economy and its manufactur-
ing sector. Lastly, the counterfactual experiment is performed on a change between pre-
and post-liberalization periods.
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2.4.1 Indonesia: Trade and Skills
Indonesia is a lower-middle-income economy, as classified by World Bank, which en-
gages intensively in international trade. Over the last four decades, Indonesia has under-
gone comprehensive trade liberalization, by participating in multilateral and regional trade
arrangements and by conducting unilateral liberalization. There are three comprehensive
trade reform periods documented in the literature. The first period is a change from an
import substitution strategy to a limited liberalization in 1970. This period is documented
by Sachs and Warner (1995) and later confirmed by Wacziarg and Welch (2008). Later
on, in the mid 1980s, Indonesia underwent unilateral liberalization. In this second pe-
riod, tariffs were rationalized and reduced across the board, and some non-tariff barriers
(NTBs) were removed. The progress on unilateral liberalization slowed by 1991. However,
a comprehensive program of tariff reductions became active again in the third period, 1995.
This followed from the Uruguay Round Agreement and creation of the WTO at the end of
1994. Figure (11) shows the evolution of the measure of cross-sector labor shifts. This is
measured by the average value of changes in sector shares in manufacturing employment,
as in Wacziarg and Wallack (2004). The average change in sector shares over three years
increased during each liberalization period.
At the firm-level, the Statistik Industri (SI) provides a firm-level panel data set for a
survey of manufacturing firms with twenty or more employees. This is published by the
Indonesia Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS). The surveys cover the period from 1990 to
2005. There were roughly 14,000 manufacturing establishments in 1990 and this number
increases to around 20,000 establishments in 2005. The series of inputs (capital, labor
and materials), output (total gross output), expenditure (wage, rental and others) and
export status for each establishment are collected and categorized based on the three-digit
industry classification.11 The employment-related data include information on wages and
11Indonesian Standard Industrial Classification Codes (KBLI) employed in the survey follow the Interna-
tional Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), with some modifications to suit Indonesian conditions.
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Figure 11: Indonesia: Dynamic Evolution of Cross-Industry Labor Shifts, 1970-2007
employment of production and nonproduction workers. The SI collected information on a
fraction of workers by education category for production and nonproduction workers for a
sub-sample of years, 1995 and 1997.
Because the firm-level data cover the period of 1990-2005, the analysis here will fo-
cus on the third period of trade reform or the WTO wave. To make sure that a change
in the country’s ability to supply skilled labor and comparative advantage is taken into
consideration, Figure (12) shows the weighted manufacturing tariff and the fraction of the
labor force with at least a secondary education during this period. At the aggregate level,
the weighted manufacturing tariff has been declining from 16% in 1990 to less than 5% in
2005, with a large drop in 1995 when a comprehensive program of tariff reductions was
announced. The country’s ability to supply skilled labor improved after 2000. Although
skill supply in Indonesia decreased slightly during 1990-1995, it has been increasing since
1995, with rapid growth after 2000.12 This observation is supported by the work of Damuri
et al. (2006), who estimated the Indonesian trade specialization index based on technology
intensity for the periods 1990-1992 and 2001-2003. The indices suggest that Indonesia had
12This is consistent with the fact that total public spending on education as a percentage of GDP was
stagnant at around 1% during 1988-1997, then more than doubled in 1998-2000 and reached 3% in 2005.
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trade specialization in low-tech industries during the 1990s, while the specialization shifts
toward high-tech industries after 2000.13
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Figure 12: Indonesia’s Weighted Tariffs and Secondary Level Education, 1990-2005
Major shifts are observed in 1995 and 2000. It is therefore interesting to explore changes
in firm behavior over three subperiods: (i) 1990 - 1995, (ii) 1996 - 1999, and (iii) 2000 - 2005.
The effect of a reduction in trade costs can be observed from changes in firm behavior from
subperiod 1 to subperiod 2, when the country’s skill supply is relatively constant. The effect
of an improvement in the ability to supply skilled labor can be observed from changes in
firm behavior between subperiod 2 and subperiod 3. The exporter skill-intensity premium
and the exporter productivity premium are estimated separately for high-tech industries
and low-tech industries. This suggests how decisions of exporting firms change relative to
those of domestic firms for different industries. Moreover, by assumption of a sector bias of
skill-biased technical change, these exporter premia can summarize the relative change in
firms’ technology decisions in response to a reduction in trade cost and an increase in the
skilled labor supply.
13For low-tech to low-medium-tech industries, the specialization indices were 13.94 and 2.79 in 1990-
1992, but decreased to 11.57 and -1.01 in 2001-2003. For medium-high-tech to high-tech industries, the
specialization indices were -24.18 and -2.10 in 1990-1992, but increased to -12.31 and 2.62 in 2001-2003.
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From the data set, firms are classified into different industries according to the ISIC
Rev.2. To group industries into a high-tech skill-intensive industry and a low-tech unskilled-
intensive industry, industries are categorized according to two indices: the skill intensity
and the technology intensity. The technology intensity definition is taken from an OECD
classification based on R&D intensities. The skill intensity of each manufacturing industry
is computed using the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. It is the ratio of
non-production workers to the total number of workers by industry. That is, Indonesian
industries will be categorized as a high-tech industry or a low-tech industry using these
criteria, regardless of their actual skill intensity and technology intensity.14
The exporter skill-intensity premium and the exporter productivity premium are esti-
mated by running the following regressions at the firm-level;
ln
(
sij
sij + uij
)
= φ0j + φ1jexporterij + ²ij , for j = l, h (2.24)
ln (tfpij) = φ0j + φ1jexporterij + ²ij for, j = l, h (2.25)
where sisi+ui is the fraction of workers who have completed a secondary degree
15, tfpi is
obtained using the Olley-Pakes method [Olley and Pakes (1996)], and exporteri is a firm-
level exporter dummy variable. Year dummies and 3-digit industry dummies are also added.
Table (8) shows estimated exporter premia from each subperiod.
During the 1990s, Indonesia trade specialization was in low-tech industries. Thereafter,
following the WTO wave of trade reform, among low-tech industries there was a significant
difference between technology levels chosen by exporting firms and domestic firms, with
exporters choosing a higher technology level. This is reflected in an increase in the exporter
productivity premium. The exporter skill-intensity premium, however, did not increase
significantly, suggesting that technology upgrading in low-tech industries is not strongly
14The category is shown in Appendix B.4.1.
15A skilled worker is defined as a worker with at least secondary education. Because the data on workers’
education are not provided every year, the number of workers with at least secondary education is approxi-
mated using the fractions of workers with at least secondary education in production and nonproduction for
each 3-digit industry obtained from the 1995 and 1997 survey.
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Table 8: Exporter Premia Estimated from Indonesian Manufacturing Data, 1990-2005
Low-Tech Industry High-Tech Industry
Skill Intensity Productivity Skill Intensity Productivity
Tariff reduction
Subperiod 1 (1990-1995) 0.37% 25.96% 2.13% 33.67%
Subperiod 2 (1996-1999) 0.37% 31.76% 1.33% 33.67%
Δ = Subperiod 2 − 1 0.00% 5.81% -0.79% 0.00%
Skill Upgrading
Subperiod 2 (1996-1999) 0.37% 31.76% 1.33% 33.67%
Subperiod 3 (2000-2005) 0.00% 17.60% 2.79% 44.40%
Δ = Subperiod 3 − 2 -0.37% -14.16% 1.46% 10.73%
1 Full estimation results are reported in Appendix B.4.2.
2 Because the dependent variables are expressed in log terms, the coefficient on the exporter dummy can
be interpreted as a percentage. For example, the skill intensity of exporters in low-tech industries was,
on average, 0.37% higher than that of non-exporters.
skill-biased. Because the country did not specialize in high-tech industries, technology levels
chosen by exporting firms and domestic firms were not significantly different. Changes in
both exporter skill-intensity and productivity premia, as a result, were insignificant. After
2000, Indonesia’s trade specialization shifted toward high-tech industries, and the difference
between technology levels chosen by exporting firms and domestic firms in these industries
became larger. Exporters chose more advanced technology which, for high-tech industries, is
more skill-biased, so there was an increase in both exporter skill-intensity and productivity
premia in high-tech industries. At the same time, trade specialization was shifted away
from low-tech industries. Exporters in these industries enjoyed less advantage from trade,
so the relative technology level between exporting firms and domestic firms became smaller.
The exporter productivity premium, thus, decreased.
2.4.2 Parameterization to Pre-reform Period
A small open economy variant of the model formulated in Section 2.2 is parameterized to
match some salient features of Indonesian firm-level data in 1990, a period before Indonesia
began to adopt WTO’s trade policy. During this period, exports to and imports from high-
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income countries accounted for 90% and 85% of total exports and total imports, respectively,
with Japan, the US, Singapore, Korea and Germany accounting for 60 % of total trade
values. Before proceeding to the parameterization, first assume a functional form for the
technology cost function:
fz(z) = h exp(bz) (2.26)
where b determines the curvature of the function. This function allows the closed-form
derivation of the sufficient condition for the existence of an optimal technology choice.16
The economy size S + U is normalized to 1. The relative supply of skilled labor, S, is
assumed to be inelastic and is set to 0.46 to match the fraction of workers with at least
secondary education, based on Indonesian manufacturing data.
Parameters are grouped into two categories. The first category includes parameters of
which the values are either taken from other literature or directly obtained from the data
using the equilibrium conditions. The second category includes parameters chosen so that
endogenous outcomes from the model match salient features of the data.
The preference parameters are the share of each good in consumer expenditure, η, and
the elasticity of substitution σ. η is set to 0.45 to match low-tech industries’ share of the
gross output of Indonesia and five major trading partners. The US estimate is used for σ,
as in Burstein and Vogel (2012); here, σ = 2.7. Marginal trade costs are the weighted aver-
age tariff rates calculated using the data from UN Comtrade and the UNCTAD TRAINS
database. Average tariff rates imposed by Indonesia’s major trading partners in low-tech
and high-tech industries are 4% and 1%, respectively. Using the same approach, average
tariff rates faced by foreign firms in low-tech and high-tech industries are 25% and 15%
respectively. The values of production parameters β1, β2 and α are assigned using the equi-
librium condition (2.5). The industry aggregate statistics are matched to the homogeneous
technology case, with z = 0. α is set to 1.6, as in Acemoglu and Autor (2011), for the
16Equation (2.10) implies that the sufficient condition for the existence of optimal technology choices is
b
σ−1 ≥ γs.
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homogeneous technology case. The shares of workers with at least secondary education
employed in low-tech industries and high-tech industries, obtained from Indonesian man-
ufacturing data, are 0.39 and 0.58. Using the observed skill premium of 2.37 in Indonesia
from Lee and Wie (2013), β1 = 0.73 and β2 = 0.85.
Table 9: Parameter Values
Value Description Source
Predetermined Parameters
η 0.45 Share of low-tech goods Economic and Social Research Institute
σ 2.7 Elasticity of substitution Burstein and Vogel (2012)
(βl, βh) (0.73, 0.85) Production parameter Indonesian manufacturing data
α 1.6 Production parameter Acemoglu and Autor (2010)
(τl, τh) (4%, 1%) Tariffs faced by Home UN Comtrade, UNCTAD TRAINS database
(τ∗l , τ
∗
h) (25%, 15%) Tariffs faced by Foreign UN Comtrade, UNCTAD TRAINS database
fe 1 Fixed entry cost Normalization
δ 0.04 Exogenous exit rate Exit rate of large Indonesia manufacturing
S 0.46 Skilled labor supply Fraction of workers with secondary education
Calibrated Parameters
(γsl , γ
s
h) (1.10, 1.57) Technology upgrading, skilled labor
(γul , γ
u
h) (0.58, 0.42) Technology upgrading, unskilled labor
b 6.05 Technology cost parameter
h 0.02 Technology cost parameter
fx 0.25 Fixed cost of export
f 0.01 Fixed operating cost
k 3.61 Pareto distribution parameter†
{R∗jP ∗j σ−1}j=l,h (3.75, 1.92) Foreign demand
† With support [0.1, 2].
The exogenous exit rate δ = 0.04 is set to capture the exit rate of large firms in
Indonesian manufacturing. This is in the range of those used in the US data, 3%−6%. The
fixed entry cost fe is normalized to 1. The rest of the parameters are selected so that the
model matches: (i) the exports share of total absorption for each sector; (ii) the imports
share of total absorption for each sector; (iii) the fraction of the total sales of each sales
quartile for each sector; (iv) the mean skill intensity of firms in each sales quartile for each
sector; (v) the skill premium; and (vi) the standard deviation of firm size (log employment).
The parameter values are illustrated in Table (9).
The model matches very well with the targeted moments shown in Table (10). For
high tech industries only, the model slightly overestimates the skill intensity of firms in the
74
middle quartiles. As in other developing countries, Indonesia imports more high-tech goods
and exports more low-tech goods. Firms in the upper quartiles of sales are more likely to
be exporters and thus earn additional revenues from the foreign market. They have higher
skill intensity because larger sales encourage them to choose more advanced technology.
Figure (13) illustrates technology, export and exit decisions of firms from both high-
Table 10: Targeted Moments
Targeted moments Data Model
Exports to total absorption, j = l, h† (17.9%, 5.3%) (18.1%, 5.8%)
Imports to total absorption, j = l, h†† (4.5%, 15.2%) (4.5%, 15.2%)
Fraction of sales by each quartile, j = l (0.02, 0.05,0.15,0.78) (0.03,0.05,0.13,0.79)
Fraction of sales by each quartile, j = h (0.02, 0.05,0.14,0.79) (0.03,0.05,0.13,0.79)
Mean skill intensity of each sales quartile, j = l (0.62,0.65,0.67,0.71) (0.62,0.64,0.66,0.70)
Mean skill intensity of each sales quartile, j = h (1.31,1.49,1.64,1.68) (1.31,1.40,1.51,1.70)
Skill premium 2.37 2.37
Standard deviation of log employment 1.20 1.17
†, †† These are merchandise exports and imports as a percentage of total absorption. Imports and exports of
high-tech and low-tech industries are obtained from UN Commodity trade statistics (UN Comtrade). Total
absorption is total income plus merchandise imports minus exports.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Technology Choice - Exit and Export Cutoffs
 
 
Low-Tech High-Tech
Export
Technology Choice
Exit
Figure 13: Technology Choices and Productivity Cutoffs
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tech and low-tech industries. An optimal technology choice is increasing in the inherited
productivity, with a discontinuous jump at the export cutoffs. Some firms downgrade their
technology from the initial level z = 0. For the least productive firms, it is optimal to give
up productivity gains in exchange for facing less skill bias due to the extremely high skill
premium in Indonesia.
Now, compare the optimal technology choice for each inherited productivity across
industries. Among domestic firms, the technology choice function is steeper in a high-
tech industry. From equation (2.10), this is because, when inherited productivity is low,
the cost saving component dominates the inherited productivity component. Although
technology upgrading reduces costs by improving productivity, the upgrading also shifts
the composition of labor demand toward skilled labor. In a country such as Indonesia that
has high skill premia, the skill-biased technical change has a negative effect on cost savings,
which is more severe in a high-tech industry. Therefore, in a high-tech industry, firms with
low inherited productivity will choose relatively low levels of technology compared to firms
with high inherited productivity. This effect is less prominent in a low-tech industry, in
which the technical change is less skill-biased. As a result, a steeper technology choice
function can be observed in a high-tech industry.
A bigger jump observed in a technology choice function in a low-tech industry can be
explained by comparative advantage. Additional revenue from exporting is relatively higher
in a comparative advantage industry, resulting in a stronger incentive to use more advanced
technology. Comparative advantage also explains why the export cutoff is lower and lies
closer to the exit cutoff in a low-tech industry.
2.4.3 Pre- and Post-reform Periods
What are the effects of Indonesia joining the WTO in 1995? Although Indonesia was
allowed to gain greater access in world markets, it was also obliged to reduce tariff rates. To
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see how well the model can predict the effect from these exogenous changes, some parameter
values are reassigned. First, tariffs are exogenously decreased to match the Indonesian
average in 1990 and 1998. Indonesia’s tariff rates were reduced from 25% to 7.3% in low-
tech industries and from 15% to 6.5% in high-tech industries, according to UN Comtrade
and the UNCTAD TRAINS database. Second, to allow for the expansion of access in world
markets, foreign demands are allowed to change to exactly match the aggregate change in
imports and exports. To be specific, between 1990 and 1998, low-tech imports expanded
from 4.5% to 7.1% of total absorption, and exports expanded from 17.9% to 28.5%. There
were changes in trade flows for high-tech industries, where imports expanded from 15.2%
to 20.2% of absorption, and exports expanded from 5.3% to 13.4% of absorption.17
Table 11: Changes in Skill Premium – Trade Reform
Skill Premium (ws/wu) Data Model
1990 2.37 2.37
1998 2.09 2.25
Δ = 1998− 1990 -0.28 -0.12
Table (11) shows that, consistent with the data, the model qualitatively and quantita-
tively predicts a decrease in the skill premium. Unlike middle-income countries, low-income
countries such as Indonesia experience a fall in the skill premium after trade reform. Fol-
lowing trade reform, specialization according to comparative advantage causes production
to shift toward a low-tech sector. At the same time, more competition from foreign firms
reduces the profits of non-exporters and discourages them from investing in skill-biased ad-
vanced technology, as shown in Figure (14). These two forces raise the relative demand for
unskilled labor, bidding up the wage for unskilled labor. In Indonesia, this effect outweighs
an increase in the relative demand for skilled labor resulting from exporters choosing more
skill-biased advanced technology, and thus the skill premium falls.
After trade reform, firms change their exit, export and technology choices. Figure (14)
17Exports expanded by a larger percentage in high-tech industries due in part to a change in Indonesia’s
trading partners. In 1990, exports to high-income countries accounted for 90% of total exports. This number
decreased to 80% in 1998.
77
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Low-Tech Industry
 
 
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
High-Tech Industry
 
 
Exit Exit
ExportExport
Technology Choice
Technology Choice
Figure 14: Changes in Technology Choices and Productivity Cutoffs – Trade Reform
shows the model results of firms’ optimal decisions for the pre- and post- reform periods.
Non-exporters downgrade their technology due to competition from foreign firms, while
exporters upgrade their technology, thanks to an expansion of access to world markets.
The downgrading among non-exporters is larger in a low-tech industry, as the tariff rate
was reduced by more. The upgrading among exporters is larger in a high-tech industry
due to a larger expansion in foreign demand and a fall in the skill premium, which make
technology upgrading more attractive. For the same reason, the export cutoff decreases
by more in a high-tech industry. Nevertheless, comparative advantage is still in a low-tech
industry, in which the export cutoff lies closer to the exit cutoff.
These changes in firms’ decisions, then, have some implication for changes in both skill
intensity and productivity among exporters and non-exporters across industries. Table (12)
reports the effect of trade reform on exporter premia in each industry, for those premia
obtained from the data and predicted by the model. Exporter premia measure the extent
to which exporters are more skill intensive or more productive than non-exporters. The
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goal is to explore the relative change between exporters and non-exporters across industries
due to trade reform in 1995. The model matches reasonably well with the exporter premia
in 1990, which are non-targeted moments in the parameterization procedure. Consistent
with the data, the model predicts that the exporter skill-intensity premium increases in
a low-tech industry and decreases in a high-tech industry, although it underestimates the
magnitude. Log value added per worker measures labor productivity, which is the most
common measure of productivity. Similarly, the exporter productivity premium increases
in a low-tech industry and decreases in a high-tech industry. This is because technology
upgrading raises both a firm’s skill intensity and its productivity. The model does fairly
well in predicting these changes.
Table 12: Changes in Exporter Premia – Trade Reform
Exporter
Non−Exporter (%)
† Low-Tech Sector High-Tech Sector
Data Model Data Model
Skill Intensity (s/u)
1990 9.82 9.90 12.95 14.57
1998 10.95 10.49 10.61 14.03
Δ = 1998− 1990 1.13 0.59 -2.34 -0.54
Log Value Added per Worker (log(r/(s + u)))
1990 7.83 6.76 9.91 8.09
1998 10.25 8.72 7.37 6.96
Δ = 1998− 1990 2.42 1.96 -2.54 -1.13
† Exporter premium is the mean difference between exporters and non-exporters in percentage terms. For
example, in 1990, exporters in low-tech industries, on average, were 8.89% more skill intensive than non-
exporters.
In a low-tech industry, an increase in the exporter premia is due to a greater tech-
nology difference between exporters and non-exporters. Comparative advantage makes
exporters significantly more profitable than non-exporters. A large reduction in the tariff
rate also causes extensive technology downgrading among non-exporters. This enlarges the
gap between exporters and non-exporters in a low-tech industry. The opposite occurs in
a high-tech industry. Comparative disadvantage makes exporters slightly more profitable
than non-exporters. An increase in foreign demand and a fall in the skill premium induce
firms that are less productive, and thus less skill intensive, to become exporters. The gap
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between exporters and non-exporters in a high-tech industry is then reduced.
Table 13: Changes in Productivity and Mass of Firms – Trade Reform
Industrial Productivity Relative Mass Aggregate Productivity
Φl, Φh Ml/Mh Φ
1990 0.73,0.94 1.67 0.81
1998 0.83,1.03 2.07 0.89
Δ = 1998− 1990 0.10,0.09 0.40 0.09
As discussed in Proposition 9 of Section 2.3, changes in firms’ decisions can affect
industrial and aggregate productivity. Although measures of the relative mass of firms and
productivity cannot be directly observed from the data, it is interesting to see how the model
predicts their changes in response to the trade reform. Table (13) shows that industrial
productivity increases in both industries because more firms become exporters and upgrade
their technology, and because the least productive firms are driven out of the market by
stronger competition. Trade reform also reallocates labor toward a comparative advantage
industry, which raises the relative mass of firms in a low-tech industry. These results are
in line with those proposed in Proposition 9. Aggregate productivity is determined by
two effects: the industrial productivity effect and the mass effect. In this quantitative
exercise, despite experiencing a larger increase in industrial productivity, a low-tech sector,
on average, has lower productivity. The two effects, thus, work in opposing directions.
Quantitatively, the industrial productivity effect dominates and the trade reform increases
aggregate productivity, although the aggregate effect is slightly dampened.
2.5 Model Revisit: Skill Upgrading
The counterfactual trade reform in the previous section predicts the effects of Indone-
sia’s trade reform in 1995 on the skill premium, the exporter premia, and productivity.
Indonesian time series data in Figure (12) and its pattern of comparative advantage suggest
another interesting structural change in 2000, when the country’s ability to supply skilled
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labor improved and comparative advantage shifted toward medium-high-tech to high-tech
industries. Exporter premia reported in Table (8) also show the relative change in firms’
decisions. This section, therefore, performs a counterfactual to see how well the model can
qualitatively predict the change in the skill premium and the exporter premia.18 Some pa-
rameter values are reassigned. First, the relative supply of skilled labor, S, increased by 5%
from 1998 to 2005, based on the fraction of workers with at least secondary education, from
Indonesian manufacturing data. Second, to allow for the change in comparative advantage,
foreign demands are allowed to change to exactly match the aggregate change in Indonesia’s
imports and exports. To be specific, between 1998 and 2005, low-tech imports decreased
from 7.1% to 6.3% of total absorption, and exports decreased from 28.5% to 13.3%. There
were changes in trade flows for high-tech industries, where imports expanded from 20.2% to
21.2% of total absorption, and exports expanded from 13.4% to 18.3% of total absorption.
Table 14: Changes in Skill Premium – Skill Upgrading
Skill Premium (ws/wu) Data Model
1998 2.09 2.25
2005 2.13 2.28
Δ = 2005− 1998 0.04 0.03
According to the National Labor Force Survey of Indonesia, the skill premium increased
significantly over 2003-2009 for overall industry and across the region. Table (14) shows that,
consistent with the data, the model predicts an increase in the skill premium. Changes in
Indonesia’s comparative advantage cause production to shift away from the low-tech sector,
raising the relative demand for skilled labor. Even though the relative supply of skills
increases, a shift in the demand causes the skill premium to rise.
Figure (15) shows how firms change their optimal decisions. In a low-tech sector, an
increase in the skill premium leads to an upgrading among non-exporters. For exporters,
however, this not enough to outweigh the effect of a contraction in foreign demand, which
18As many calibrated parameter values could have changed between 1990 and 2005, predicting magnitude
is difficult.
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Figure 15: Changes in Technology Choices and Productivity Cutoffs – Skill Upgrading
causes them to downgrade their technology levels. For the same reason, the fraction of
exporting firms decreases. The opposite occurs in a high-tech sector. Exporters upgrade
their technology thanks to an expansion of foreign demand, although a higher skill premium
might discourage them from adopting advanced technology, which is too skill biased. Non-
exporters downgrade their technology due to competition from foreign firms and a rise in
the skill premium. It is obvious that the export cutoff now lies closer to the exit cutoff in
a high-tech industry, as a result of the shift in comparative advantage.
The implication of changes in firms’ decisions on changes in both skill intensity and
productivity among exporters and non-exporters across industries is shown in Table (15).
As mentioned, the goal is to see how the model can qualitatively predict the direction of
changes. Consistent with the data, the model predicts that the exporter skill intensity and
productivity premia decrease in a low-tech industry. This is due to technology upgrading
among non-exporters and technology downgrading among exporters. Because the reverse
occurs in a high-tech industry, a greater technology difference between exporters and non-
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Table 15: Changes in Exporter Premia – Skill Upgrading
Exporter
Non−Exporter (%)
† Low-Tech Sector High-Tech Sector
Data Model Data Model
Skill Intensity (s/u)
1998 10.95 10.49 10.61 14.03
2005 -4.21 9.53 11.62 14.48
Δ = 2005− 1998 -15.16 -0.96 1.01 0.45
Log Value Added per Worker (log(r/(s + u)))
1998 10.25 8.72 7.37 6.96
2005 1.01 6.96 6.64 7.13
Δ = 2005− 1998 -9.24 -1.76 -0.73 0.17
† Exporter premium is the mean difference between exporters and non-exporters in percentage terms. For
example, in 1998, exporters in low-tech industries, on average, are 10.95% more skill intensive than non-
exporters.
exporters causes skill-intensity and productivity export premia to rise. This result appears
to contradict the data, which suggest that the exporter premium of log value added per
worker fell from 1998 to 2005.19
Table 16: Productivity and Mass of Firms – Skill Upgrading
Industrial Productivity Relative Mass Aggregate Productivity
Φl, Φh Ml/Mh Φ
1998 0.83,1.03 2.07 0.89
2005 0.72,1.06 1.84 0.84
Δ = 2005− 1998 -0.11,0.03 -0.23 -0.05
Changes in the relative mass of firms and productivity are shown in Table (16). Indus-
trial productivity decreases in a low-tech industry. Mainly, this is because firms that were
once exporters downgrade their technology as their foreign profits fall and some of them
switch to the domestic market only. In a high-tech sector, more firms become exporters
and upgrade their technology, and the least productive firms are driven out of the market
by stronger competition. Industrial productivity, thus, increases. A shift in comparative
advantage also reallocates labor toward a high-tech industry. In this quantitative exercise,
19The exporter productivity premium estimated using the Olley-Pakes method reported in Table (8),
however, increased from subperiod 2 to subperiod 3. This might be due to a discrepancy between the firm
total factor productivity based on the Olley-Pakes method and log value added per worker as measured
productivity. The counterfactual experiments focus on log value added per worker because this has a direct
mapping from the model.
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industrial productivity substantially falls in a low-tech sector but hardly rises in a high-
tech sector. Therefore, despite a fall in the relative mass of firms in a low-tech industry,
which on average has lower productivity, aggregate productivity decreases. Similar to the
counterfactual reform presented in the previous section, the industrial productivity effect
dominates the mass effect. Nevertheless, the mass effect does dampen the negative impact
on aggregate productivity.
2.6 Conclusion
How does trade liberalization affect productivity and the demand for skills, at both
firm and aggregate levels, in developing countries? Empirical evidence suggests that cross-
sectoral labor reallocation following trade liberalization should not be ignored, especially
in low-income countries. This paper proposes a unified model of international trade with
multiple sectors, heterogeneous firms, and endogenous technology choices. The model pro-
vides a rich setting for explaining how productivity and skill intensity of firms in different
industries respond to trade liberalization. This, in turn, shows some implications of trade
liberalization for changes in aggregate productivity and the aggregate demand for skilled
labor.
Analytical results show that, within industry, more firms adopt advanced technology
and become more skill intensive, but, between industries, labor is reallocated toward a
low-tech industry. If a high-tech industry has a higher productivity gain from technology
upgrading, within- and between-industry effects work in opposite directions in determin-
ing aggregate productivity and the demand for skill, resulting in an ambiguous impact of
trade liberalization. To quantify this aggregate impact, the model is parameterized using
Indonesian manufacturing data during the pre-trade reform period. The counterfactual
reform matches the data qualitatively well. In Indonesia, the skill premium falls, imply-
ing a decrease in the aggregate demand for skill. An increase in industrial productivity
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is large enough that aggregate productivity increases, although slightly dampened due to
between-sector reallocation.
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Chapter 3
Capital-Based Corporate Tax Benefits:
Endogenous Misallocation through Lobby-
ing
This chapter is co-authored with Felipe E. Saffie and Minchul Shin.
Abstract
The dominant issue of corporate lobbying in the U.S. is taxation. Firms that lobby are
granted tax benefits and enjoy systematically lower effective tax rates than non-politically
active firms, even after controlling by firm characteristics. Because most of these tax benefits
are tied to capital holding, corporate lobbying could distort the allocation of capital in
the economy. A heterogeneous firm dynamics model with endogenous lobbying decisions
is presented to study the macroeconomic effects of capital-based tax benefits and their
interaction with endogenous corporate lobbying behavior. The model is calibrated to U.S.
firm-level data. The model suggests that the increase in corporate lobbying and the decrease
in effective corporate tax rates between 1998-99 and 2010-11 are mostly due to the increase
in the availability of political rents. Moreover, rent-seeking by firms explains more than
20% of the dispersion in the marginal product of capital, the main measure used in the
literature to quantify the misallocation of capital.
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3.1 Introduction
The current U.S. tax system taxes corporate income at a statutory rate of 35%, the
highest rate among the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
nations.1,2 The system, however, contains a number of deductions, exemptions, deferrals,
and tax credits. The largest part of corporate tax benefits - also referred to as corporate
tax expenditures - includes accelerated depreciation, the domestic production activities de-
duction, the deferral of income earned abroad, and credit for increasing research activities. 3
These benefits affect firms unequally. For instance, the largest tax deduction is associated
with depreciation of capital, and one of the most important tax credits is the Research
and Experimentation Tax Credit, heavily used by large and capital intensive companies.
These tax provisions imply that the effective tax rate paid by U.S. corporations is highly
heterogeneous and well below 35% on average.4 Figure (16) illustrates the distribution of
effective tax rates paid by U.S. corporations over the past decade. Effective tax rates vary
significantly across firms, with the average fluctuating around 21.8%.
Nevertheless, the nature and extension of these tax benefits is not completely exogenous
to the companies. In fact, some of those benefits are applicable to a very restrictive set of
firms.5 This leaves room for corporate pressure by lobbying activity. While tax benefits
cannot be negotiated on a case-by-case basis with companies because they must be incor-
porated into a tax code, many companies successfully lobby for the creation of tax benefits
1According to the law, the tax starts at 15% for income below $50 , 000. It reaches 34% gradually for
incomes between $335, 000 and $10m, then it gradually increases to 35% for incomes above $18.33m.
2See Appendix C.1 for corporate income tax rates in OECD countries.
3Tax expenditures - special exemptions and exclusions, credits, deductions, deferrals, and preferential
tax rates claimed by corporations - support federal policy goals to encourage certain types of behaviors and
assist certain businesses but result in revenue forgone by the federal government. Source: U.S. Government
Accountability Office.
4The effective tax rate for a corporation is the average rate at which its pre-tax profits are taxed. It
is computed by dividing total tax expenses by the firm’s earnings before taxes. In fact, the U.S. average
effective tax rate is similar to the OECD weighted average, as reported in Gravelle and Marples (2014).
5For example, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2013), “in 2010 almost 12, 000
organizations claimed the tax exemption for certain insurance companies owned by tax-exempt organizations
($200 million in corporate tax revenue losses in 2011) while 5 corporations claimed the credit for energy
efficient appliances ($280 million in corporate tax revenue losses in 2011).”
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Source: Authors’ calculation. 5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 90%, and 95%
quantiles of effective tax rate among all firms over time.
Figure 16: Effective Tax Rate Distribution
tailored to their profiles.6 Not surprisingly, lobbying expenditures for taxation purposes
are among the top two issues of corporate lobbying every single year in the U.S. The tax
benefits of firms that lobby can be seen even in the raw data. As Figure (17a) shows, lobby-
ing firms face consistently lower effective tax rates than non-lobbying firms7, and this gap
is particularly important when corporate lobbying expenditure for taxation, Figure (17b),
increases sharply.
This paper, thus, aims to study the macroeconomic effects of capital-based tax benefits
and their interaction with endogenous corporate lobbying behavior. In particular, as this
class of benefits distorts the marginal cost of capital differently across firms, it can poten-
tially generate substantial capital misallocation in the economy. In a nutshell, if two firms
face different costs of capital, the marginal productivity of capital between these firms will
not be equalized, and, hence, a redistribution of the total existing capital from this distorted
6Case studies and journal articles are full of examples. See, for instance, Kocieniewski (2011) for “GE’s
strategies let it avoid taxes altogether,” and McIntyre et al. (2011) for “Corporate taxpayers and corporate
tax dodgers.”
7For the rest of the paper, the terms “lobbying firm” and “non-lobbying firm” are used to describe a
firm’s lobbying status. For example, firm A is a lobbying firm in 2000 if it spent money on lobbying in 2000.
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Figure 17: Effective Tax Rates and Lobbying Expenditures
situation could potentially increase output in the economy. Moreover, the presence of po-
litical rents tied to lobbying can substantially amplify the gaps in the marginal product of
capital among firms and, therefore, exacerbate the misallocation in the economy.
To support the link between tax benefits and firms’ political influence, which will be the
central mechanism of interest, some empirical regularities on effective corporate taxation
and lobbying behavior in the U.S. economy are documented. The lobbying data from the
Center for Responsive Politics is matched with Compustat to obtain the firm characteristics
that are necessary for calculating effective corporate tax rates.8 We first document that
taxation is the dominant issue for corporate lobbying, and that, although less than 12% of
the sample lobbies every year, these firms account for more than 50% of the capital holding
in the sample. Then, we document three empirical regularities that motivate our model: i)
capital intensity is associated with lower effective tax rates; ii) lobbying firms are large and
capital intensive; iii) lobbying firms, on average, have lower effective tax rates.
To identify the mechanisms that link tax benefits and firms’ lobbying activities to
resource misallocation, we develop a dynamic model of heterogeneous firms with endogenous
8The Center for Responsive Politics data set is available starting in 1998.
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lobbying decisions. The framework is adapted from Hopenhayn (1992). In the model
economy, firms use a decreasing returns to scale technology to transform capital and labor
into output, and they face idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Firms decide on the level
of inputs and on lobbying spending. In addition, there is a government, which grants tax
benefits to firms as tax deductions associated with their capital holdings. A first component
of these benefits is applied to all firms, while a second component can be influenced by
lobbying activity, namely, a preferential tax treatment. However, because the government
has limited resources for tax expenditures, the benefits are allocated sequentially, starting
with the firms that value them the most. Hence, only a subset of the firms lobby in
equilibrium.
In order to quantify the macroeconomic impact of tax benefits and corporate lobbying
on capital allocation, we calibrate the model to the U.S. economy during 2010-11. The
benchmark calibration is able to successfully match every targeted moment. We evaluate
the model calibration using a set of non-targeted moments. The model is able to mimic
closely the empirical distribution of the marginal product of capital, for both lobbying
and non-lobbying firms. Moreover, it generates 70% of the persistence in lobbying status
observed in the data, as well as the signs of all conditional correlations between lobbying
activities and effective tax rates documented in the empirical section. The success of the
model relies on the fact that highly productive firms with low capital that decide optimally
not to participate in lobbying face a higher effective tax rate than low-productivity firms
that over-accumulate capital in order to maximize their tax benefits from lobbying.
After validating the calibrated model, we conduct two counterfactual exercises. First,
we examine whether an increase in the fraction of revenue losses from tax expenditures
can explain the differences between 1998-99 and 2010-11. To this end, we compare the
benchmark to a counterfactual calibration, where the only change is that the fraction of
revenue losses from tax expenditures is set to 1998-99. In the model, the increase in the
proportion of tax benefits generates a decrease in the effective tax rate of lobbying and
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non-lobbying firms, with lobbying firms experiencing a larger decrease. It also increases
the fraction of lobbying firms and the amount of capital held by them. All these trends
are present in the data. Moreover, the model captures fairly well the magnitudes of these
changes. It generates 76% of the observed decrease in the average effective tax rate of
the U.S. economy. The second exercise studies the effect of capital-based tax benefits
and corporate lobbying on capital misallocation. To this end, we compare the benchmark
model to two counterfactuals, one where tax benefits are tied to capital but lobbying does
not generate additional rents, and the other where there are neither standard capital-based
benefits nor rents to be extracted by lobbying. Because, in an undistorted world, the
marginal product of capital should be equalized among firms, the dispersion of the marginal
product of capital reflects an inefficiency in allocation of resources. The impact of corporate
lobbying on misallocation is substantial. Firms’ political activity accounts for at least 20%
and up to 70% of the dispersion. The remaining fraction is due to the standard tax benefits
that apply evenly across firms. Therefore, the calibrated model suggests that an increase in
the fraction of tax expenditures can explain a decrease in effective tax rates and an increase
in corporate lobbying at both the extensive and intensive margins. This, in turn, worsens
capital misallocation in the economy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes some of the related literature
on firms’ political activity and corporate taxation. Section 3.3 presents our database and
the main empirical findings of the paper. A dynamic model of heterogeneous firms with
endogenous lobbying decisions is introduced in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents the quan-
titative exercises, including the model calibration and quantitative experiment. Finally,
Section 3.6 concludes the paper.
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3.2 Literature Review
The paper contributes to two strands of literature: corporate lobbying and resource
misallocation. Firm-level empirical work on corporate lobbying has been done in several
dimensions. Igan et al. (2012) find that lobbying was associated with more risk-taking
during 2000-07. Kerr et al. (2014) explore lobbying behavior toward immigration-specific
issues and document the persistence in lobbying status. Several accounting and finance
papers have explored the link between lobbying expenditure and tax benefits. Birnbaum
and Murray (2010) provide evidence of the pressure exerted by lobbyists in the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 in the United States in order to grant specific benefits and exemptions to their
clients. Kang (2013) quantifies the effect of lobbying expenditures on policy enactment in
the energy sector. Among others, Richter et al. (2009), Meade and Li (2012), Cooper et al.
(2010), and Brown et al. (2013) find that political action by firms is positively correlated
with firms’ preferential treatment and profit. However, theoretical work is considerably
less developed. The only area of study that is theoretically and empirically well developed
is the literature on the influence of lobbying activity on trade policy by Grossman and
Helpman (1994), Mitra (1999), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), Bombardini (2008),
Bombardini and Trebbi (2012), and Kim (2012). Less attention has been drawn to tax
lobbying, which accumulates more expenditure than trade issues for every single year in the
data. Even so, little work has been done in looking at lobbying effort as an endogenously
determined decision.
Recent literature emphasizes that input misallocation across firms is one of the main
sources of aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) loss. Many factors are thought to be
important sources of misallocation. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Lagos (2006) and
Guner et al. (2008) study the distortion created by taxes and government policy, which
leads to resource misallocation and aggregate TFP loss. Another interesting factor is trade
barriers as a source of misallocation, studied by Waugh (2010) and Epifani and Gancia
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(2011). However, the most studied source of misallocation is credit market imperfections.
Erosa (2001), Amaral and Quintin (2010), Buera et al. (2011), and Midrigan and Xu
(2010) have all estimated the effects of credit market imperfections on TFP through various
channels. However, one key issue in this literature is that productivity differentials usually
disappear once the establishments can overcome credit market constraints through self-
financing. Instead of focusing on the channel which creates misallocation, Restuccia and
Rogerson (2008) exogenously introduce idiosyncratic tax rates and examine the conditions
under which the misallocation caused by these generic distortions leads to larger effects
on aggregate TFP. In our paper, we propose a new source of misallocation which, to our
knowledge, has not been explored. The distortion in our model is endogenously driven by
capital-based tax benefits and firms’ rent-seeking behavior, creating resource misallocation.
3.3 Data and Empirical Regularities
This section introduces the database used in this paper. We first document that tax-
ation is the dominant issue in corporate lobbying. Then we document an expansion in
lobbying activities, at both the intensive and extensive margins, during the 1998-2011 pe-
riod. Finally, we document the main empirical regularities that motivate our modelling
strategy.
3.3.1 Data: Lobbying for Taxation
The empirical analysis relies on two sources of data. Lobbying behavior data is obtained
from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP). This data is available due to the Lobbying
Disclosure Act of 1995.9 This Act requires filers to disclose detailed information about
9This Act was strengthened by the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2011. Because
the law did not change the mandatory disclosure, we decided to use the complete data for this analysis.
Nevertheless, our empirical analysis is robust to the exclusion of this part of the data.
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lobbying expenditures above $3,000 during a quarter.10 Lobbying activity is reported under
one of 78 issue areas and the expenditure allocated to lobbying on a particular bill must be
declared. The information on firm’s characteristics comes from Compustat. This database
contains detailed information on sales, employment, assets, and tax expenditures, among
other variables, for publicly traded companies in the U.S. economy. Table (17) summarizes
the raw data for the period spanning 1998 - 2011.
Table 17: Lobbying Data and Compustat
Lobbying data Compustat Lobbying in Compustat
# of obs. (firm-year) 72,110 159,111 4,978
Lobbying Expenditure ($ million) 14,130 N/A 6,674 (47.2%)
Total Asset ($ million) N/A 873,200,000 289,000,000 (33.1%)
Although the CRP data contains not only corporate lobbying but also lobbying by
organizations, individuals, and even foreign governments, lobbying firms account for 47%
of the total lobbying expenditures in CRP. Therefore, most corporate lobbying activity is
likely to be reflected in our sample. In addition, lobbying firms account for 33% of the total
asset values in Compustat. Therefore, given the relevance of actors involved in lobbying,
lobbying behavior is likely to have a sizable impact on the aggregate economy. Moreover,
the data shows that the primary purpose of lobbying is taxation.
As shown in Table (18), the percentage of total lobbying expenditures spent on taxation
issues over the period of 1998-2011 is well above every other issue.11 Appendix C.2 presents
this analysis for each year. Taxation ranks first every year except 2009.12
10Firms with in-house lobbying activities are also required to report the relevant information. However,
the CRP data do not include bribes, other under-the-table payments or firms’ illegal expenditures aiming
to influence policy outcomes.
11Each bill might contain multiple issues, so we discount the dollar amount by the number of issues. Then
we build the total amount for every issue during the period and rank them accordingly. Ranking is based
on the matched data set before sample selection.
12The health care reform in 2009 placed health issues at the top.
94
Table 18: Percentage of Aggregate Expenditures by Is-
sues (Top 10, 1998 − 2011)
Issue %
Taxes 10.68
Health Issues 7.47
Energy/Nuclear 5.30
Budget/Appropriations 5.22
Medicare/Medicaid 5.02
Trade (Domestic & Foreign) 4.93
Defense 4.15
Telecommunications 3.81
Environmental/Superfund 3.77
Financial Institutions/Investments/Securities 3.53
3.3.2 Lobbying at the Extensive and Intensive Margin
Table (19) and Figure (18) show descriptive statistics for lobby data.13 In our sample,
the number of lobbying firms has increased over the years. In particular, the number of
lobbying firms was practically constant at around 80 firms for the first five years, and
then it has been increasing steadily, and double the number in the last year of the sample.
This implies that lobbying participation increased by more than double during the past
decade. The intensive margin also follows a similar pattern, i.e., the average lobbying
expenditure almost doubled during the period. Introducing the median into the analysis,
we see considerable inequality among lobbying expenditures, where few firms account for
most of the expenditures. This inequality grows steadily over time. Finally, the dispersion
in lobbying expenditure essentially doubles during the period. Figure (18) illustrates the
trends in lobbying activities at both the intensive and extensive margins over time. The
increasing trend is obvious for all variables: the total lobbying expenditure, the proportion
of lobbying firms, the average lobbying expenditure, and the standard deviation of lobbying
expenditure. In addition, each variable more than doubles over the period of 1998-2011.
13Hereafter, we focus on lobby invoices that are issued for tax subjects. Appendix C.3 describes the sample
selection procedure, the removal of outliers and the basic variables of the data set used for the rest of this
section.
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Table 19: Descriptive Statistics for Lobby Data
year # of firms # of lob firms % lob firms lob exp per firm median (lob exp) SD(lob exp) total exp
1998 2146 78 3.63 1.09 0.2 1.83 85.35
1999 1952 83 4.25 0.92 0.24 1.46 76.23
2000 1748 84 4.81 1.13 0.22 1.76 94.65
2001 1480 69 4.66 1.1 0.19 1.93 75.83
2002 1433 63 4.4 1.17 0.15 2.02 73.72
2003 1592 85 5.34 1.02 0.35 1.71 86.99
2004 1768 102 5.77 1.21 0.38 1.84 123.22
2005 1801 115 6.39 1.35 0.34 2.66 154.71
2006 1766 124 7.02 1.23 0.4 2.03 153.12
2007 1657 132 7.97 1.34 0.45 2.28 176.48
2008 1353 127 9.39 1.73 0.57 3.2 219.46
2009 1236 127 10.28 1.68 0.39 2.92 213.99
2010 1402 160 11.41 2.22 0.61 4.41 355.81
2011 1479 153 10.34 1.99 0.64 3.29 304.57
average 1629.5 107.29 6.83 1.37 0.37 2.38 156.72
sum 22813 - - - - - 2194.13
98-99 avg 2049 80.5 3.94 1.01 0.22 1.65 80.79
10-11 avg 1440.5 156.5 10.88 2.11 0.63 3.85 330.19
1 Lobbying expenditure (million dollars) is deflated by the GDP deflator (index=100 at 1998).
2 Lobbying expenditure per firm is the average lobbying expenditure among lobbying firms.
3 Lobbying statistics are based on bills that are issued for tax. Appendix C.3 describes the sample selection procedure.
3.3.3 Conditional Correlations: Effective Tax Rate, Capital Intensity,
and Lobbying Activity
The statutory corporate tax rate is generally flat at 35% in the U.S. economy for our
sample. This is the highest corporate tax rate among the O.E.C.D. countries. Neverthe-
less, the effective tax rates actually paid by U.S. companies are well below this rate. We
calculate effective tax rates in our sample following the definition of Richter et al. (2009).
In a nutshell, the effective tax rate is taxes paid divided by taxable income reported to
stockholders. Each company’s effective tax rate is computed using entries from Compustat
as follows:
ETR =
Income Taxes Total −Deferred Taxes
Pre-Tax Income − Equity in Earnings − Special Items + Interest Expense .
As mentioned above, firms in our sample on average pay an effective tax rate of 21 .8%,
considerably lower than the statutory tax rate. Moreover, there is considerable hetero-
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Figure 18: Lobbying Data Statistics
geneity across firms with respect to their effective tax rate. Lobby data suggests that
corporate lobbying seems to influence a potential pattern for this heterogeneity. In partic-
ular, the time-series of ETR conditional on lobbying activity suggests that lobbying firms
face consistently lower effective tax rates than their non-lobbying counterparts. This section
provides more compelling evidence of the correlation between corporate lobbying activity
and effective tax rates. Table (20) presents the results of five panel regressions estimated
using random effects. The dependent variable in every specification is the effective tax rate.
More details on variables can be found in Appendix C.4.
Reg (1) and Reg (2) provide evidence on the correlation between effective tax rates and
corporate lobbying activity at the extensive margin. Reg (1) confirms that the effective
tax rate differential between lobbying firms and non-lobbying firms is significant even after
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Table 20: Effective Tax Rate Panel Regression
Reg (1) Reg (2) Reg (3) Reg (4) Reg (5)
if lobt−1 -0.014** -0.010** -0.006
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
log lobt−1 -0.020** -0.018*** -0.014*
(0.009) (0.006) (0.007)
cap int -0.575*** -0.354*** -0.572*** -0.359*** -0.360***
(0.067) (0.045) (0.067) (0.045) (0.045)
log lobt−1 × cap int 0.109 0.105
(0.080) (0.079)
ETRt−1 0.343*** 0.343*** 0.343***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
lev -0.196*** -0.142*** -0.195*** -0.142*** -0.142***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
inv int 1.432** 1.165** 1.447** 1.162** 1.159**
(0.655) (0.466) (0.656) (0.466) (0.466)
R&D int -0.675 0.346 -0.547 0.522 0.569
(3.055) (2.194) (3.063) (2.206) (2.207)
size 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.009** 0.005*** 0.005***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Random effect model Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.140 0.344 0.140 0.344 0.344
# of observations 15743 15743 15743 15743 15743
1 ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.01.
2 † Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix C.4.
controlling by capital intensity, leverage, investment intensity, R&D intensity, size, year and
industry dummies. In particular, just controlling for the extensive margin, we see that, on
average, lobbying firms face effective tax rates 1.4% lower. As Reg (2) shows, this result
is robust when the lagged effective tax rate is included in the regression. This result also
holds at the intensive margin, as shown in Reg (3) and Reg (4). Firms that lobby more face
lower effective tax rates. When including both extensive and intensive margins, Reg (5)
shows that both effects maintain their signs, but only the intensive margin is statistically
significant. Interestingly, capital intensity is associated with a lower effective tax rate in
every specification. This points to the capital-based tax benefits that constitute most of
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the tax expenditures in the U.S. These results are in line with those of Richter et al. (2009)
and Meade and Li (2012).
3.4 Model Economy
To study the mechanism that links tax benefits and firms’ lobbying activities and its
effect on resource misallocation, this section presents a dynamic model of heterogeneous
firms with endogenous lobbying decisions to obtain tax preferential treatment. The model
is adapted from Hopenhayn (1992). In the model, the industry is composed of a continuum
of firms which produce a homogeneous product. Firms behave competitively, taking prices
as given. They decide on the level of capital and lobbying spending. In addition, there is a
government, which grants tax benefits to firms in the form of tax deductions or tax credits. A
part of tax benefits is standard, applied to all firms, while the other part can be influenced
by lobbying activity, namely, preferential tax treatment. However, the government has
limited resources for tax expenditures. In the model, the benefits are allocated sequentially,
starting with the firms that value them the most, until the total amount of funds available
for tax benefits is reached. Therefore, in equilibrium, only a subset of the firms lobby.
3.4.1 Firms
An operating firm starts the period with capital k and debt b. It produces output using
a production function that combines productivity z, capital k, and labor n. The production
function has a decreasing return to scale:
y = f(z, k, n) = zkαnη, (3.1)
99
where 0 < α + η < 1 and α, η ∈ (0, 1). The productivity z follows
ln(zt+1) = (1− ρ) ln(μ) + ρ ln(zt) + ²t+1, ²t+1 ∼ N
(
0, σ2
)
(3.2)
After producing and selling the output, the firm is subject to the statutory tax of τ on
its net income. However, the government grants tax benefits to firms in the form of tax
deductions or tax credits associated with the firm’s capital stock. A part of tax benefits is
standard, applying to all firms, while the other part can be influenced by lobbying activity.
Because the government has limited resource to spend on tax credits, not every firm is
granted those additional tax benefits in equilibrium. We assume that standard benefits are
granted to every firm first. Then, if there are still resources to be allocated, those lobby-
dependent tax benefits are granted. In particular, we assume that lobby-induced benefits
are allocated sequentially, starting with the firms that are willing to lobby the most14. Note
that, because the information is perfect, every agent knows in equilibrium what the order
is. In the firm’s problem, this is equivalent to the existence of a threshold of lobbying effort,
l, above which the firm receives preferential tax treatment. Therefore, the firm lobbies if
and only if its non-strategic lobbying decision is above the threshold l. In addition, the
firm can accumulate capital over time. It finances the new capital k′ and dividends d with
after-tax profits net of debt payment and a new loan b′. However, the loan is subject to the
collateral constraint such that there is no default.
The timing of the decision for an operating firm within each period is as follows. At the
beginning of the period υ, a fraction of firms exogenously exit. All surviving firms realize
their idiosyncratic productivity z. A firm with capital k, debt b and productivity z makes
the decision on labor and lobbying spending. It then chooses a new loan, capital for the
following period, and dividends. At the end of each period, firms with negative values exit.
14This assumption is for tractability, as it allows us to have a single equilibrium associated with lobbying.
It mimics the case that big corporations are allowed to negotiate before small companies.
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The firm value function is given by
V (k, b, z; l) = max
{
V l(k, b, z; l), V nl(k, b, z; l), 0
}
, (3.3)
where
V l(k, b, z; l) = max
n,k′,b′,l≥l
dl +
1− υ
1 + r
Ez′|zV (k′, b′, z′; l′) (3.4)
V nl(k, b, z; l) = max
n,k′,b′
dnl +
1− υ
1 + r
Ez′|zV (k′, b′, z′; l′) (3.5)
subject to a non-negative dividend condition given by
dl = (1− τ)π + τR (l, b, k) + (1− δ)k − k′ − b + 1
1 + r
b′ − Γ(l) ≥ 0, (3.6)
dnl = (1− τ)π + τR (0, b, k) + (1− δ)k − k′ − b + 1
1 + r
b′ ≥ 0, (3.7)
π = zkαnη − wn. (3.8)
R (l, b, k) is the firm-specific tax deduction, which depends on the standard tax benefits b,
lobbying effort l, and capital k. Tax benefits reduce net income that is subject to tax. This
function will be specified in the next section. Even though the firm decides not to lobby, it
can still get the standard tax benefits. By making lobbying effort l, the firm receives extra
tax benefits but incurs the cost of Γ(l) = γ2 l
2. Flows are discounted at the interest rate
1 + r15.
3.4.2 Government and Tax Policy
The government grants corporate tax benefits to reduce a tax burden. Mostly , firms
obtain tax benefits, notably through research and experimentation credits and accelerated
depreciation schedules tailored to specific types of capital equipment.16 As stated in the
15In this model, there is no aggregated risk; therefore, we can think of r as the long-run interest rate
implied by the discount factor of a representative household owning every firm.
16See Bartlett and Steele (1988), McIntyre and Nguyen (2000, 2004), and Richter et al. (2009).
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previous section, a firm-specific tax deduction follows the function R (l, Ω, k), where
R (l, Ω, k) = min
{
(ψlϕ + Ω) kφ, χπ
}
0 < ϕ, φ < 1 (3.9)
How much a firm can reap tax benefits depends on its capital k, in line with the
fact that most tax benefits are tied to capital, either in the form of research activities or
accelerated depreciation of machinery and equipment.17 Without any effort in lobbying,
the tax burden decreases by τΩkφ. If a firm lobbies, it obtains preferential tax treatment,
where the additional tax benefit is increasing in the lobbying effort. To ensure that, at
least, a minimum amount of income tax is paid in spite of the legitimate use of deductions,
the maximum tax deduction is limited by a firm’s profit, χπ.
Finally, the government can only forgo a limited fraction of its revenue on corporate tax
expenditures.18 Because the amount of tax expenditures is limited, the government only
grants preferential tax treatment to firms that put in more lobbying efforts, until it runs
out of resources. Tax benefits, therefore, are partly determined by other firms’ lobbying
spending and the total amount of tax expenditures. There is a threshold l such that firms
receive preferential tax treatment according to their lobbying effort only if their lobbying
effort is higher than this threshold. The government tax expenditure constraint is
τ
∫
R (l(k, b, z)× 1{l(k, b, z) ≥ l}, Ω, k) dΨ(k, b, z) = θτ
∫
(zkαnη −wn)dΨ(k, b, z). (3.10)
That is, the government is willing to lose a θ fraction of its revenue on corporate tax
expenditures.
17In 2011, accelerated depreciation of machinery and equipment and credit for increasing research activities
accounted for 48% of corporate tax revenue losses.
18A corporate tax expenditure is a debatable issue for policymakers. Although it supports federal pol-
icy goals to provide incentives and assist certain businesses, estimated revenue loss due to corporate tax
expenditures is relatively large.
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3.4.3 Entrants
The problem for a potential entrant is simple in this model. All entrants enter with no
debt. Capital collected from exiting firms is distributed equally among entrants, and their
initial productivity is drawn from the ergodic distribution associated with Equation (3.2).
Thus, the value for a potential entrant is given by
V e(z) = V (kˉ0, 0, z; l), (3.11)
where kˉ0 is the capital distributed equally among entrants. To ensure that the mass of
firms does not change, the mass of entrants must be the same as the mass of firms that
exit, either exogenously or voluntarily.
3.4.4 Definition of Equilibrium
Definition 3. Given a wage rate w and interest rate r, a stationary partial equilibrium
under the tax policy rule R is a set of value functions {V, V l, V nl, V e}, decision rules
{n(k, b, z), k′(k, b, z), b′(k, b, z) , l(k, b, z) }, an exit decision, a threshold l ,and a distribution
Ψ(k, b, z) such that, given prices, the following conditions are satisfied:
1. Firms’ value functions, their decision rules and exit decisions are consistent with
(3.3)-(3.8), and (3.11).
2. A stationary distribution Ψ.
3. The government tax expenditure constraint (3.10) holds.
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3.5 Quantitative Exercise
In this section, we perform a quantitative exploration of the model introduced in Sec-
tion 3.4 to assess the impact of capital-based tax benefits on resource misallocation in the
economy and their interaction with firms’ rent-seeking behavior. In particular, we calibrate
the model to the firm level data presented in Section 3.3 for the period 2010-11. We evaluate
the calibrated model using two sets of non-targeted moments. The first test is to compare
the distribution of the marginal product of capital that is implied by the model to its data
counterpart. Despite its parsimony, the model is able to match the shape and the first two
moments of the data-generated distribution fairly well. The second challenge faced by the
model tests its ability to replicate the conditional correlation analysis in Section 3.3. The
model-generated data, like the U.S. data, suggest that effective tax rates are negatively cor-
related with a firm’s lobbying activities and capital intensity, and positively correlated with
a firm’s values. Moreover, we show that the empirically observed persistence in the lobbying
status of the firms can be generated by the model through the interaction between tax ben-
efits and capital holdings. In particular, because capital stock is endogenously persistent,
it imparts this property to the lobby participation margin.
We then use the calibrated model to learn more about the lobbying process and its
implications for the allocation of capital in the economy. In the first experiment, we show
that an increase in the fraction of revenue loss from tax expenditures between 1998-99
and 2010-11 can explain a decrease in the overall effective tax rate and also can explain
an increase in both the intensive and extensive margin of lobbying during the period. In
the second experiment, we use the calibrated model to study the impact of lobbying and
capital-based tax benefits on resource misallocation in the U.S. economy. We document that
lobbying can account for at least 20% of capital misallocation, measured as the variance of
the marginal product of capital.
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3.5.1 Calibration
We calibrate our model to the U.S. economy. Parameters are grouped into two cate-
gories. The first category includes parameters for which the values are either taken from
other literature or directly obtained from the data. The second category includes parame-
ters chosen so that endogenous outcomes from the model match salient features of the U.S.
firm-level data in 2010-11.
The productivity process is discretized following the method in Tauchen (1986). The
number of grid points for z is set to 20. The productivity distribution of entrants is as-
sumed to be the ergodic distribution obtained from the transition matrix. The parameters
governing the productivity process are set to those estimated for the U.S. manufacturing
sector by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). In particular, ρ = 0.885, μ = 1, and σ = 0.2.
The return to scale α + η is set to 0.85, as in Restuccia and Rogerson (2008). A standard
value of the income share of labor is 0.64, implying α = 0.31 and η = 0.54. The depreciation
rate δ is taken from D’Erasmo and Moscoso Boedo (2012) in their firm dynamics model for
the formal sector of the U.S. economy. The exogenous exit probability, υ, is in the range
used in the U.S. data, 3%−6%.19 The maximum bound on tax benefits, χ, ensures that, at
least, a minimum amount of income tax is paid in spite of the legitimate use of tax credits.20
Finally, the taxation parameters, τ and θ, are taken directly from the statutory tax rate and
tax credits in the U.S. In particular, the statutory corporate tax rate is 35% and the tax
expenditure ratio is calculated from the IRS corporate income tax returns balance sheet.
Five internally calibrated parameters are those governing tax benefits and lobby spend-
ing: Ω, φ, ϕ, ψ, and γ. Although these parameters are calibrated jointly to match six
targeted moments, each parameter value is mostly related to a particular moment. The
base tax deduction that is independent of lobbying expenditure, Ω, pins down the average
19Its only role is to ensure the existence of a stationary distribution by preventing firms from accumulating
capital without bounds.
20This rules out highly negative effective tax rates. In the baseline calibration, this constraint binds for
10% of firms.
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Table 21: Parameter Values
Value Description Source
Predetermined Parameters
θ 0.33 Revenue loss by tax expenditure IRS corporate tax returns balance sheet
α 0.31 Production function, capital Income share, Restuccia and Rogerson (2008)
η 0.54 Production function, labor Income share, Restuccia and Rogerson (2008)
δ 0.07 Depreciation of capital D’Erasmo and Moscoso Boedo (2012)
τ 0.35 Statutory tax rate U.S. statutory corporate tax rate
r 0.04 Interest rate D’Erasmo and Moscoso Boedo (2012)
υ 0.06 Exogenous exit rate Restuccia and Rogerson (2008)
χ 1.5 Maximum benefit Mininum ETR = 1st percentile ETR samples
ρ 0.89 Autocorrelation Cooper and Haltiwanger(2006)
μ 1 Mean of productivity Cooper and Haltiwanger(2006)
σ 0.2 Std Dev of stochastic component Cooper and Haltiwanger(2006)
Calibrated Parameters
b 0.075 Tax benefit, base deduction Mean ETR of non-lobbying firms
φ 0.35 Tax benefit, capital exponent Fraction of capital held by lobbying firms
ϕ 0.04 Tax benefit, lobby exponent Mean ETR of lobbying firms
ψ 2.5 Tax benefit, lobby scale Fraction of lobbying firm
γ 41.6 Lobby cost, scale Lobbying expenditure to sales
effective tax rate of the non-lobbying firms in the data. φ, which represents the link be-
tween the capital level of the firm and its tax deductions, is closely related to the fraction
of total capital held by lobbying firms in equilibrium. The exponent of lobbying in the
benefit function, ϕ, closely links to the average effective tax rate of lobbying firms in the
economy. The scale of the benefit function, ψ, has a direct nexus to the minimum lobbying
expenditure that allows for benefits, l, and therefore it affects the fraction of lobbying firms
in equilibrium. Lastly, the scale parameter of the lobbying cost function, γ, determines
how firms allocate their profit to lobbying activities, so it is mostly related to the ratio of
lobbying expenditure to sales in the economy. Table (21) summarizes all parameter values.
The targeted moments are reported in Table (22).
The model-based counterpart of the data is based on the stationary distribution of the
economy. Despite its parsimony, the model is able to successfully match the targets. The
model does a good job of generating the small fraction of lobbying firms, which own more
than half of the total capital. In particular, approximately 60% of capital is owned by
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Table 22: Targeted Moments
Moments Data Model
Average effective tax rate (%) All firms 18.7 18.0
Lobbying firms 15.5 10.8
Non-lobbying firms 19.1 19.2
Lobbying firms (%) 10.9 13.5
Capital owned by lobbying firms (%) 60 64
Lobby expenditure over sales (%) 0.06 0.11
lobbying firms, which only account for 10% of firms. The model also generates the result
that lobbying firms, on average, pay lower effective tax rates. Although matching well the
average effective tax rate of non-lobbying firms, the model underestimates the effective tax
rate of lobbying firms.
3.5.2 Results and Non-Targeted Moments
Lobbying firms, on average, pay lower effective tax rates. This is mainly due to pref-
erential tax treatment granted when they exert lobbying efforts. The right panel of Figure
(19) shows that, without lobbying benefits, the effective tax rate is increasing in productiv-
ity and capital. This is because the standard deductions are tied only to capital, and with a
decreasing return. Once lobbying benefits are introduced to the policy function, i.e. ψ > 0,
large firms find it profitable to lobby and become entitled to additional deductions. The left
panel of Figure (19) illustrates how lobbying effort can change the relative effective tax rate
for lobbying firms and non-lobbying firms. For firms with the same level of productivity,
large firms enjoy significantly lower effective tax rates when they decide to exert lobbying
effort, compared to small, non-lobbying firms. However, lobbying benefits, measured by ef-
fective tax rates, seem to be less prominent for highly productive firms because the benefits
are only tied to capital.
To make it clearer, the black dots in Figure (19) show two firms with the same amount
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(b) Model without Lobbying benefits (ψ = 0)
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Figure 19: Effective Tax Rate Functions for Baseline Model and Model without Lobbying
Benefits
of income. Effective tax rates faced by large, unproductive firms are substantially lower
than those faced by small, productive firms in the baseline model, while the difference is
less noticeable in the model without lobbying benefits. This obviously has implications for
resource misallocation issues. On the one hand, large, unproductive firms enjoy tax bene-
fits, encouraging them to accumulate more capital. On the other hand, small, productive
firms face high effective tax rates, reducing their after-tax profit and preventing them from
accumulating capital.
Marginal Product of Capital, Non-Targeted Moments
Because the model has a clear implication for resource misallocation and because further
analyses will be conducted in Section 3.5.4 to explore how tax benefits and lobbying activ-
ities distort the allocation of capital, it is crucial to see how well the model can match the
most common measure of resource misallocation, i.e., a dispersion of the marginal product
of capital (MPK).
Table (23) reports four non-targeted moments: the relative mean and standard devi-
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Table 23: Marginal Product of Capital (MPK), Non-Targeted Moments
Moments Data Model
mean(MPK) (Lobbying firms)/(All firms) 0.71 0.71
(Non-lobbying firms)/(All firms) 1.04 1.04
std. dev.(MPK) (Lobbying firms)/(All firms) 0.57 0.09
(Non-lobbying firms)/(All firms) 1.04 1.07
ation of the marginal product of capital for both lobbying and non-lobbying firms. The
data show that lobbying firms have, on average, lower marginal product of capital than
the average firm, and that non-lobbying firms have, on average, higher marginal product
of capital. The data also suggest that the marginal product of capital is two times less
dispersed among lobbying firms than non-lobbying firms. Most of these facts are captured
well by the model.
In the model, as suggested by the policy functions in Figure (19), lobbying firms hold
large amounts of capital. The average amount of capital is even larger for less productive
firms. The model, thus, naturally delivers the low average marginal product of capital
among lobbying firms.
Figure (20) compares the model-implied distribution of the logarithmic marginal prod-
uct of capital, in the top panel, to the actual distribution from the data for the period
2010-11, in the bottom panel. Note that the model is able to replicate the distribution of
the marginal product of capital of both groups of firms. In fact, the support of model-
implied demeaned distribution is very similar to the support of the demeaned distribution
in the data. Moreover, just as in the data, the distribution of non-lobbying firms (left panel)
is significantly more dispersed than the distribution of lobbying firms (right panel). Finally,
the shapes of the distributions are also very similar; in fact, the only difference is in the
non-lobbying distribution, where, in the model, there are some signs of a bimodal distribu-
tion. Therefore, because the model is able to capture the main features of the distribution
of the marginal product of capital, it is well suited to study the misallocation of capital in
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Figure 20: Distribution of ln (MPK)
the economy.
Lobbying and Effective Tax Rates, Non-Targeted Moments
When calibrating the model, the targeted moments are the average effective tax rates
of lobbying firms and non-lobbying firms. To check the model performance, a conditional
correlation between lobbying activities and effective tax rates from the model’s predictions
can be compared with the correlation from the data. In particular, the panel regressions (1)
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Table 24: ETR Regressions, Non-Targeted Moments
Variables Reg (1) Reg (3)
Data† Model Data Model Same Sign Data Model Same Sign
if lobt−1 1(l−1 > 0) −0.014∗∗ −0.136 yes
log lobt−1 log(l−1 + 1) −0.020∗∗ −0.022 yes
cap int k/n −0.575∗∗∗ −0.003 yes −0.572∗∗∗ −0.003 yes
lev b/k −0.196*** −0.270 yes −0.195∗∗∗ −0.267 yes
size log(V ) 0.009∗∗∗ 0.306 yes 0.009∗∗∗ 0.308 yes
1 † Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix C.4.
2 ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.01.
3 See Table (20) for regressions with data.
and (3) reported in Table (20) of Section 3.3 are compared to their model counterparts in
a test performed with 100, 000 simulated samples from the benchmark model.21 Table (24)
reports the regression results from model-simulated observations along with those from the
data for the period 1998-2011.
Although the model is calibrated to 2010-11 data, it yields correct predictions of the
sign of all regression coefficients, including lobbying activities, capital intensity, leverage
ratio, and total assets. Regression 1 shows the effect of lobbying at the extensive margin.
Firms that engage in lobbying activity have, on average, lower effective tax rates. Regression
2 shows the effect of lobbying at the intensive margin. By spending a larger amount on
lobbying activity, firms enjoy lower effective tax rates. The higher capital intensity and
leverage ratio the firm has, the lower effective tax rate the firm pays. This is because tax
benefits are tied to capital. Capital intensive firms can claim higher tax benefits. The
negative coefficient for the leverage ratio is influenced by small, unproductive firms that are
highly leveraged but take large benefits from base deductions. These firms pay very low
effective tax rates. Lastly, a proxy for the volume of assets is the firm’s value. Firms with
large volumes of assets pay higher effective tax rates. This prediction arises in the model
from the fact that tax benefits are tied to capital with a decreasing return. Large firms,
and, particularly, productive large firms, can then possibly face higher effective tax rates
because of their large sales volume. Those that pay low effective tax rates are unproductive
21Because there are no model counterparts for R&D intensity and inventories, these variables are dropped
from the analysis.
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firms, which generally have lower values.
3.5.3 The Persistence of Lobbying
A resilient fact of corporate lobbying documented by Kerr et al. (2014) is that lobby
status is highly persistent at the firm level. Before proceeding to the analysis of the cal-
ibrated model, it is interesting to see this moment delivered by the model. Tables (25a)
to (25c) show the average transition probabilities in the data between lobbying and non-
lobbying firms for three different periods. In line with the results from Kerr et al. (2014),
lobbying decisions are highly persistent states. They suggest that this persistence is due
mainly to the option value generated by the interaction between entry cost to lobby and
returns to experience in lobbying.
Table (25d) shows the model-implied transition probability for the baseline calibration.
The baseline model captures more than 70% of the persistence in lobby status without fixed
entry cost to lobby or returns to political experience. The fact that tax benefits are tied
to capital holdings and that capital is highly persistent implies that benefits from lobbying
are also persistent. Therefore, at least for tax-related lobbying, this paper provides an
alternative mechanism that can explain the persistence in firms’ political activism.
Table 25: Transition Matrix of Lobbying Decision
(a) Data (1998 − 1999)
lobt = 0 lobt = 1
lobt−1 = 0 98.74 1.26
lobt−1 = 1 20.31 79.69
(b) Data (2010 − 11)
lobt = 0 lobt = 1
lobt−1 = 0 98.23 1.77
lobt−1 = 1 14.29 85.71
(c) Data (1998 − 2011)
lobt = 0 lobt = 1
lobt−1 = 0 98.45 1.55
lobt−1 = 1 14.59 85.41
(d) Model (Baseline Calibration)
lobt = 0 lobt = 1
lobt−1 = 0 92.67 7.33
lobt−1 = 1 38.1 61.9
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3.5.4 Quantitative Experiment
Changes in Tax Expenditures: How do Lobbying and Tax Evolve from 1998?
The first experiment is to see how well the model can capture changes in lobbying
activities and effective tax rates between 1998-1999 and 2010-11, the first and the final two
years of the data set. Because the level of tax expenditures determined by the government
is observed directly in the data, the only change to the baseline calibration is in θ. In
1998-1999, revenue losses from tax expenditures are 23%, compared to 33% in 2010-11.22
In particular, all targeted moments in the benchmark calibration are obtained for the model
with benchmark parameters but with θ = 0.23.
Table 26: Lobbying and Effective Tax Rate Moments in 1998-1990 and 2010-11
1998-1999 2010-11 Change (%)
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Effective tax rate (%) All firms 24.4 21.9 18.7 18.0 -23.4 -17.8
Lobbying firms 21.2 16.7 15.5 10.8 -26.9 -35.3
Non-lobbying firms 24.6 22.3 19.1 19.2 -22.4 -13.90
lobbying firms (%) 4.0 7.0 10.9 13.5 172.5 92.8
Capital owned by lobbying firms (%) 28 59 60 64 114.3 8.5
Lobbying expenditures to sales (%) 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.11 -14.3 22.2
1 Numbers in bold are targeted. They are reported in Table (22).
2 All parameters but θ are common. θ = 0.23 for the model replicating 1998-99.
The first column of Table (26) shows the data moments from the period of 1998-99.
Although several other parameters might have changed over the past decade, by adjusting
only the fraction of tax expenditures, the model is able to qualitatively predict all changes
observed in the data except the ratio of lobbying expenditures to sales. The last column of
Table (26) compares the percentage changes observed in the data and those predicted by the
model. In fact, other than under-predicting the change in capital owned by lobbying firms
and over-predicting the change in lobbying expenditures over sales, the model quantitatively
22IRS corporate tax returns balance sheet.
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predicts all changes relatively well.
In the model, the increase in tax expenditures reduces the average effective tax rate
for every group of firms, with lobbying firms experiencing a larger decrease. The rise in
tax expenditures allows more firms to benefit from lobbying activities, resulting in a larger
fraction of lobbying firms. Most of these new lobbying firms have low productivity but not
high enough capital, so they were not able to spend a large enough amount on lobbying
activities when preferential tax treatment was more limited. These firms’ optimal lobbying
spending is relatively lower but, once they are granted preferential treatment, their effective
tax rates become substantially lower than those of existing lobbying firms, which generally
have higher productivity and greater capital. As a result, the ratio of lobbying expenditures
to sales decreases, and the average effective tax rate of lobbying firms falls substantially. For
the group of non-lobbying firms, the only effect is that there is a lower proportion of firms
with a large amount of capital, which, in general, have slightly higher effective tax rates,
as discussed above. As a result, the average effective tax rate falls by a smaller percentage.
Lastly, the share of the total capital owned by lobbying firms increases. This is mainly due
to a larger fraction of lobbying firms in the economy. All these predictions are confirmed in
the data, with considerable success even at the quantitative level.
Resource Misallocation
The effective tax rate functions shown in Figure (19) suggest that a non-negligible
distortion is created by the presence of lobbying activities on top of a distortion from the
standard tax benefits, which are applied evenly across firms. Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
point out that the more dispersed is the marginal product of capital, the more severe is the
resource misallocation in the economy. This is because capital can be reallocated across
firms to achieve a higher level of output.
Table (27) shows the dispersion of the marginal product of capital generated by the
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Table 27: Dispersion of Marginal Product of Capital
(1) (2) (3)† (4)††
Measure Benchmark ψ = 0, b = 0 ψ = 0, b = 0.075 ψ = 0, b = 0.8
Variance MPK 1.58 0.07 1.29 0.50
% Tax Expenditures 33% 0% 4% 33%
† The parameter value, b, is kept at a benchmark value.
†† The parameter value, b, is reassigned so that revenue losses from tax expenditure account for 33%.
model with different sets of parameter values. The model with the benchmark parameter
values is reported in the first column. The second column is the model without tax ben-
efits. The last two columns are the models without lobbying benefits, one with the same
base deduction as the benchmark and the other with the base deduction, which yields the
benchmark’s fraction of tax expenditures. The benchmark parameters result in the most
severe misallocation. Removing tax benefits washes out almost all of the misallocation ex-
cept that created by entrants, driving down the variance of the marginal product of capital
practically to zero.23 Removing lobbying benefits yield intermediate results. Therefore,
tax benefits, either base deductions or preferential tax treatment, endogenously generate a
larger dispersion in the marginal product of capital, implying inefficiencies in the allocation
of resources. When base deductions are high, there are a number of highly productive firms
clustered around high levels of capital. Low-productivity firms choose to have low levels
of capital because they can still enjoy very low effective tax rates. When base deductions
are low, more firms, including productive firms, cluster around low levels of capital. As a
result, the variance of the marginal product of capital is larger in the model with lower base
deductions.
In summary, this section shows that the calibrated version of the model introduced in
Section 3.4 successfully replicates the data features highlighted in Section 3.3. Moreover,
the model suggests that the evolution of effective tax rates and lobbying activity in the
U.S. economy between 1998-2011 can be attributed to a relative increase in the availability
23Exit firms are replaced by entrants with capital holdings equal to the total capital of exit firms; only
after a period are they able to adjust their holdings.
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of corporate tax benefits tied to capital usage. Finally, the calibrated model implies that
corporate rent-seeking is responsible for at least 20% of capital misallocation in the U.S.
economy.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we document a wide heterogeneity in the effective corporate taxation
paid by U.S. corporations. In particular, firms in the U.S. pay on average an effective tax
rate that is more than ten percentage points lower than the statutory tax rate, with a great
dispersion among them. This is mainly due to tax benefits granted by the government.
These benefits are not exogenous for every firm. In fact, large, capital-intensive firms are
able to lobby for tailored benefits that fit their profiles. Because most tax provisions are tied
to capital holding, different firms face different marginal benefits depending on their capital
accumulation. Therefore, corporate lobbying can be an endogenous mechanism driving
capital misallocation in the economy.
The heterogeneous firm dynamic model presented in this paper formalizes this mecha-
nism and provides a framework to quantify the role of capital-based tax benefits and firms’
rent-seeking behavior in the economy. In the model, firms are granted tax benefits tied
to their capital holdings, and lobbying firms are granted extra benefits depending on their
lobbying expenditure. Because benefits available through lobbying are limited, only a small
fraction of firms lobby in equilibrium. However, these firms are large and they can poten-
tially hold most of the capital in the economy; therefore, the presence of capital-based tax
benefits and lobbying behavior can potentially create important capital misallocation in the
economy.
The calibrated model matches the targeted and non-targeted moments in the data. In
particular, it is accurate when replicating the non-targeted moments, such as the first two
moments of the marginal product of capital for a group of lobbying and non-lobbying firms.
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The two main quantitative results of the paper can be summarized as follow. First, the
increase in the availability of tax benefits in the U.S. economy between 1998-99 and 2010-11
can explain most of the decrease in the effective tax rate, and can also explain the increase in
lobbying activity at both the intensive and extensive margins. Second, corporate lobbying
accounts for more than 20% of the variance in the marginal product of capital in the U.S.
economy, which measures the degree of misallocation.
This paper provides a new mechanism that can endogenously generate misallocation
of resources in the economy. The main alternative channel in the literature to endogenize
capital misallocation is the existence of credit-constrained firms that cannot achieve their
optimal scale. Future research should contrast the two channels and quantify the contribu-
tion of each channel to the misallocation of capital. For this particular sample, the credit
constraint channel does not seem to be particularly important. In fact, credit access has
not been an issue for large and publicly-held firms in the U.S., even during the Great Reces-
sion. Nevertheless, in a developing economy where small firms are likely to be constrained,
and weak institutions give wide access to rent-seeking behavior, the distinction of the two
channels is fundamental for the efficient design of public policy.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Data
1. World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) A cross-country firm-level data set
collected by the World Bank as a second data source. The data set combines sur-
veys of 130,000 firms in 125 countries, most of which are developing and emerging
countries. The surveys cover a broad range of topics, with in-depth data on firms’
characteristics, ownership structure, technology usage, financial constraints, human
capital and productivity. In particular, the surveys collect information on technol-
ogy adoption, assets, liabilities, sales, raw materials, investments, labor composition,
capital composition and credits. The firms were asked whether they use technology
licensed from a foreign-owned company. This will be used as a proxy for a firm’s
adoption decision. The analysis is based on the standardized survey conducted be-
tween 2002-2005, a common questionnaire across countries allowing for cross-country
comparison. Government-owned firms are excluded from the samples.
Regression Variables Firm characteristics include size, human capital, foreign own-
ership and foreign activity. sizej is the total number of employees. human capitalj
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corresponds to the fraction of skilled workers. foreign ownj is a dummy taking the
value of 1 if more than 40% of the firm’s shares are owned by foreign entities. Impj
takes the value of 1 if more than 40% of the firm’s inputs and supplies are imported
directly or indirectly. Industryk are 11 dummies taking the value of 1 if the firm’s
main production activity is categorized into that particular industry. Countryc is
a matrix including GDP per capita, regulation environments and country dummies.
Regulation environments are proxied by one index, the Ease of Doing Business Rank.
The rank is taken from The World Bank’s Doing Business, where a high ranking on
the ease of doing business index means the regulatory environment is more conducive
to the starting and operation of a local firm. Loan recovery rate measures the cents on
the dollar recovered by creditors through reorganization, liquidation or debt enforce-
ment proceedings. Interest rate spread is the interest rate charged by banks on loans
to prime customers minus the interest rate paid by commercial banks for deposits
or minus the ”risk free” treasury bill interest rate. Credit depth of information in-
dex measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility, and quality of credit information
available through public or private credit registries. The index ranges from 0 to 6,
with higher values indicating the availability of more credit information, from either
a public registry or a private bureau, to facilitate lending decisions. These three mea-
sures are country-specific. Firm-specific interest rate is the loan’s approximate rate
of interest reported by each firm.
Industries The sample is restricted to firms in manufacturing and agroindustry sec-
tors, which can be categorized into 12 industries: textiles and garments, food and
beverage, electronics, leather, chemicals and pharmaceutics, metals and machinery,
non-metallic and plastic materials, wood and furniture, papers, agroindustry, auto
and auto components, and other manufacturing.
2. Historical Cross-Country Technological Adoption (HCCTA) An unbalanced
panel data set with information on adoption decisions of about 104 technologies in
161 countries since 1800. As the focus is on the speed of technology diffusion, the U.S.
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data is truncated to a time before the intensity of technology usage becomes stable
or decreasing. To calculate technology usage lags, first compute the usage intensity
of a given technology in sampled countries at time t. Then, compare these numbers
with the historical U.S. time series to find the last time the U.S. had the same usage
intensity. If the usage intensity of the sampled countries is not exactly equal to the
intensity values observed in the U.S. time series, linear interpolation is employed to
get the result. However, it can be the case that the U.S. historical time series is not
long enough to obtain a rich observation of technology usage lags. To circumvent this
issue, the U.S. time series is initialized by setting the usage intensity observed in the
U.S. equal to 0 at the year of invention.
3. Chilean Annual Manufacturing Survey (ENIA) An unbalanced panel data set,
which is an annual manufacturing survey of Chilean firms with more than 10 employ-
ees collected by the National Statistics Institute of Chile (INE). The survey collects
firm-level information on sales, employment, raw materials and investments. Un-
like other manufacturing survey data, the Chilean Manufacturing Survey also collects
information on firm-level expenditures on licenses and foreign technical assistance,
which is used as a proxy for foreign technology usage intensity, along with the data on
imported inputs. All nominal variables are expressed in real terms using the deflator.
4. World Productivity Database (WPD) A data set provides the measure of TFP
computed relative to the TFP level of the United States for as many as 112 coun-
tries, from 1960 to 2000. The measurement method is a standard Cobb-Douglas, in
logarithmic form, with Hicks neutral technical change being assumed. The capital is
assumed to depreciate at 6 percent annually and labor is adjusted by schooling where
possible.
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A.2 Proofs for Propositions and Lemmas
A.2.1 Proposition 1
Proof for Proposition 1. First, show in Lemma A.2.1 that the distribution of new tech-
nology productivity is monotonic in λ in a first order stochastic dominance sense.
Lemma A.2.1. Denote Ψλ the distribution λΨh(∙)+(1−λ)Ψl(∙) and ψλ the density function
λψh(∙) + (1− λ)ψl(∙).
(i) If ψh and ψl satisfy MLRP with ψ
h(x1)
ψl(x1)
≥ ψh(x0)
ψl(x0)
for x0 < x1,
ψλ1 (x1)
ψλ2 (x1)
≥ ψλ1 (x0)ψλ2 (x0) for
λ1 > λ2.
(ii) If λ1 > λ2, Ψλ1 first order stochastically dominates Ψλ2 on the support [z
n, zn].
Proof for Lemma A.2.1 . For (i), ψ
λ1 (x)
ψλ2 (x)
= λ1ψ
h(x)+(1−λ1)ψl(x)
λ2ψh(x)+(1−λ2)ψl(x) =
λ1
ψh(x)
ψl(x)
+(1−λ1)
λ2
ψh(x)
ψl(x)
+(1−λ2)
. This
is increasing in ψ
h(x)
ψl(x)
. As ψ
h(x1)
ψl(x1)
≥ ψh(x0)
ψl(x0)
for x0 < x1,
ψλ1 (x1)
ψλ2 (x1)
≥ ψλ1 (x0)
ψλ2 (x0)
. For (ii), Ψh(∙)
first order stochastically dominates Ψl(∙) on the support [zn, zn] by assumption. Then,
Ψh(∙) ≤ Ψl(∙). Since λ1 > λ2, it follows that λ1Ψh(∙)+(1−λ1)Ψl(∙) ≤ λ2Ψh(∙)+(1−λ2)Ψl(∙)
for all zn ∈ [zn, zn].
First, to prove the first property of the interest rate schedule, fix loan size k. The
associated interest rate offered to a firm when the belief is λ is
{
i
∣∣∣∣ 1 + r = (1 + i)(1−Ψλ ( (1+i)kkα ))+ ξkα−1 ∫ (1+i)kkα0 zndΨλ(zn)
}
The solution to this problem is not necessary unique. If not, only the lowest offered interest
rate will be observed in equilibrium. This is because it is not optimal for a firm to choose
the contract that offers the same loan amount at a higher interest rate. The analysis is
restricted only in the region of nonnegative interest rates. Rewrite the expected zero profit
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condition as
(i− r) = Ψλ
(
(1 + i)k
kα
)(
(1 + i)− ξkα−1EΨλ
[
zn
∣∣∣∣0 ≤ zn ≤ (1 + i)kkα
])
. (A.1)
The first step is to show that the right-hand side is nonnegative and decreasing in λ. Let
g(i, λ) =
(
(1 + i)− ξkα−1EΨλ
[
zn
∣∣∣0 ≤ zn ≤ (1+i)kkα ]). ξkα−1EΨλ [zn ∣∣∣0 ≤ zn ≤ (1+i)kkα ] ≤
ξkα−1 (1+i)kkα = ξ(1+ i) implies that g(i, λ) ≥ 0 ∀i ≥ 0. As k > 0, it follows that Ψλ
(
(1+i)k
kα
)
is positive and increasing in i. Let m(i, λ) = Ψλ
(
(1+i)k
kα
)
g(i, λ), it is trivial to show that
m(i, λ) ≥ 0. From LEMMA A.2.1, the conditional distribution Ωλ(x) = ψ
λ(x)
Ψλ(
(1+i)k
kα
)
also
satisfies MLRP and FOSD. Thus, EΨλ
[
zn
∣∣∣0 ≤ zn ≤ (1+i)kkα ] is increasing in λ and g(i, λ) is
decreasing in λ. Because Ψλ
(
(1+i)k
kα
)
is decreasing in λ, m(i, λ) is decreasing in λ. Then,
let f(i) = i − r. It is trivial to show that f(i) is continuous and increasing in i, f(0) < 0,
and f(r) = 0.
Now, let h(i, λ) = m(i, λ) − f(i), then h(0, λ) > 0, and h(i, λ1) ≤ h(i, λ2) for λ1 > λ2.
There are two possible cases. First, consider the case where there exists i∗(λ) = min{i |
h(i, λ) = 0}. Then, for any λ′ < λ, h(i∗(λ), λ′) ≥ 0 and h(i, λ′) ≥ h(i, λ) > 0 ∀i < i∗(λ). By
continuity, i∗(λ′) ≥ i∗(λ). Second, consider the case where there does not exist a solution
to h(i, λ) = 0. The same argument can be applied. If a financial intermediary charges an
infinite interest rate to the λ-type firm, (which is equivalent to not issuing any loan contract
to that firm, they must charge infinite interest rate to the λ′-type firm for any λ′ < λ as
well. As a result, given loan size k,
min
{
i
∣∣∣∣∣(1 + i)k
(
1−Ψλ
(
(1 + i)k
kα
))
+ ξkα
∫ (1+i)k
kα
0
zndΨλ(zn) = (1 + r)
}
is nonincreasing in λ.
Second, to prove the second property of the interest rate schedule, fix a belief λ.
Let m(i, k) = Ψλ
(
(1+i)k
kα
)(
(1 + i)− ξkα−1EΨλ
[
zn
∣∣∣0 ≤ zn ≤ (1+i)kkα ]). Taking the partial
derivative, it can be shown that m(i, k) is increasing in k. Follow the same steps of proof
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with k as the variable of interest and λ treated as exogenous. The result shows that
min
{
i
∣∣∣∣(1 + i)k (1−Ψλ ( (1+i)kkα ))+ ξkα ∫ (1+i)kkα0 zndΨλ(zn) = (1 + r)} is nondecreasing in
k.
Third, to prove that the maximum loan size is increasing in λ, suppose kˉ(λ1) > kˉ(λ2)
for λ2 > λ1. The equilibrium interest rate is decreasing in λ for a given k and increasing in
k for a given λ. There exists k′ such that kˉ(λ1) > k′ > kˉ(λ2) and i(k′, λ2) < i(k′, λ1) < ∞
as the equilibrium interest rate is decreasing in λ given a given k. However, this implies
that i(k′, λ2) < i(kˉ(λ2), λ2) = ∞ where k′ > kˉ(λ2). This contradicts the fact that the
equilibrium interest rate is increasing in k for a given λ.
Lastly, to show the comparative statics with respect to ξ, it is sufficient to show that
the right-hand side of equation (A.1) is decreasing in ξ for given λ and k. This is trivial.
A.2.2 Proposition 2
Proof for Lemma 1
1. Proof for Lemma 1(i). It is straightforward that πo∗(zo, λ) is constant in λ.
πn(zn, k, i) is increasing in zn. From Lemma A.2.1, Ψλ1 first order stochastically
dominates Ψλ2 when λ1 > λ2. Then, EΨλ1 [π
n(zn, k, i)] ≥ EΨλ2 [πn(zn, k, i)]. Because
πn(zn, k, i) is decreasing in i, EΨλ [πn(zn, k, i)] is decreasing in i. From Proposition
1, if λ1 > λ2, Dn(zo, λ1) weakly dominates Dn(zo, λ2) in the sense that Dn(λ1) offers
the same set of k at a lower interest rate. Hence,
Eπn∗(zo, λ) = max
(k,i)∈Dn(zo,λ)
EΨλ [πn(zn, k, i)]
is nondecreasing in λ. Boundedness follows from the fact that zo and zn are bounded.
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2. Proof for Lemma 1(ii). Rewrite the firm’s problem by adding the state variable c
indicating the technology choice last period;
V (zo, λ, c) = max
e∈{0,1}
 (1− e) [π
o∗(zo, λ, c) + βEV (zo, Λ(λ, 0, zn), 0)]
+e [Eπn∗(zo, λ, c) + βEV (zo, Λ(λ, 1, zn), 1)]

where c = {0, 1}, πo∗(zo, λ, c) = πo∗(zo, λ) and Eπn∗(zo, λ, c) = Eπn∗(zo, λ).
EV (zo, Λ(λ, 1, zn), 1) =
∫
V (zo, Λ(λ, 1, zn))dΨλ(zn)
Let X ⊆ R+×[0, 1]×{0, 1} and B(X) represent a space of bounded function ϕ : X → R
with the sup-norm d. Let T : B(X) → B(X) be an operator
TV (zo, λ, c) = max
e∈{0,1}
 (1− e) [π
o∗(zo, λ, c) + βEV (zo, Λ(λ, 0, zn), 0)]
+e [Eπn∗(zo, λ, c) + βEV (zo, Λ(λ, 1, zn), 1)]

ϕ is bounded below by 0 and bounded above by the perpetuity value of profit from
the realization of zˉn. To guarantee that there is a unique solution to the recursive
equation, we show that ϕ satisfies Blackwell’s sufficient conditions for a contraction;
(a) (Monotonicity) Take ϕ1 ≥ ϕ2 for all (zo, λ, c) ∈ R+ × [0, 1] × {0, 1} . Then it is
trivial that Tϕ1(zo, λ, c) ≥ Tϕ2(zo, λ, c).
(b) (Discounting) For any function ϕ, a positive real number a > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1);
T (ϕ + a) = Tϕ + βa
3. Proof for Lemma 1(iii)-(iv). Given the recursive structure of the model, the proof
is to show that the limiting form of the value function is weakly increasing and convex
in the state variable, λ. The proof consists of two steps. The first step is to show,
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by induction, that the value function for the finite-horizon problem is weakly increas-
ing and convex. Then, the finite horizon problem is extended to the infinite horizon
problem.
Consider the T-period finite problem. Denote Vt(zo, λ) the value function in period t.
The value function for the last period T is VT (zo, λ) = max{πo∗(zo, λ),Eπn∗(zo, λ)}.
Eπn∗(zo, λ) is weakly increasing in λ by Lemma 1(i) and it is convex in λ by assump-
tion. Therefore, VT (zo, λ) is weakly increasing and convex in λ as it is the maximum of
a constant and a weakly increasing, convex function. Now, suppose Vt(zo, λ) is weakly
increasing and convex in the second argument. W ot−1(zo, λ) is a linear transformation
of Vt(zo, λ), so it is also weakly increasing and convex. To show that Wnt−1(zo, λ) is
weakly increasing and convex in the second argument, rewrite the continuation value
as Vt(zo, Λ(λ, 1, zn)). Denote
Ut(Λ(λ, 1, zn)) =
∫
Vt(zo, Λ(λ, 1, zn))dΨλ(zn) =
∫
Vt(zo, λ
ψh(zn)
ψλ
)ψλdzn.
From the monotone likelihood ratio property, Λ(λ, 1, zn) is increasing in zn. Because
Λ(λ, 1, zn) is increasing in λ, it follows from Lemma A.2.1 that Ut(Λ(λ, 1, zn)) is weakly
increasing. Moreover, by convexity of Vt;
∫
Ut(Λ(λ, 1, zn))ψλdzn ≥
∫
Vt(zo, λ)ψλdzn = Ut(
∫
Λ(λ, 1, zn)ψλdzn)
Wnt−1(zo, λ) is the summation of two weakly increasing, convex functions of λ. There-
fore, it possesses the properties of weak monotonicity and convexity. Vt−1(zo, λ) as
the maximum of two weakly increasing, convex functions is thus weakly increasing
and convex in the second argument. It follows that Vt(zo, λ) is weakly increasing and
convex for t = 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., T by induction. Denote Vˆ T (zo, λ) the value of T-period
finite problem. Vˆ T (zo, λ) is then weakly increasing and convex.
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To prove the monotonicity and convexity of the infinite-time problem, it is sufficient
to show that V (zo, λ) = limT→∞ Vˆ T (zo, λ) exists and is weakly increasing and convex.
Because the reward functions are bounded and β ∈ (0, 1), the sequence Vˆ t(zo, λ) is
Cauchy and hence converges to finite value V (zo, λ). Weak monotonicity and convex-
ity is preserved under pointwise convergence.
Proof for Proposition 2. This proof is done by considering the following 3 cases;
1. Suppose πo∗(zo, 0) < Eπn∗(zo, 0), then πo∗(zo, λ) < Eπn∗(zo, λ) ∀λ;
W o(zo, λ) = πo∗(zo, λ) + βV (zo, λ)
= πo∗(zo, λ) + βV
[
zo,
∫
λ
ψh(zn)
ψλ(zn)
dΨλ(zn)
]
< Eπn∗(zo, λ) + β
∫
V (zo, λ
ψh(zn)
ψλ(zn)
)ψλdzn
< W n(zo, λ) ∀λ.
where inequality comes from the facts that πo∗(zo, 0) < Eπn∗(zo, λ) by assumption
and V (zo, λ) ≤ ∫ V (zo, λψh(zn)
ψλ(zn)
)ψλdzn by Jensen’s inequality. Recall that V (∙) is a
convex function. In this case, λ(zo) = 0 and all firms with zo adopt new technology.
2. If πo∗(zo, 1) > Eπn∗(zo, 1), it is trivial that λ(zo) = 1. Firms with zo do not adopt
new technology.
3. Now considering the intermediate case: πo∗(zo, 0) > Eπn∗(zo, 0) and πo∗(zo, 1) <
Eπn∗(zo, 1).
W o(zo, 0) = πo∗(zo, 0) + βV (zo, 0) > Eπn∗(zo, 0) + βV (zo, 0) = Wn(zo, 0)
W o(zo, 1) = πo∗(zo, 1) + βV (zo, 1) < Eπn∗(zo, 1) + βV (zo, 1) = Wn(zo, 1)
As it has been shown that W o(zo, λ) and Wn(zo, λ) are increasing and convex in λ,
there exists λ(zo) such that W o(zo, λ) < W n(zo, λ) ∀λ ∈ [λ(zo), 1].
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Follow the proof by Copeland (2007), but adjusted for the infinite horizon case. Denote
D(zo, λ) = Wn(zo, λ) −W o(zo, λ), it is suffice to show that D(zo, λ) is increasing in
λ. Rewrite D(zo, λ) as
D(zo, λ) = β
[
Eπn∗(zo, λ) + βE
[
V (zo, λ′) | λ]− V (zo, λ)]
− β [πo∗(zo, λ) + (β − 1)E [V (zo, λ′) | λ]]
+ (1− β) [Eπn∗(zo, λ)− πo∗(zo, λ)] .
The last term is increasing in λ by Lemma 1(i). From Lemma 1(iii), E [V (zo, λ′) | λ]
is increasing in λ. The second term is then decreasing in λ. The first term is
W n(zo, λ) − V (zo, λ) which equals either 0 or β(Wn(zo, λ) − W o(zo, λ)). Hence,
D(zo, λ) is increasing in λ.
A.2.3 Proposition 3
Proof for Proposition 3. The proof is completed by showing that λ(zo) is decreasing in
ξ for all zo. As the focus is on the effect of ξ, all notations are expressed as a function
of ξ. From the equilibrium debt contract characterization (1.11), the interest rate charged
on a loan k is decreasing in ξ for a particular firm (zo, λ). This implies that Eπn∗(zo, λ, ξ)
and Wn(zo, λ, ξ) are increasing in ξ. Suppose ξ2 > ξ1. By solving λ(zo, ξ1) = max{λ |
Wn(zo, λ, ξ1) ≤ W o(zo, λ)} and λ(zo, ξ2) = max{λ | Wn(zo, λ, ξ2) ≤ W o(zo, λ)}, it follows
that λ(zo, ξ1) ≥ λ(zo, ξ2).
A.2.4 Proposition 4
Proof for Lemma 2. As the belief updating in this setting is a Markovian process,
E [λt | λt−1, λt−2, ...] = E [λt | λt−1]. If the true type is h, the expected belief next period is
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given by
E [λt | λt−1] =

∫
Λ(λt−1, 1, znt )dΨh(zn) if et = 1
λt−1 if et = 0
Thus, E [λt | λt−1] ≥ λt−1 and a sequence of beliefs (λ0, λ1, ...) is submartingale. Analo-
gously, if the true type is l, the expected belief next period is given by
E [λt | λt−1] =

∫
Λ(λt−1, 1, znt )dΨl(zn) if et = 1
λt−1 if et = 0
Thus, E [λt | λt−1] ≤ λt−1 and a sequence of beliefs (λ0, λ1, ...) is supermartingale.
Proof for Proposition 4. The convergence is trivial if λ0 = 1 or λ0 = 0. For λ0 ∈ (0, 1),
suppose a firm chooses to adopt only new technology, i.e., et = 1 ∀t. From Lemma 2
and Martingale Convergence Theorem, the posterior belief {λt} converges to a limit belief
almost surely as t →∞.
P0{λt → 0} = P1{λt → 1} = 1
However, when the firm can make its own technology choice, the model has two absorbing
states: λ = 1 and λ0 ≤ λ(zo). Let et be the technology choice at time t. Proposition 2
shows that, if the firm starts period 1 with (zo, λ0) where λ0 ≤ λ(zo), et = 0 and λt = λ0
∀t regardless of the realization path {znt }∞t=1. If the firm starts period 1 with (zo, λ0) where
λ0 ≥ λ(zo), the belief convergence will depend on the realization path {znt }∞t=1. Given
{znt }∞t=1, there are two possible outcomes. If {znt }∞t=1 induces the choice of et = 1 ∀t, λt → 1
a.s. Contrarily, if {znt }∞t=1 induces the choice of et = 0 ∀t ≥ T (Recall that eT−1 = 1 and
eT = 0, then et = 0 ∀t ≥ T ), λt → λT ∈ [0, λ(zo)].
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter2
B.1 Labor Reallocation During Trade Liberalization
Figure (21) shows the measure of cross-sector labor shifts around the trade liberalization
period for each income group: middle-income countries and low-income countries. The
measure of cross-sector labor shifts is calculated using the approach proposed by Wacziarg
and Wallack (2004). The first step is to compute the absolute value of changes in the share
Stsc of each sector s in total employment for country c in any given year t. Denote CH
t
sc(τ) =∣∣Stsc − St−τsc ∣∣ as the absolute value of changes in shares over τ years. To compute this, the
sectoral employment data are obtained from the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO), which provides the 3-digit data covering a maximum of 28 sectors.
The period t considered is 5 years before and after each country’s trade liberalization year.
For robustness, differences in shares over 2 years, 3 years, 4 years and 5 years are considered.
Then, the average value of a difference in shares over sectors CH tc(τ) is computed for each
country. To aggregate this measure for each group of countries, CH tc(τ) is normalized by
its average value over 11 years of the periods considered. Averaging over countries in each
income group yields the measure of cross-sector labor shifts of each group five years before
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and after the liberalization year. The average change in a sector’s share of employment
increases around the trade liberalization period in the group of low-income countries. This
result is robust for all choices of τ . The pattern, however, is not the case in middle-income
countries.
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Figure 21: Average X-Year Change in a Sector’s Share of Employment
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B.2 Exporters, Skills and Technology Upgrading: Firm-Level
Evidence
This section explores the effect of skill supply on domestic and exporting firms’ decisions.
Because the model focuses on skill-biased technology upgrading, firms’ technology usage
and skill intensity are particularly examined. Firm-level data are obtained from the World
Bank Enterprise Survey, which covers a broad range of topics with in-depth data of firm’s
characteristics, ownership structure, technology usage, foreign activities, skill intensity, and
productivity. In particular, the surveys collect information on technology adoption, assets,
liabilities, sales, raw materials, investments, export status and labor composition. xijc is
a variable of firm i in an industry j from country c. Skill intensityijc is defined as the
fraction of skilled labor, including professional, management and skilled production workers.
Technology upgradingijc is a binary variable which equals 1 if the firm uses technology
licensed from a foreign-owned company. Expijc is a dummy variable taking the value of 1
if the firm has its product sold in a foreign market. Skill supply is proxied by the fraction
of workers with at least a secondary level education (Secondaryc) and average years of
schooling (AvgSchY rc), obtained from Barro and Lee (2010). Firm controls include firms’
capital to labor ratio, size, ownership and sales. The regression specification controls for
industry-specific effects and country-specific effects using industry dummy variables and
GDP per capita.
The estimated coefficients reported in Table (28) confirm that human capital plays an
important role in determining the firm’s hiring decision and technology choice. As shown
in the left panel, firms in the country with the higher supply of skilled labor are more skill-
intensive. The effect of skill supply on firms’ skill intensity is also more prominent among
exporters. As the technology upgrading choice is a binary variable, the right panel shows
the results from the logit regression. Firms in the country with the higher supply of skilled
labor are more likely to adopt foreign technology. The effect is also larger among exporters.
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Table 28: Heterogeneous Firms-Skill Upgrading-Technology Upgrading
Skill intensityijc Technology upgradingijc
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Secondaryc -0.049 0.009∗∗
(0.030) (0.004)
Secondaryc × Expijc 0.294∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.005)
AvgSchY rc 1.061∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(0.265) (0.034)
AvgSchY rc × Expijc 0.648∗∗ 0.077∗∗
(0.349) (0.039)
Expijc −6.107∗∗∗ −3.916∗ 0.013 -0.101
(1.157) (2.223) (0.140) (0.264)
Firm Controls
√ √ √ √
Country Control
√ √ √ √
Industry Dummies
√ √ √ √
# Observations 11461 11461 10362 10362
R2 0.09 0.009 0.13 0.13
1 ∗significant at 10 %, ∗∗significant at 5 %, ∗∗∗significant at 1 %
2 Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey, Educational Attainment for Total Population,
1950-2010, Barro and Lee (2010)
This is not surprising, as the data also show that the firm’s technology upgrading choice is
positively related with its skill intensity.
In sum, firm-level data suggest that human capital affects firms’ decisions on skill
intensity and technology upgrading, with a larger effect on exporting firms. In the model,
this is due to the interaction between comparative advantage and skill-biased technology
upgrading.
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B.3 Proofs for Propositions and Lemmas
B.3.1 Two Large Countries
With two discrete technology choices, each firm’s profit can be separated into three
components: (1) profits earned from the domestic market with technology z0, π0dj , (2)
profits earned from the foreign market with technology z0, π0xj , and (3) profits earned from
upgrading technology to z1, πΔj :
π0dj =
ηjR
σ
[
ϕρPj
c0j
]σ−1
− fc0j (B.1)
π0xj =
ηjR
∗
σ
[
ϕρP ∗j
τjc0j
]σ−1
− fxc0j (B.2)
πΔj =
(
ηjR
σ
[
ϕρPj
c0j
]σ−1
+
ηjR
∗
σ
[
ϕρP ∗j
τjc0j
]σ−1)((
c0j
cΔj
)σ−1
− 1
)
− fΔc0j (B.3)
Proof for Lemma 3
Proof. First, consider the free trade equilibrium where there is neither a fixed cost of export
fx = 0 nor a trade cost τ = 1. The relative price indices are the same in both countries,
P frl
P frh
= P
∗,fr
l
P ∗,frh
, where the superscript fr indicates free trade.
Now, under autarky, the relative price index is
P autl
P auth
=
(
Ml
Mh
) 1
1−σ c0l
c0h

∫ ϕˉzl
ϕˉl
ϕσ−1μl(ϕ)dϕ +
∫∞
ϕˉzl
(
ϕc0l
cΔl
)σ−1
μl(ϕ)dϕ∫ ϕˉzh
ϕˉh
ϕσ−1μh(ϕ)dϕ +
∫∞
ϕˉzh
(
ϕc0h
cΔh
)σ−1
μh(ϕ)dϕ

1
1−σ
(B.4)
where the superscript aut indicates the autarky. Substitute for Mj = Rj/rˉj with Rj = ηjR
and equilibrium average revenue rˉj =
[∫ ϕˉzj
ϕˉj
ϕσ−1μj(ϕ)dϕ +
∫∞
ϕˉzj
(
ϕc0j
cΔj
)σ−1
μj(ϕ)dϕ
]
σfc0j
ϕˉσ−1j
.
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Then the relative price index can be expressed as
P autl
P auth
=
(
ηl
ηh
) 1
1−σ ϕˉh
ϕˉl
(
c0l
c0h
) σ
σ−1
, (B.5)
Using the Pareto distribution of inherited productivity, the free entry condition (2.11) and
the equilibrium relationship between productivity cutoffs (2.21) under autarky, the exit
cutoff can be derived:
ϕˉj =
 σ − 11 + k − σ 1feδ
f + f ( f
fΔ
) k+1−σ
σ−1
((
c0j
cΔj
)σ−1
− 1
) k
σ−1

1
k
. (B.6)
Because Home is a skill-scarce country, w
s
wu >
ws∗
wu∗ under autarky. Assumption 2 implies that(
c0l
c0h
) σ
σ−1
<
(
c∗0l
c∗0h
) σ
σ−1 and ϕˉhϕˉl <
ϕˉ∗h
ϕˉ∗l
. Therefore, in an autarkic equilibrium, P
aut
l
P auth
<
P ∗,autl
P ∗,auth
.
From (2.13), the price index in an open economy can be written as
Pj =
 Mj
(∫ ϕˉzj
ϕˉj
(
c0j
ϕρ
)1−σ
μj(ϕ)dϕ +
∫∞
ϕˉzj
(
cΔj
ϕρ
)1−σ
μj(ϕ)dϕ
)
+M∗j
(∫ ϕˉ∗zj
ϕˉ∗xj
(
τ∗j c
∗
0j
ϕρ
)1−σ
μ∗j (ϕ)dϕ +
∫∞
ϕˉ∗zj
(
τ∗j c
∗
Δj
ϕρ
)1−σ
μ∗j (ϕ)dϕ
)

1
1−σ
. (B.7)
As τ∗j , τj → ∞ and fx → ∞ for j = l, h, the relative price converges to its aurtarkic
value where P
aut
l
P auth
<
P ∗,autl
P ∗,auth
. As τ∗j , τj → 1 and fx → 0 for j = 1, 2, the relative price converges
to the free trade value where P
fr
l
P frh
= P
∗,fr
l
P ∗,frh
. For intermediate fixed and variable trade costs
where selection into export markets occurs, the relative price indices lie in between the
autarky values and the free trade values. Therefore, with costly trade, PlPh <
P ∗l
P ∗h
. Equation
(2.20) implies that Λxl < Λxh and Λ∗xl > Λ
∗
xh. The fraction of surviving firms that export
is 1−G(ϕˉxj)1−G(ϕˉj) =
(
ϕˉxj
ϕˉj
)−k
= Λ−kxj , so
1−G(ϕˉxl)
1−G(ϕˉl) >
1−G(ϕˉxh)
1−G(ϕˉh) and
1−G(ϕˉ∗xh)
1−G(ϕˉ∗h) >
1−G(ϕˉ∗xl)
1−G(ϕˉ∗l ) .
Proof for Proposition 5 and 7
Following from equation (2.21), an equilibrium relationship between the technology
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cutoff and the exit cutoff under autarky is
ϕˉautzj
ϕˉautj
=
[
f
fΔ
((
c0j
cΔj
)σ−1
− 1
)] 1
1−σ
. (B.8)
Under costly trade, this equilibrium relationship becomes
ϕˉzj
ϕˉj
=
 ffΔ
((
c0j
cΔj
)σ−1
− 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect Effect
+
fxΛ1−σxj
fΔ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct Effect
((
c0j
cΔj
)σ−1
− 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect Effect

1
1−σ
. (B.9)
As stated before, the direct effect is the effect of trade opening with the skill premium held
fixed. The indirect effect is the impact through a change in the skill premium following
trade opening.
1. Proof for Proposition 5
Proof. In autarky, τj = ∞, which implies Λxj = ∞. Λxj becomes finite in an open
economy. From equation (B.8) and (B.9), ϕˉzjϕˉj <
ϕˉautzj
ϕˉautj
for all j. Denote %Δ ϕˉzjϕˉj =(
ϕˉzj
ϕˉj
ϕˉautj
ϕˉautzj
)
− 1. Because Λxl < Λxh and Λ∗xl > Λ∗xh, it follows that %Δ ϕˉzlϕˉl < %Δ
ϕˉzh
ϕˉh
and %Δ ϕˉ
∗
zh
ϕˉ∗h
< %Δ ϕˉ
∗
zl
ϕˉ∗l
.
2. Proof for Proposition 7
Proof. Consider first the specialization channel. The skill premium under an open
economy lies between the two countries’ autarkic values. It converges in each coun-
try to the autarkic value as trade costs become infinite and converges to the free
trade value as trade costs approach 0. Because w
s
wu >
ws∗
wu∗ under autarky, the skill
premium rises in Foreign and falls in Home after trade opening. By Assumption 2,
%Δ
(
c0h
cΔh
)σ−1
> %Δ
(
c0l
cΔl
)σ−1
> 0 and %Δ
(
c∗0h
c∗Δh
)σ−1
< %Δ
(
c∗0l
c∗Δl
)σ−1
< 0, where
%Δ is a percentage change when the country moves from autarky to costly trade.
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Therefore, %Δ ϕˉzjϕˉj =
[(
1 +
fxΛ
1−σ
xj
f
)
%Δ
(
c0j
cΔj
)σ−1] 11−σ − 1. This implies that the in-
direct effect of trade through the specialization channel is %Δ ϕˉzjϕˉj < 0 and %Δ
ϕˉ∗zj
ϕˉ∗j
> 0
for j = 1, 2. To show the indirect effect of trade through the skill-biased technical
change channel, it is sufficient to show that the direct effect of trade on firms’ tech-
nology choice increases the skill premium. Following the same argument, %Δ ϕˉzjϕˉj < 0
and %Δ
ϕˉ∗zj
ϕˉ∗j
< 0 for j = 1, 2.
Proof for Proposition 6 and 8
Using the Pareto distribution of inherited productivity, the free entry condition (2.11)
and the equilibrium relationship between productivity cutoffs (2.21), the exit cutoff under
autarky is given by
ϕˉautj =
 1feδ σ − 11 + k − σ
f + fΔ( f
fΔ
) k
σ−1
((
c0j
cΔj
)σ−1
− 1
) k
σ−1

1
k
. (B.10)
Once the economy opens to trade, the exit cutoff becomes
ϕˉj =
{
1
feδ
σ − 1
1 + k − σ
[
f + fxΛ−kxj + fΔ
[
f+fxΛxj
1−σ
fΔ
((
c0j
cΔj
)σ−1 − 1)] kσ−1
]} 1
k
. (B.11)
1. Proof for Proposition 6
Proof. (ϕˉautj )
k is determined by two terms: f and fΔ
(
f
fΔ
) k
σ−1
((
c0j
cΔj
)σ−1 − 1) kσ−1 .
Under costly trade, Λxj becomes finite and the exit cutoffs rise in both industries.
The first term becomes f + fxΛ−kxj , while the second term becomes
fΔ
[
f + fxΛxj1−σ
fΔ
((
c0j
cΔj
)σ−1
− 1
)] k
σ−1
.
Because Λxl < Λxh and Λ∗xl > Λ
∗
xh, a percentage increase in both terms is larger in
a country’s comparative advantage industry. It follows that %Δϕˉl > %Δϕˉh > 0 and
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%Δϕˉ∗h > %Δϕˉ
∗
l > 0.
2. Proof for Proposition 8
Proof. As shown in the proof of Proposition 7, through the specialization channel,
the skill premium rises in Foreign and falls in Home after trade opening. Following
the same step as in the proof for Proposition 7, it can be shown that the indirect
effect of trade through the specialization channel is %Δϕˉj > 0 and %Δϕˉ∗j < 0 for
j = 1, 2. Similarly, through the skill-biased technical change channel, %Δϕˉj < 0 and
%Δϕˉ∗j < 0 for j = 1, 2.
Proof for Proposition 9
Proof. In this analytical setting, industrial productivity is governed by two productivity
cutoffs: ϕˉzj and ϕˉj :
Φj =
∫ ϕˉzj
ϕˉj
ϕμj(ϕ)dϕ + eγ
u
j Δ
 βj1−βj (wswu )1−α exp(α−1)(γsj−γuj )Δ +1
βj
1−βj
(
ws
wu
)1−α exp(α−1)2(γsj−γuj )Δ/α +1
 αα−1 ∫ ∞
ϕˉzj
ϕμj(ϕ)dϕ
(B.12)
1. By the labor market clearing condition, the relative supply of skilled labor must equal
the relative demand for skilled labor,
S
U
=
S′h
U ′h
Ml
Mh
S′l
S′h
+ 1
Ml
Mh
U ′l
U ′h
+ 1
(B.13)
where S′j and U
′
j are aggregate demands for skilled and unskilled labor from firms
of mass 1, respectively. If the specialization channel dominates, a larger fraction of
firms upgrade their technology following a reduction in trade cost. The skill-biased
technical change implies that ShUh increases. Because
Sl
Sh
< UlUh ,
Ml
Mh
must increase so
that the relative demand equals the relative supply, which is fixed at the autarky level.
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2. Following from Propositions 5-8, the direct effect of trade, combined with the indirect
effect through the specialization channel, not only raises the exit cutoffs but also brings
the technology cutoffs closer to the exit cutoffs in Home. Thus, it has a positive effect
on industrial productivity.
B.3.2 Small Open Economy
Proof. Given that P
aut
l
P auth
<
P ∗l
P ∗h
and P ∗j remains unchanged, to prove that the results from
Lemma 3 remain valid for Home as a small open economy, it is sufficient to show that
Pl
Ph
<
P ∗l
P ∗h
after trade opening. The price index in a small open economy can also be written
as in equation (B.7).
As τ∗j → ∞ and fx → ∞ for j = 1, 2, the relative price converges to P
aut
l
P auth
<
P ∗l
P ∗h
. As
τ∗j → 1 and fx → 0 for j = 1, 2, the relative price PlPh →
P ∗l
P ∗h
. Therefore, when a small open
economy moves from autarky to costly trade, the relative price index is such that PlPh <
P ∗l
P ∗h
.
Following the same proof, it can be shown that Λxl < Λxh and the results from Proposition
1 remain valid for Home.
The proof for Propositions 5-8 relies upon the results from Lemma 3, i.e., Λxl < Λxh and
Pl
Ph
<
P ∗l
P ∗h
. The difference in the relative price index, together with w
s,aut
wu,aut >
ws∗
wu∗ , creates the
similar specialization pattern, which moves labor toward a country’s comparative advantage
industry. The direct effect analysis for Home remains valid in the small open economy case.
Likewise, under the small open economy assumptions, the specialization channel and the
skill-biased technical change channel shift the skill premium in the same way as in the
asymmetric two-country case. Therefore, the indirect effect analysis for Home can also be
carried over to the small open economy case. It is obvious that Proposition 9 still holds
under the small open economy assumptions, as the proof rests only on the results of Lemma
3 and Propositions 5-8.
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B.4 Indonesian Manufacturing
B.4.1 Industry Classification
Table (29) reports the classification of manufacturing industries into a high-tech indus-
try and a low-tech industry, the definitions used in the model.
Table 29: Classification of Manufacturing Industries
ISIC Rev 2 Industry Skill Intensity OECD Category
(NBER-CES) classification
311-312 Food Products 0.25 Low-Tech Low-Tech
313 Beverage 0.39 Low-Tech High-Tech
314 Tobacco 0.27 Low-Tech High-Tech
321 Textiles 0.16 Low-Tech Low-Tech
322 Wearing apparel 0.20 Low-Tech Low-Tech
323 Leather Products 0.21 Low-Tech Low-Tech
324 Footwear 0.17 Low-Tech Low-Tech
331 Wood Products 0.18 Low-Tech Low-Tech
332 Furniture 0.22 Low-Tech Low-Tech
341 Paper and Products 0.22 Low-Tech Low-Tech
342 Printing and Publishing 0.34 Low-Tech High-Tech
351 Industrial Chemicals 0.40 Med-High-Tech High-Tech
352 Other Chemicals 0.36 Med-High-Tech High-Tech
353 Petroleum Refineries 0.30 Med-Low-Tech High-Tech
354 Miscellaneous Petroleum/Coal 0.37 Med-Low-Tech High-Tech
355 Rubber Products 0.22 Med-Low-Tech Low-Tech
356 Plastic Products 0.23 Med-Low-Tech Low-Tech
361 Pottery, China, Earthenware 0.20 Med-Low-Tech Low-Tech
362 Glass and Products 0.18 Med-Low-Tech Low-Tech
369 Non-Metallic Mineral Products 0.26 Med-Low-Tech High-Tech
371 Iron and Steel 0.21 Med-Low-Tech Low-Tech
372 Non-ferrous Metals 0.23 Med-Low-Tech Low-Tech
381 Fabricated Metal Products 0.27 Med-Low-Tech High-Tech
382 Machinery, Except Electrical 0.38 Med-High-Tech High-Tech
383 Electric Machinery 0.38 Med-High-Tech High-Tech
384 Transport Equipment 0.34 Med-High-Tech High-Tech
385† Professional/Scientific Equipment 0.46 Med-High-Tech -
† Firms from ISIC 385 are dropped from the analysis. Most of them are foreign owned, with a large percentage
of capital owned by foreign. They are highly technology intensive and skill intensive.
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B.4.2 Estimation Results of Exporter Premia
Table (30) shows the estimation results by pooling observations from all subperiods for
low-tech and high-tech industries. Different subperiods are captured by dummy variables:
1{year ≥ 1995} and 1{year ≥ 2000}. Changes in exporter premia can then be directly
observed from the coefficients of interaction terms.
Table 30: Estimates of Exporter Premia for Different Subperiods
Low-Tech Industry High-Tech Industry
Skill Intensity Productivity Skill Intensity Productivity
Exp 0.004∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.011) (0.003) (0.032)
1{year ≥ 1995} −0.014∗∗∗ −0.165∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ −0.208∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.016) (0.004) (0.035)
1{year ≥ 2000} 0.111∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.016) (0.004) (0.035)
1{year ≥ 1995} × Exp -0.002 0.058∗∗∗ -0.007 0.069
(0.002) (0.016) (0.005) (0.045)
1{year ≥ 2000} × Exp −0.004∗∗ −0.142∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.107∗∗
(0.002) (0.016) (0.007) (0.047)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √
ISIC Rev 2 Dummies
√ √ √ √
# Observations 183,040 137,677 61,327 42,624
R2 0.83 0.05 0.91 0.17
1 ∗significant at 10 %, ∗∗significant at 5 %, ∗∗∗significant at 1 %
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter3
C.1 Corporate Income Tax Rates in OECD Countries
Figure (22) shows that the current U.S. tax system taxes corporate income at a statu-
tory rate of 35%, the highest rate among the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) nations. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD), however, face an average rate of 25%. Even corporations in high-tax
European countries such as Belgium (34 %), France (34 %), and Sweden (22 %) face lower
statutory rates than those in the United States.
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Source: OECD Tax Database
Figure 22: Central Government Statutory (Flat or Top Marginal) Corporate Income Tax
Rate by OECD Nation, 2013
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C.2 Ranking of Lobbying Issues Based on Expenditures
Table (31) lists the top ten lobbying issues by lobbying firms in the Compustat database,
according to proportions of lobby expenditure for specific issues. Ranking is based on the
matched data set before the sample selection. Because there can be multiple issues for
a single bill, we discount each lobbying expenditure by dividing the total amount by the
number of issues reported in each bill. During 1998-2011, taxation issues stay at the top for
every single year except 2009, when the health care reform places health issues at the top.
Table 31: Top 10 Lobbying Issues Based on Aggregate Expenditures
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX HCR TAX TAX
TRD TRD TRD TRD TRD DEF BUD BUD BUD ENG ENG MMM ENG ENG
BUD HCR HCR HCR HCR TRD HCR HCR TRD HCR HCR PHA HCR BUD
DEF TEC TEC TEC DEF HCR DEF TRD HCR TRD TRD TAX FIN ENV
ENV DEF DEF DEF ENG BUD TRD DEF ENG BUD BUD ENG BUD HCR
TEC ENV BUD BUD BUD TEC TEC TEC DEF CPT DEF BUD ENV TRA
HCR BUD ENV ENG TEC ENG ENG ENG TEC DEF ENV ENV DEF FIN
TRA UTI ENG ENV MMM MMM MMM MMM CPT MMM CPT TRD TRD TRD
ENG ENG LBR AVI ENV FIN TOR TRA MMM TEC MMM FIN CPT CPT
UTI LBR TRA TRA FIN TOR FIN FIN RET FIN TEC CPT MMM SCI
1 See Table (34) for an explanation of abbreviation.
C.3 Data Source and Sample Selection
As explained in the main text, we link lobby data and data on firm characteristics
from Compustat for the period of 1998–2011. We focus on lobby data on tax issues only
and keep i) firm-year observations that have non-negative pre-tax income; ii) firms that
are incorporated (or legally registered) in the U.S.; and iii) non-financial firms. Then, we
further refine data by dropping extreme and missing values for variables considered in the
regression. After selection, there are 28,710 firm-year observations, giving on average 2,050
firms each year. It is an unbalanced panel. Nominal variables are deflated by the GDP
deflator so that they are in dollars in 1998.
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Each company’s effective tax rate is computed using data from Compustat as:
ETR =
Income Taxes Total −Deferred Taxes
Pre Tax Income − Equity in Earnings − Special Items + Interest Expense . (C.1)
Marginal product of capital is computed using data from Compustat as:
mpk =
SALE
Property, Plant and Equipment - Total (Gross)
.
C.4 List of Variables
Table (32) provides details and sources of all variables used in the empirical analysis.
Table (33) presents the variables used as regressors in this exercise and their Compustat
codes.
Table 32: Variable Sources
Code Variable description Source
ETR related variables
TXT Income Taxes – Total Compustat
TXFO Income Taxes – Foreign Compustat
TXDI Income Taxes – Deferred Compustat
TXDFO Deferred Taxes – Foreign Compustat
PI Pretax Income Compustat
PIDOM Pretax Income Domestic Compustat
PIFO Pretax Income Foreign Compustat
ESUB Equity in Earnings – Unconsolidated Subsidiaries Compustat
SPI Special Items Compustat
XINT Interest and Related Expense Compustat
TXPD Income Taxes Paid Compustat
Other variables
AT Assets – Total Compustat
PPEGT Property, Plant and Equipment – Total (Gross) Compustat
DLTT Long – Term Debt – Total Compustat
INVT Inventories – Total Compustat
XRD Research and Development Expense Compustat
SALE Sales/Turnover (Net) Compustat
LT Liabilities – Total Compustat
FCA Foreign Exchange Income (Loss) Compustat
EMP Employees Compustat
Deflator
GDPDEF Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator FRED
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Table 33: Variable Definitions
Variable name Variable description Calculation
def GDP deflator -
ETRt Effective tax rate at t See equation (C.1)
if lob t Indicator variable takes one when firm lobbies -
lob t Lobby expenditure in million dollar (in 1998) -
loglob t Natural logarithm of lobt log(lobt + 1)
cap int Deflated capital over workers (ppegt/emp/def) ppegt/emp/def
inv int Deflated inventories over workers (invt/emp/def) invt/emp/def
rnd int Deflated R&D over workers (xrd/emp/def) xrd/emp/def
size at Log transformation of deflated total assets log(at/def + 1)
lev Leverage (liabilities divided by total assets) lt/at
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C.5 List of Lobbying Issues
Table 34: List of Lobbying Issues
Abbreviation Full description Abbreviation Full description
ACC Accounting CSP Consumer Issues/Safety/Protection
HOM Homeland Security RET Retirement
ADV Advertising CON Constitution
HOU Housing ROD Roads/Highway
AER Aerospace CPT Copyright/Patent/Trademark
IMM Immigration SCI Science/Technology
AGR Agriculture DEF Defense
IND Indian/Native American Affairs SMB Small Business
ALC Alcohol & Drug Abuse DOC District of Columbia
INS Insurance SPO Sports/Athletics
ANI Animals DIS Disaster Planning/Emergencies
INT Intelligence and Surveillance TAR Miscellaneous Tariff Bills
APP Apparel/Clothing Industry/Textiles ECN Economics/Economic Development
LBR Labor Issues/Antitrust/Workplace TAX Taxation/Internal Revenue Code
ART Arts/Entertainment EDU Education
LAW Law Enforcement/Crime/Criminal Justice TEC Telecommunications
AUT Automotive Industry ENG Energy/Nuclear
MAN Manufacturing TOB Tobacco
AVI Aviation/Aircraft/Airlines ENV Environmental/Superfund
MAR Marine/Maritime/Boating/Fisheries TOR Torts
BAN Banking FAM Family Issues/Abortion/Adoption
MIA Media (Information/Publishing) TRD Trade (Domestic & Foreign)
BNK Bankruptcy FIR Firearms/Guns/Ammunition
MED Medical/Disease Research/Clinical Labs TRA Transportation
BEV Beverage Industry FIN Financial Institutions/Investments/Securities
MMM Medicare/Medicaid TOU Travel/Tourism
BUD Budget/Appropriations FOO Food Industry (Safety, Labeling, etc.)
MON Minting/Money/Gold Standard TRU Trucking/Shipping
CHM Chemicals/Chemical Industry FOR Foreign Relations
NAT Natural Resources URB Urban Development/Municipalities
CIV Civil Rights/Civil Liberties FUE Fuel/Gas/Oil
PHA Pharmacy UNM Unemployment
CAW Clean Air & Water (Quality) GAM Gaming/Gambling/Casino
POS Postal UTI Utilities
CDT Commodities (Big Ticket) GOV Government Issues
RRR Railroads VET Veterans
COM Communications/Broadcasting/Radio/TV HCR Health Issues
RES Real Estate/Land Use/Conservation WAS Waste (hazardous/solid/interstate/nuclear)
CPI Computer Industry WEL Welfare
REL Religion
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